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ABSTRACT

Powerhouse Chihuahua:
Electricity, Water, and the State in the Long Mexican Revolution
by
Jonathan M. Hill Jr.

Advisor: Herman L. Bennett

State formation has for decades been a major analytical focus for historians of Mexico,
especially during the armed Mexican Revolution (1910–20) and the “long” political and social
revolution which continued for decades thereafter. Since the 1980s, the cultural turn in the
humanities has produced groundbreaking works in the field and introduced a model of state
formation framed around hegemony, subaltern agency, and the nation. While these reflect
prevailing approaches, this dissertation joins more recent interdisciplinary work on Mexico in
conversation with a ‘material turn’ in the humanities and social sciences. Focusing on the policy
debates and infrastructural networks which attended state formation in Chihuahua in the long
Revolution, this dissertation brings the subfield of Mexican state formation into conversation
with Sociology, Environmental History, and Science and Technology Studies (STS), among
others. It explores the little-known history of one of the earliest hydroelectric systems in Mexico,
which was built in Chihuahua by Canadian promoters in the waning years of the dictatorship of
Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911). Drawing on archival documents from relevant federal ministries,
private papers, and contemporary engineering literature, this dissertation describes the deliberate
and gradual integration of this private energy system into the circuitry of the growing Mexican
state. It identifies severe drought in the late 1920s as a major inflection point in this process,
since it invited greater federal oversight over water use and set this hydropower system on two
related but divergent developmental paths. The first of these was state-led irrigation, which has
been explored by Mexican water historian Luis Aboites, and which would come to define the
Conchos River basin. The second was private electrical provision, explored here for the first
time, which was forced by the 1930s to evolve away from its foundations in hydropower.
“Powerhouse Chihuahua” demonstrates the utility of infrastructure in reassessing state formation
in Mexico, while also proposing productive avenues for exploring the deep and wide
entanglement of foreign capital and state formation in Mexico and throughout Latin America.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1917, a major hydroelectric project in northern Mexico drew the attention of engineers
across the globe. Through the construction of a dam known as La Boquilla, engineers created a
reservoir stretching nearly 20 miles through the highland deserts of Chihuahua, inaugurating a
phase of dramatic environmental and social transformation in this arid border state. With federal
permission, Canadian hydroelectric promoters created this valuable reserve of water by damming
the Conchos River at a narrow canyon mouth, from which the dam drew its name.1 There, water
dropped more than 200 feet, generating up to 40 thousand horsepower of cheap and renewable
power for nearby mining interests. After a series of dry years, a rainy autumn in 1917 finally
filled this reservoir for the first time since its completion two years earlier, allowing hydropower
to be generated. Dubbed Lake Toronto, this artificial reservoir ranked for at least a decade as the
largest in the world, while La Boquilla rivaled the most advanced dams under construction in the
United States.2 What really set this project apart, however, was its completion in the middle of a
revolutionary battlefield.

1

The Conchos is the main tributary of the Rio Grande, known in Mexico as the Río Bravo del Norte, which
forms the international border between Texas and the Mexican states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and
Tamaulipas. The Conchos flows entirely within Chihuahua, and joins the Rio Grande at Presidio-Ojinaga.
2

David P. Billington, Donald C. Jackson, and Martin V. Melosi, The History of Large Federal Dams:
Planning, Design, and Construction in the Era of Big Dams (Denver: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2005), 91. La
Boquilla was built at about the same time as two of the earliest projects of the US Bureau of Reclamation: the
Theodore Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River in Arizona (1903–11) and the Elephant Butte Dam on the Rio Grande in
New Mexico (1911–16). While both dams stood taller than La Boquilla (just over 200 feet), neither impounded as
much water (around 3 billion cubic meters). And unlike La Boquilla, these dams were intended primarily for
irrigation, and not initially equipped for hydroelectric generation.

1

The northern borderlands served as a major theater of war during the Mexican Revolution
(1910–20), and the work site experienced regular guerrilla attacks after 1915.3 But the Compañía
Agrícola y de Fuerza Eléctrica del Río Conchos (CAFERC), the Canadian-Mexican company
which built La Boquilla, also faced pressures from state actors.4 As the waters of the Conchos
slowly pooled in Lake Toronto, a major sociopolitical project was also underway: the new
Constitution of 1917. When this document was ratified, it signaled a revolutionary change in the
relationship between the Mexican state and the natural environment, threatening Canadian

3

The literature on the Revolution is vast, dominating the historiography of Mexico. For a review of the
debates surrounding the Mexican Revolution, see Gilbert M. Joseph and Jürgen Buchenau, Mexico’s Once and
Future Revolution: Social Upheaval and the Challenge of Rule since the Late Nineteenth Century (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2013), 1–14. See also, among others, Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, Everyday Forms of
State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press,
1994); Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, Volume 1: Porfirians, Liberals, and Peasants (University of Nebraska
Press, 1990); Friedrich Katz, “Origins, Outbreak, and Initial Phase of the Mexican Revolution of 1910,” in The
Secret War in Mexico (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 3–35; John Womack, Zapata and the Mexican
Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1970); John Mason Hart, Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the
Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). While the debates surrounding the Revolution
are varied, they might be generally summarized in reference to two interrelated problems – the proper periodization
and the real impact of the Revolution. The traditional periodization relates to the period of armed conflict between
1910 and 1920, but there were regional and local conflicts before and after these dates. In addition, the state party
created in 1929 (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, PNR) cast itself as the guarantor of the ongoing Revolution, and
oversaw through the relatively powerful Mexican executive office significant political and social changes in
subsequent decades, although the extent to which such changes were “revolutionary” in the post-WWII era is a
source of ongoing debate. This points to the second problem – the extent to which the Revolution produced any
“revolutionary” changes within Mexico’s many cultural, social, geographical, political spheres. Whether this state
was very different from its predecessor, or simply represented a bureaucratic reshuffling of an enduring system
rooted in exclusion, patronage, and graft, remains a source of ongoing debate.
4

Despite its Spanish name, this company was a foreign concern which built, owned, and operated La
Boquilla until its acquisition by General Electric affiliates in 1929. Founded by hydroelectric promoters at the banks
of Montreal and Toronto, the CAFERC was a free-standing company of the Mexican Northern Power Company
(MNPC), which was established in Canada under a virtually identical board of directors. The phenomenon of the
free-standing company as a vehicle of foreign utilities promotion is explored in William J Hausman, Peter Hertner,
and Mira Wilkins, Global Electrification: Multinational Enterprise and International Finance in the History of
Light and Power, 1878-2007 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). On the free standing company and
foreign electrification in Mexico, see Reinhard Liehr and Mariano Enrique Torres Bautista, “Las compañías
eléctricas extranjeras y la modernización urbana e industrial de México, 1880-1960,” in Las compañías eléctricas
extranjeras en México, 1880-1960, ed. Mariano Enrique Torres Bautista and Reinhard Liehr (Puebla: Benemérita
Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 2010), 17–66.

2

control of Lake Toronto before it had even filled. While La Boquilla was conceived in the last
years of Porfirian modernization, an era driven by foreign investment and concessionary
resource policies, it was born into a revolution which threatened its very existence.5 When
concessionaires had pitched La Boquilla to federal regulators, they described it as a “fountain of
wealth” for Chihuahua and the modernizing Mexican state. By the time the dam was completed
in the midst of a national revolution, it was unclear who would ultimately profit from this
fountain, or on what terms.6
Conventional narratives of Chihuahua in the early 1920s paint a portrait of devastation,
statelessness, and anti-Yankee fervor. While such characterizations are broadly accurate,
processes of development in post-Revolution Chihuahua were particular and uneven, defying
broad categorization. Most agricultural, commercial, and industrial interests in the state were
indeed damaged by war. But newly-electrified mines returned to production almost immediately.
Through the early 1920s, Chihuahua experienced a boom in silver, lead, and zinc mining which
reached global markets and buoyed the distant federal government in Mexico City with growing
revenue streams. Within a few years, all major mining and mineral processing facilities in
Chihuahua south of the capital were powered by hydroelectricity from La Boquilla, even as the
industry lagged elsewhere in Mexico. The dam had indeed become a fountain of wealth for

5

Porfirio Díaz held the Mexican presidency through various political manipulations between 1876 and
1911 – a period known as the Porfiriato. This era was marked by order and progress: domestic stability, economic
prosperity, and intensive modernization projects fueled largely through foreign investment from North America and
Europe. However, very few profited from this system, making violence and political repression central features of
the Porfirian project. When the Revolution erupted in 1910, it was fueled by the complains of two broad groups:
upwardly mobile middle classes, who felt excluded from political and economic participation, as well as popular
classes, who continued to suffer from poverty, landlessness, and a near-total exclusion from civic life.
6

Archivo Histórico de Agua (AHA), fondo Aguas Nacionales (AN), caja 115, exp. 1097, leg. 165, f. 19.
This term appeared first in company proposals to federal ministers.

3

Mexico City, but also for Guggenheim-owned mining interests and utilities promoters at the
banks of Toronto and Montreal. This complicated entanglement of public and private interests in
implementing state-led development in Chihuahua tells a story about Mexican state formation
which departs from conventional narratives and highlights the transnational elements of this
ostensibly national process.
A growing tension between these different interests became evident in the early 1920s.
Owing to the irregular flow of the Conchos, which threatened both electrical and agricultural
production, federal, regional, and company officials began to debate the best use of scarce
national waters. From that moment of environmental inflection, competing hydraulic and electric
development schemes began to diverge, even while all parties were forced to cooperate in the
short term. While the 1920s marked a mining bonanza in Chihuahua, driven by hydropower, it
also witnessed a growing interest by Mexican officials and engineers in integrating La Boquilla
into federal irrigation projects in the service of national agrarian reform, a major revolutionary
priority.7

7
As a source of major and ongoing historical debate, the question of agrarian reform has produced a
correspondingly vast historiography. Among many others, see Marı́a Vargas-Lobsinger, La comarca lagunera: de la
revolución a la expropiación de las haciendas, 1910-1940 (México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México, 2010); John Joseph Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute: The Expropriation of American-Owned Rural Land in
Postrevolutionary Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Jesús Carlos Morett Sánchez, Reforma agraria:
del latifundio al neoliberalismo (México, D.F.: Plaza Valdés, 2003); Ben Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised: The
Failure of Reform in Postrevolutionary Yucatán (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); Laura Randall, ed.,
Reforming Mexico’s Agrarian Reform (Armonk, NY.: M.E. Sharpe Publishers, 1996); John Gledhill, Casi Nada: A
Study of Agrarian Reform in the Homeland of Cardenismo (Albany: State University of New York, 1991); Antonio
García de León, Enrique Semo, and Julio Moguel, eds., Historia de la cuestión agraria mexicana, 9 vols. (México,
D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 1990); Susan R. Walsh Sanderson, Land Reform in Mexico: 1910-1980 (Orlando: Academic
Press, 1984); Jesús Silva Herzog, ed., El agrarismo mexicano y la reforma agraria: exposición crítica (México:
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1985); Eyler N. Simpson, The Ejido: Mexico’s Way Out (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1937).

4

After some initial failures, a major institutional reorganization by president Plutarco Elías
Calles (1924–28) finally allowed a resurgent Mexican state to act directly in Chihuahua, where
he implemented a large-scale program of “revolutionary irrigation.”8 But this project was not
executed merely via federal fiat in Chihuahua, as some previous scholarship might suggest. New
archival research related to the administration of La Boquilla shows that Mexican engineers and
bureaucrats succeeded in gradually “reprogramming” the dam for use in this irrigation campaign
through a series of contract renegotiations and new concessions. La Boquilla and its auxiliary
works were subsequently acquired by General Electric affiliates, marking the end of Canadian
hydropower development in the region, as well as the de facto state recapture of the waters of the
Conchos for use in irrigation.9 From the 1930s onward, electrical expansion in Chihuahua was
financed and managed privately, with little reliance on hydropower, while La Boquilla became
the foundation of the sprawling federal irrigation district 5 in Delicias, Chihuahua.
The development of La Boquilla and Lake Toronto has not been the focus of any
monographic work in English or Spanish, despite their clear technological and social importance.
This appears partly due to the challenges these constructions pose to prevailing national
paradigms of revolution, destruction, and recovery. Chihuahua played a unique role in Mexican

8
The term “revolutionary irrigation” was coined by Luis Aboites, a Chihuahua native and scholar of water
history in Mexico. Discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5, “revolutionary irrigation” refers to the gradualist,
market-driven, and smallholding program of state-led irrigation implemented by president Plutarco Elías Calles
(1924–28), as contrasted to the centralized and collectivist approach of later president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40).
See Luis Aboites Aguilar, La irrigación revolucionaria: historia del sistema nacional de riego del Río Conchos,
Chihuahua, 1927–1938 (México, D.F.: CIESAS, 1988).
9
This was the American and Foreign Power Company (AFP), a subsidiary of the Electric Bond and Share
Company (EBASCO). EBASCO had itself been created as a holding company in 1905 to manage the ballooning
portfolio of utilities assets acquired by General Electric, but later came under the scrutiny of federal antitrust
regulators during the Great Depression. AFP acquired electrical interests in Mexico and across Latin America
through much of the late 1920s, retaining most of these until nationalization in 1960. Considering that many vital
industries were nationalized during the populist presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40), the reasons for the
relatively late nationalization of the electrical industry have yet to be explained, and merit further research.

5

development during the 1920s, a fact which is not diminished by the central role played by
private electrical interests in this process. In fact, while these assets were legally foreign-owned
during this time, I argue that their “reprogramming” by Mexican engineers was an important step
in establishing state power in Chihuahua, perhaps for the first time. This is a claim which points
away from debates over the legal ownership of infrastructural systems and instead toward their
real impact – the ways in which power is cultivated and projected materially across society and
the space it inhabits.
Representing Revolution
Development rarely figures in the discourse of armed revolution, even though these
processes are closely linked. The Revolution in Chihuahua offers examples of destruction and
development, of deprivation and abundance, and of power structures and vacuums in
coexistence. This fact points to the uneven and granular nature of development, as well as the
overlapping scales implicit in revolutionary change, ranging from the personal and quotidian to
the global and longue durée. Scholars of the Mexican Revolution have understandably
emphasized the violence and social dislocation of the armed struggle in all its regional
articulations, as well as the “long” sociopolitical Revolution lasting into the 1940s. Debates over
the historical continuities and breaks implicit in the Revolution have dominated, yet the clear
developmental continuities observed in Chihuahua appear muted in the historiography. Histories
of Mexico between 1910 and 1930 rarely emphasize ongoing development, exploring instead
themes of devastation, political intrigue, and reconstruction. But the emergence of La Boquilla at
the intersection of North Atlantic capital expansion and Mexican state formation during this
period tells a very different kind of story about Chihuahua during the long Mexican Revolution.

6

The proliferation of foreign-owned electrical assets in Mexico in the early twentieth
century has long been known to historians, yet remarkably little has been written on the subject
in English or Spanish. La Boquilla’s corporate ownership appears in passing in the literature on
global electrification, a subfield of business history, which employs English-language documents
relating to stock dividends, debt issues, acquisitions, and the like.10 This work tends to focus on
the metropolitan centers from which electrification emanated, and does not systematically
explore the local transformations engendered by electrification.11 The lone work exploring La
Boquilla with any sustained focus is La irrigación revolucionaria by eminent Chihuahuan
historian Luis Aboites.12 This work explored La Boquilla from the perspective of federal

10

Christopher Armstrong and Henry Vivian Nelles, Southern Exposure: Canadian Promoters in Latin
America and the Caribbean, 1896–1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), esp. 85–104, 185–226, 249–
56. While this work was the first to explore the wave of Canadian hydroelectric promotion which swept Latin
America before World War I, of which La Boquilla was a part, it focused far more on the larger and more widelyknown Mexican Light and Power Company operating in central Mexico. La Boquilla and the CAFERC were also
discussed briefly in the work of Hertner, et al, mostly regarding the dam’s 1929 acquisition by the American and
Foreign Power Company (AFP). See William J. Hausman, Peter Hertner, and Mira Wilkins, Global Electrification:
Multinational Enterprise and International Finance in the History of Light and Power, 1878–2007 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 115, 184. Passing references to the dam can also be found in Thomas F.
O’Brien, The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900–1945 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), though these appear to be based on secondary sources.
11

An exception is the concise Spanish-language collected volume edited by Liehr and Torres, which
utilizes a wide range of sources including some in English and German. The CAFERC is discussed briefly in the
context of the entire Mexican electrical industry in Reinhard Liehr and Mariano Enrique Torres Bautista, “Las
compañías eléctricas extranjeras y la modernización urbana e industrial de México, 1880–1960,” in Las compañías
eléctricas extranjeras en México, 1880–1960, ed. Mariano Enrique Torres Bautista and Reinhard Liehr (Puebla:
Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 2010), 17–66, esp. 30, 42. This volume also contains insightful
chapters on the activities of British magnate Weetman Pearson and German electrical giant Allgemeine ElektricitätsGesellschaft (AEG) in Mexico, both of which figured in the development of La Boquilla. See Alma Parra, “Lord
Cowdray y la industria eléctrica en México,” in Las compañías eléctricas extranjeras en México, 107–43; also
Reinhard Liehr and Mariano Enrique Torres Bautista, “Formas y estrategias de expansión de las empresas
multinacionales eléctricas alemanas en México, 1894–1942,” in Las compañías eléctricas extranjeras en México,
191–220.
12

Aboites Aguilar, La irrigación revolucionaria, 85–7, 120–22, 146. This work remains the seminal text
explaining the creation and evolution of the irrigation district of Delicias beginning in 1926 – a project to which La
Boquilla was absolutely vital. For Aboites’ extensive scholarship on water and irrigation in Chihuahua see, among
others, Luis Aboites Aguilar, Demografía histórica y conflictos por el agua: dos estudios sobre 40 kilómetros de

7

irrigation projects, however, and preceded the creation of the Archivo Histórico del Agua in
1994, which has since produced a wealth previously unknown documents relating to this
project.13 While there has been a recent burst of scholarly activity on the history of Mexican
electrification, this historiography remains limited, especially in regards to foreign electrification
in Chihuahua.14 Thus, despite its global economic importance and pioneering use of

historia del río San Pedro, Chihuahua (México, D.F.: CIESAS, 2000); Luis Aboites Aguilar, Agua y tierra en la
región del Conchos-San Pedro, Chihuahua, 1720–1938: fuentes para una historia agraria (México, D.F.: SEP,
CIESAS, 1986); Luis Aboites Aguilar, El norte entre algodones: población, trabajo agrícola y optimismo en
México, 1930–1970 (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 2013); Luis Aboites Aguilar, “The Transnational
Dimensions of Mexican Irrigation, 1900–1950,” Journal of Political Ecology 19 (2012): 70–80; Luis Aboites, El
agua de la nación: una historia política de México, 1888-1946 (México, D.F.: CIESAS, 1998); Luis Aboites, La
decadencia del agua de la nación: estudio sobre desigualdad social y cambio político en México, segunda mitad del
siglo XX (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 2009).
13
Aboites was instrumental in the creation of the Archivo Histórico del Agua, and has overseen a
generation of water scholarship in Mexico, published primarily in the Biblioteca del Agua series by the Centro de
Investigación y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS). Whereas English-language water histories
have tended to emphasize environmental themes, the historiography of water in Mexico is broadly concerned, as in
Aboites’ own work, with the relationship between changing juridical, social, and political patterns of water usage
and the strength of the Mexican state. With some recent exceptions (see Walsh, Wolfe), these English- and Spanishlanguage historiographies have not engaged in extensive conversation. For a brief cross-section of the Mexican
literature, see Rosalva Loreto López, Agua, poder urbano y metabolismo social (Puebla: Benemérita Universidad
Autónoma de Puebla, 2009); Blanca Estela Suárez Cortez, ed., Historia de los usos del agua en México:
oligarquías, empresas y ayuntamientos, 1840–1940 (México, D.F: CIESAS, 1998); Rocío Castañeda González,
Antonio Escobar Ohmstede, and Jorge A. Andrade Galindo, eds., Desastre económico o debilidad federal en los
primeros gobiernos posrevolucionarios (México, D.F: CIESAS, 2005); Rocío Castañeda González, Las aguas de
Atlixco: estado, haciendas, fábricas y pueblos, 1880–1920 (CIESAS, 2005); Rocı́o Castañeda González, Irrigación
y reforma agraria: las comunidades de riego del valle de Santa Rosalía, Chihuahua, 1920–1950 (México, D.F.:
CIESAS, 1995); Lourdes Romero Navarrete, El río Nazas y los derechos de agua en México: conflicto y
negociación en torno a la democracia, 1878–1939 (México, D.F.: CIESAS, 2007); Eva Luisa Rivas Sada, “Cambio
tecnológico, dinámica regional y reconversión productiva en el norte de México: la comarca lagunera 1925–1975”
(PhD dissertation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2011), 122–32. On the English-language literature, see
Vera Candiani, Dreaming of Dry Land: Environmental Transformation in Colonial Mexico City (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2014); Christopher R. Boyer, A Land Between Waters: Environmental Histories of Modern Mexico
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012); Clifton B. Kroeber, Man, Land, and Water: Mexico’s Farmlands
Irrigation Policies, 1885–1911 (Berkeley: University of California, 1983); Michael C. Meyer, Water in the Hispanic
Southwest: A Social and Legal History, 1550–1850 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996); Casey Walsh,
Building the Borderlands: A Transnational History of Irrigated Cotton along the Mexico-Texas Border (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008); Mikael Wolfe, Watering the Revolution: An Environmental and
Technological History of Agrarian Reform in La Laguna, Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).
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Even with some recent activity, there exists remarkably little historical research on the Mexican electrical
industry overall. Among the most widely-known, and most easily confused, are the works of Galarza and of de la
Garza, which also bear similar titles. The first, published in 1941, began as a dissertation at Columbia University.
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hydroelectric and damming technology, La Boquilla has long appeared as an enigmatic structure
in the literature.
In contrast to the paucity of research on La Boquilla, the historiography of state
formation in Mexico is vast and well-established. This analytical preference for state formation
and revolution bears the ideological imprint of nearly a century of single-party dominance.15
Cycles of expanding and contracting state power have been a recurring theme of Mexican history

This work discussed La Boquilla in places, but also contained information which clearly does not square with the
archival record, calling into question the value of the research on the CAFERC. The second, published in 1994,
discussed La Boquilla hardly at all, and focused on industrial labor relations, with funding from the Comisión
Federal de Electricidad (CFE). Both cast foreign ownership of electrical assets in a negative light. See Ernesto
Galarza, La Industria eléctrica en México (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1941); also Enrique de la
Garza Toledo, Historia de la industria eléctrica en México (México, D.F.: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana,
1994). A recent collected volume of economic history explores electricity as a state “strategic resource” in
developing the Mexican north. While framing expanding electrical regime as a process of the expanding state, this
work focuses mostly on the period after 1930, during which formal federal management of electrical assets began to
grow. And while this focused on the north, it contained no explicit focus on Chihuahua or the importance of foreign
interests in developing early electrical systems. Indeed, while the importance of the US as a source of capital and
technology is implicit in this volume, the links between electrification and foreign activities, forged before the
1930s, are not discussed. See Moisés Gámez and Juan José Gracida Romo, Electricidad: recurso estratégico y
actividades productivas: procesos de electrificación en el norte de México, siglos XIX–XX (San Luis Potosí: El
Colegio de San Luis, 2013). The interdisciplinary work of Campos Aragón explored contemporary social and
economic problems of electrical supply in greater Mexico City, and included a historical summary of the growth and
development of Luz y Fuerza del Centro which began, like the CAFERC, as a Canadian concern called the Mexican
Light and Power Company. See Leticia Campos Aragón, La electricidad en la ciudad de México y área conurbada:
historia, problemas y perspectivas (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI, 2005). Broadly speaking, the historiography of
electrification in Mexico (especially before the 1930s) remains firmly rooted in a small group of secondary works
and presumptions about the negative nature of foreign involvement in electrical expansion, with the possible
exception of Liehr and Torres, eds., Las compañías eléctricas extranjeras en México.
15
The Mexican federal government has experienced no major regime change in the century since the end of
the Revolution, due in large part to the dominance of the official revolutionary party. The Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI), under various names, has held control over the presidency and much of the legislative branch
since its formation in 1929. The majority of major political challenges in the twentieth century came not from
outside parties, but through the internal wrangling of the PRI. It was for this reason that that renowned Peruvian
novelist Mario Vargas Llosa famously called PRI-led Mexico the “dictadura perfecta” (perfect dictatorship) on
Mexican national television in 1990; see Joseph and Buchenau, Mexico’s Once and Future Revolution, 4, 141–66.
This endurance of state is closely related to the endurance of the state in historical analyses of Mexico. It was for
this reason that, in response to the call in the 1980s to “bring the state back in,” Alan Knight noted that, in Mexico,
“it had never been shown the door.” See Alan Knight, “The Weight of the State in Modern Mexico,” in Studies in
the Formation of the Nation-State in Latin America, ed. James Dunkerley (London: Institute of Latin American
Studies, 2002), 212; also Charles Tilly, Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and
Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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almost since the end of the armed Revolution. Early histories, often written by revolutionary
participants or sympathetic observers, heroically cast the Mexican state as the guarantor of
ongoing social and political Revolution.16 Yet the many contradictions implicit in the state’s
attempt to contain multitudes became clear in 1968 when civilian and student protesters were
massacred by state forces at Tlatelolco ahead of the Olympics. As cracks began to appear in this
façade of legitimacy, a corresponding revisionist historiographical turn recast the state party as a
vast network of corruption and repression which tended to institutionalize the very abuses it
claimed to address.17 While this turn was perhaps a “useful corrective” to the romanticism of
earlier works, like their forebears, revisionist historians also adopted a reified and uncritical
concept of the Mexican state which was roughly coterminous with federal institutions,
overlooking rich opportunities to interrogate the practice of power.18 Revisionism still left the
state intact, characterizing a history like that of La Boquilla as an example of cynical collusion
between foreign capitalists and corrupt agents of the Mexican state.
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Among many others, this includes scholars such as Frank Tannenbaum, Ernest Gruening, Eyler Simpson,
José Valadés, and Jesús Silva Herzog; see Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, “Popular Culture and State
Formation in Revolutionary Mexico,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of
Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 6.
17

See, for example, Womack, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution; Roger D. Hansen, The Politics of
Mexican Development (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971); Arnaldo Córdova, La ideología de la
revolución mexicana: la formación del nuevo régimen (México, D.F.: Ediciones Era, 1973); Jean André Meyer, The
Cristero Rebellion: The Mexican People between Church and State, 1926-1929, trans. Richard Southern (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Ramón Eduardo Ruiz, México: la gran rebelión, 1905-1924 (México,
D.F.: Ediciones Era, 1980); David A. Brading, Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1980); Nora Louise Hamilton and Ana María Palos, México: los límites de la
autonomía del estado (México, D.F.: Ediciones Era, 1983). For an overview of this revisionist phase, see David C.
Bailey, “Revisionism and the Recent Historiography of the Mexican Revolution,” The Hispanic American Historical
Review 58, no. 1 (1978): 62–79. An exception to this tendency which anticipated the regional studies of the 1980s
was Adolfo Gilly, La revolución interrumpida: México, 1910-1920 (México, D.F.: Ediciones El Caballito, 1971).
18

Joseph and Nugent, “Popular Culture and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico,” 8.
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The cultural framework of state formation which now dominates the field emerged as a
response to these theoretical limits of revisionism, even while preserving its critical posture
toward the Mexican state. Dubbed the postrevisionist or neopopulist turn, this was influenced by
the same postmodernist and poststructuralist currents which reshaped the discipline of history,
and indeed much of the humanities, during the 1980s. Rather than a machine defined by parties,
institutions, and political economy, scholars saw the Mexican state as a hegemonic project of
nationalist discourse – a process which conventional Western theories of the state were illequipped to describe. This turn toward what Alan Knight called “emic” rather than “etic”
analysis demonstrated a preference for the local, the subaltern, the particular, and the cultural
over totalizing, grand theory assumptions.19 This long-overdue skepticism encouraged scholars
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Alan Knight, “Weapons and Arches in the Mexican Revolutionary Landscape,” in Everyday Forms of
State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel
Nugent (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 33. This distinction refers to an approach which prioritizes the
subjective experiences and ideas of historical participants over objective, macro-level generalizations. Although this
volume sought to bring into dialogue traditional, state-centric approaches and regional “neopopulist” histories,
“emic” inquiry was clearly the priority. As suggested by Knight’s later contribution in The Other Mirror, this
remained a problem in 1994. For examples of “neopopulist” history, see Mark Wasserman, Capitalists, Caciques,
and Revolution: The Native Elite and Foreign Enterprise in Chihuahua, Mexico, 1854-1911 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Gilbert M. Joseph, Rediscovering the Past at Mexico’s Periphery: Essays
on the History of Modern Yucatan (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1986); Knight, The Mexican
Revolution, Volume 1; John Tutino, From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico: Social Bases of Agrarian Violence,
1750-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Hart, Revolutionary Mexico; Paul J. Vanderwood,
“Building Blocks but Yet No Building: Regional History and the Mexican Revolution,” Mexican Studies/Estudios
Mexicanos 3, no. 2 (1987): 421–32; Eric Van Young, “Introduction: Are Regions Good to Think?,” in Mexico’s
Regions: Comparative History and Development (San Diego: Center for US-Mexican Studies, UCSD, 1992);
William H. Beezley, Cheryl English Martin, and William E. French, Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public
Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1994). On the endurance of state
formation as cultural hegemonic process in the historiography, see for example Rick A. Lopez, Crafting Mexico:
Intellectuals, Artisans, and the State after the Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Patience
Alexandra Schell, Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City (Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
2003); Todd Hartch, Missionaries of the State: The Summer Institute of Linguistics, State Formation, and
Indigenous Mexico, 1935-1985 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006); Matthew D. Esposito, Funerals,
Festivals, and Cultural Politics in Porfirian Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010); Ben
Fallaw, Religion and State Formation in Postrevolutionary Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013);
Michael Matthews, The Civilizing Machine: A Cultural History of Mexican Railroads, 1876-1910 (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2014). It must also be noted the enormous influence that subaltern studies, emerging
from scholarship on Southeast Asia, had on scholars of Latin America at this time. See, for example, Michael Adas,
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to “decenter” narratives from global metropoles and tell history, for perhaps the first time, “from
below.”20 To the extent that conventional large-scale political, social, or economic structures
figured in such analysis, they were typically offered as a negative referent against which
Mexican regional and local histories were being “excavated” and recast.21 With no center left to

“Bandits, Monks, and Pretender Kings: Patterns of Peasant Resistance and Protest in Colonial Burma, 1826-1941,”
in Power and Protest in the Countryside (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982); Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects
of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can
the Subaltern Speak?,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg
(London: Macmillan, 1988); James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
20
Florencia Mallon’s methodology for “excavating political history from below” in Mexico and Peru
remains foundational in the field of Latin American history. See Florencia E. Mallon, “Political History from Below:
Hegemony, the State, and Nationalist Discourses,” in Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and
Peru (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 1–20. Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined
communities” has also had an unusually enduring impact in studies of nationalism in Latin America, especially
considering that he was not a specialist in the field. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991).
21

The approach laid out by Joseph and Nugent brought together perspectives from “above” and “below,”
placing the classic, foundational models of Marx, Engels, Weber, Durkheim, et al, in conversation with more
contemporary, culturally-attuned scholars such as E.P. Thompson, Raymond Williams, Philip Abrams, James C.
Scott, Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer. While acknowledging the dialectical relationship between material and
discursive processes, this volume was most interested in understanding the latter – popular, quotidian,
counterhegemonic practices of contestation within larger nation-state projects. Indeed, citing Abrams’s call for the
state to be “abandoned” as an object of study, since it merely masks the real practice of power, Joseph and Nugent
emphasized processes over things, and sought to move away from normative, Eurocentric state models which were
seen to offer little insight on the unique processes which had shaped Latin America. This dissertation acknowledges
the problem Abrams, Joseph, and Nugent identified with fetishizing the state, and the associated impulse to force
unique processes into unsuitable or inappropriate analytical categories, while also arguing for its continued utility in
understanding social change. In agreement with these scholars, the present study frames the state around
relationships, although the impulse to trace these through large-scale, material networks of electricity, water, and
capital represents a methodological departure. See Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, “Popular Culture and State
Formation in Revolutionary Mexico,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of
Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 3–23; also Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty
of Studying the State (1977),” Journal of Historical Sociology 1, no. 1 (1988): 58–89. For the purpose of analysis,
the present work relies upon the relatively straightforward definition of the state offered by Knight – “the broad and
enduring apparatus of power: the branches of government, the police and military, the bureaucracy and their related
agencies (public enterprises, state schools, official mass organizations).” Adoption of this definition is strategic,
however, in that this analysis seeks to argue for the importance of ostensibly non-state capital and technological
flows, foreign or otherwise, to the practice of state power. Knight, “The Weight of the State,” 238.
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hold, scholars pursued questions about the Mexican Revolution and subsequent state formation
in a kaleidoscopic range of innovative, challenging, and often unrelated ways.
While this “great arch” approach to state formation described by Joseph and Nugent has
proven enduring in Mexican history, offering important insights into the unique and varied
trajectories of Mexican history, it has also had its critics.22 Among the most cogent and thorough
challenges was offered by Alan Knight, who questioned whether a prevailing preference for
questions of culture and discourse in historical inquiry had led scholars to neglect potentially
valuable grand theory approaches.23 Stressing the continuing need for top-down, large-scale, and
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Joseph and Nugent, Everyday Forms of State Formation, 12. This concept has been deeply influential in
the genealogy of the “state formation” approach to Mexican history. On the “great arch” theory of the state,
Corrigan and Sayer argued that state formation was a cultural process of control over individual behavior – “Moral
regulation is coextensive with state formation.” Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State
Formation As Cultural Revolution (New York: Blackwell, 1985), 4. See also Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein,
and Eric Zolov, Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico Since 1940 (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2001); Joseph and Buchenau, Mexico’s Once and Future Revolution.
23
Here, two closely-related volumes merit special mention. The first, The Other Mirror, argued that “grand
theory” approaches rooted largely in Sociology, Political Science, and Economics (Karl Polanyi, Alexander
Gerschenkron, Charles Tilly, Michael Mann and Theda Skocpol, for example) retain their analytical value, despite
clear epistemological biases toward the supposedly normative historical trajectories of metropolitan centers.
Speaking against a tendency to avoid general comparisons and falsifiable assertions, Centeno and López-Alves
sought to identify what remains useful from these disciplines, and consciously adapt these models to new Latin
American contexts. In doing so, the region might become “another mirror” to grand theory approaches, producing
new, more appropriate, and perhaps unimagined models. See Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves,
eds., The Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through the Lens of Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001). The second, while more heterodox in character, represents another intervention on behalf of grand theory in
approaches to Latin America, and indeed features a handful of the same scholars. Written as more of a “state of the
state” survey of Latin American scholarship, the intellectual thrust of this volume points back toward the material,
the measurable, and the verifiable. Identifiable across many of the collected essays is a recognition of the essential
and mutually-constitutive relationship between the state and economic activity, implicitly arguing that this
connection had been neglected in recent decades. See James Dunkerley, ed., Studies in the Formation of the NationState in Latin America (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 2002). Notably,
Knight’s essay on the “weight of the state” contained in this volume was a response to Stephen Haber’s call for
more empirical and economically-oriented studies of Latin America, which was itself a response to the cultural turn
in the humanities. See Stephen H. Haber, “Introduction: Economic Growth and Latin American Economic
Historiography,” in How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, 1800–
1914, ed. Stephen H. Haber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 1–33.
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empirical analyses, Knight and others suggested that Latin American historians had thrown out
the proverbial baby with the bathwater, abandoning the many valuable methods and models of
Sociology, Political Science, and Economics, for example. In the specific case of Mexican state
formation, despite a wealth of insightful work describing hegemonic state processes, Knight
argued that there was still no consensus on what the state actually was, or how it might be most
effectively measured.24 This rejection of classical Western models of state did not produce any
corresponding attempt to propose more appropriate models. Prefiguring a more recent material
turn in the humanities, Knight suggested that scholars of Mexico direct their efforts to assessing
the “weight” of the state – the quantitative, material, and observable networks through which the
state, by whatever definition, operates upon and within society.25 It is toward this effort to
rethink the scale, shape, and nature of the state that this analysis is aimed.

24

In the last decade, some scholars have begun to revisit what might be seen as grand theory approaches to
power in Mexico, although these remain the exception in studies of the state. Gauss’ work on the relationship
between regional industrial development and state policy in postrevolutionary Mexico deserves special mention,
particularly in demonstrating the prevalence of negotiation in various regional relationships. See Susan M. Gauss,
Made in Mexico: Regions, Nation, and the State in the Rise of Mexican Industrialism, 1920s–1940s (University
Park: Penn State University Press, 2011). Others have approached the materiality of state power from a variety of
approaches and traditions. See Christopher R. Boyer, Political Landscapes: Forests, Conservation, and Community
in Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015); Nichole Sanders, Gender and Welfare in Mexico: The
Consolidation of a Postrevolutionary State (Penn State University Press, 2011); Halbert Jones, The War Has
Brought Peace to Mexico: World War II and the Consolidation of the Post-Revolutionary State (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2014); Wil G. Pansters, ed., Violence, Coercion, and State-Making in TwentiethCentury Mexico: The Other Half of the Centaur (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012); Heather McCrea,
Diseased Relations: Epidemics, Public Health, and State-Building in Yucatán, Mexico, 1847-1924 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2011); Raymond B. Craib, Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and
Fugitive Landscapes (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Emily Wakild, Revolutionary Parks: Conservation,
Social Justice, and Mexico’s National Parks, 1910–1940 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2011).
25

Knight, “The Weight of the State,” 213–14. This term seeks to describe how we might define and
disaggregate the concept of the state (and, by extension, state power) in ways which are quantitative rather than
“impressionistic,” and thus “amenable to comparison across time and space.” The present study takes as an
operating assumption that infrastructural development is a constitutive element of state power, and does not seek to
prove this quantitatively, relying instead in Mann’s theory of “infrastructural power” to do this work (discussed
below). In this sense, it is not exactly, as Knight described, an attempt to “weigh” the state in post-revolutionary
Chihuahua through, for example, statistics on mining activity, electrical generation, or water usage. Rather, it
combines quantitative and qualitative approaches, seeking to describe historically the clear material transformations
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Weighing the State
Exploring the Mexican state through infrastructure is not without precedent. In his history
of irrigation along the Conchos River in post-Revolution Chihuahua, Aboites clearly described
this process as one of state formation.26 John Coatsworth’s enduring study of the Mexican
railway made similar assumptions about transport networks.27 But the connection between
infrastructure and state power has generally been more implicit than explicit. Only recently have
scholars asked how the built environment is created, by whom, and for what purposes as a means
of understanding state expansion in Mexico. Infrastructure is not a byproduct state power, but a
material record of the networks through which such power is consolidated and projected. This
study explores the essential relationship between state interests and private capital and expertise

wrought by La Boquilla and its expanding network in the context of the debates, questions, and concerns which
attended its growth. This is a study of how state “weight” is created and projected, which actors are involved, who
benefits, and on what terms.
26

Aboites Aguilar, La irrigación revolucionaria, 10, 132. The term Aboites used was “fortalecimiento,” or
strengthening. In his analysis, the creation of Delicias through federal mandate over the objections of local-regional
actors as well as those of foreign capitalists was evidence of the new Mexican state exerting itself in Chihuahua.
27

By subjecting the Mexican railway system to a cost-benefit analysis meant to determine both the value it
created and extracted, Coatsworth’s classic cliometric study is an example of the economically-oriented
dependentista approach common in the 1970s and 1980s, which posited an enduring structural relationship of
economic dependency between global cores and peripheries. See John H. Coatsworth, Growth Against
Development: The Economic Impact of Railroads in Porfirian Mexico (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press,
1981). Unlike the electrical grid, Mexican railway and tramway systems have long attracted historical analyses from
a range of methodological approaches. See William Earl French, “The Nature of Canadian Investment in Mexico,
1902–1915: A Study of the Incorporation and History of the Mexican Light and Power Company, the Mexico
Tramways Company and the Mexico North Western Railway” (Master’s Thesis, University Of Calgary, 1981);
Teresa Miriam Van Hoy, A Social History of Mexico’s Railroads: Peons, Prisoners, and Priests (New York:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); Michael Matthews, The Civilizing Machine: A Cultural History of Mexican
Railroads, 1876–1910 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014); Robert F. Alegre, Railroad Radicals in Cold
War Mexico: Gender, Class, and Memory (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014). For a concise survey of
mobility and transport historiography of Mexico, see Michael K. Bess, “Pathways of the Golden Eagle: Themes of
Mobility and Transport in Recent Scholarship of Mexico,” ed. Peter Norton et al., Mobility in History: The Yearbook
of the International Association for the History of Transport, Traffic, and Mobility 5 (2014): 121–26.
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in the creation and administration of large-scale infrastructural projects – a relationship which
challenges conventional definitions of the state framed around federal governance. In the case of
La Boquilla, these private interests were also foreign, complicating conventional approaches
even further. But by focusing on networks rather than institutions – or what the state does rather
than what the state is – this analysis argues that infrastructures offer an effective means for
“weighing” the state. This means that the Canadian corporation involved in public works in
Chihuahua was a vital actor in Mexican state formation, perhaps even approaching some level of
state agency.
In framing the state as a system of integrated “sociospatial networks,” I draw on the
concept of state “infrastructural power” elaborated over the course of decades by historical
sociologist Michael Mann, which has been rarely invoked in historical studies.28 In this
approach, the social power upon which state systems are built is fundamentally a spatial
question: “organization, control, logistics, communication – the capacity to organize and control
people, materials, and territories, and the development of this capacity throughout history.”29

28

Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992), 1–11. The idea to apply Mann’s notion of “infrastructural power” to the Mexican state was first
suggested in Knight, “The Weight of the State,” 226–37. It should be noted here that “infrastructural power” does
not refer exclusively to material objects, such as railways, sewers, or electrical grids, but also to the networks they
imply and, in the final instance, the legitimizing power the state draws from these in distributing services,
protections, and the coercive force expected by society. Thus, using infrastructural power in studying the state does
not necessarily require an exploration of what might be termed “hard” infrastructures. At the core of this approach is
the idea that dramatic technological transformation has necessarily been tied to dramatic expansions in state
capacities and social expectations – an expansion of both state reach and grasp.
29
Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D.
1760 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1–4. It should also be noted that, within Mann’s complex
model of the state, “infrastructural power” is not offered as the sole root of state power, but an important and
relatively overlooked aspect. This dissertation brings Mann’s most innovative ideas about “infrastructural power” to
the historiography of Mexican state formation without seeking to employ his full, complex, schematic model of the
state which divides power into ideological, economic, military, and political categories.
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This means that questions of state must account for the projection of power within and across
territory. As he wrote, “The state is, indeed, a place – both a central place and a unified territorial
reach.”30 Unlike mining corporations, political parties, armies, or cattle barons, states claim
territorial monopolies which, in theory, contain the whole of the social sphere and the agency of
all organizations therein. State power depends not so much upon a hegemonic power over public
discourse, but over the material space society inhabits, the bodies therein, and the capacity to
circulate unevenly distributed resources. Thus, La Boquilla presents a privileged site for
understanding processes of state formation in Chihuahua through the disputes it provoked over
land and water use, electrical generation and distribution, and the proper roles of private and
public interests in utilizing large infrastructures. Pushing this analysis even further, this study
calls into question how we represent private, foreign entities which are essential to the
distributive capacity of a state.
Infrastructural power can also be used to illustrate why the introduction of railways,
telegraph lines, gasoline generators, and hydropower dams into the Mexican borderlands after
the late nineteenth century corresponded with a dramatic sociopolitical transformation, fueling
anti-Porfirian sentiment in the north. As Mann argued, the story of the last century and a half is
one of “logistical penetration of territory” – the expanding scale of social power and the
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Mann, States, War and Capitalism, 18–19. Compare this to envirotech historian Sara Pritchard, who
argues that the nation “takes place.” While she uses the term “nation,” her point is part of a larger discussion on
nation-states, and the fact that such projects are both discursive and material, or “abstract and concrete.” Both Mann
and Pritchard point to a fact which has not always been recognized in studies of the Mexican state – that, in addition
to its discursive qualities, the state is also material and spatial, and must be seen as such. Sara B. Pritchard,
Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2011), 8.
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corresponding emergence of new state systems and national imaginaries.31 While state
infrastructural power in Chihuahua had for millennia been limited by extreme heat and cold, a
lack of water, high deserts, mountainous terrain, and the limited capacities of human and animal
bodies, the late nineteenth century saw a burst in organizational capacity which brought the
region into the operational range of elite actors in Mexico City and urban centers in the North
Atlantic. Even when La Boquilla was little more than an ambitious proposal, it was already
entangled in global networks of finance, governance, and expertise.
Based on the approach detailed above, this dissertation frames the state as a technological
phenomenon and seeks to explore the dialectical relationship between new material networks and
evolving political practices.32 Physical infrastructures serve as a proxy for understanding the
cultivation and projection of social power in Chihuahua and reveal the vital role played by
engineers, bureaucrats, and promotors in shaping the emerging state. This is an approach which
is well-suited to the archive produced around La Boquilla – planning and concession documents,
engineering surveys, trade journals, ministry memos, and other technical miscellany – which
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Mann, States, War and Capitalism, 24. Like the state, the concept of nation is deeply technological, not
only in its most obvious connection to cultural diffusion (print media, radio, film, etc.), but also in a logistical sense
– the “penetration of territory” which brings formerly distant bodies and voices into regular contact, producing new
social realities through railways and roads, telephones, markets and, of course, electrification and large-scale
irrigation.
32

The constructivist notion that there exists a mutually-constitutive relationship between technologies and
the societies which develop and employ them is now foundational to the history of technology as well as Science
and Technology Studies (STS). Developed three decades ago as a response to the positivist implications of “great
man” narratives focusing on inventors and their inventions, this “social construction of technology” (or SCOT)
approach proposed an entirely new way of thinking about the role of human activities in shaping historical change.
Among its many prominent early adopters were Thomas Parke Hughes and David Nye, whose work has defined the
subfield of global electrification. See Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas Parke Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, The Social
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2012). On the SCOT approach to electrification, see Hughes, Networks of Power; David E. Nye,
Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).
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similarly framed civil engineering as an important form of statemaking, especially after the
Revolution.33 These documents reveal sharp debates about the distribution and usage of national
resources, the proper role of the expert in shaping policy, and the benefits of technology transfer
between the United States and Mexico, not only between company and federal officials but also
within various federal ministries. At the same time, they also reveal points of consensus, or at
least strategic cooperation, as different actors pursued their own aims through the dam at La
Boquilla. In this archive, one can read a nuanced portrait of state formation in Chihuahua which
was not imposed by federal fiat after 1928, as the historical record might imply, but through
constant negotiation over the best use of the Conchos River.
Infrastructure as Archive

33
Primary sources cited herein are drawn primarily from the Archivo Histórico del Agua (Historical Water
Archive, AHA), the repository of most federal documents relating to water infrastructure in Mexico. These were
generated before 1917, mostly by the Secretaría de Fomento, Colonización e Industria (Ministry of Development,
Colonization, and Industry, SFCI), and thereafter by the Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento (Ministry of
Agriculture and Development, SAF). Of particular importance in the latter part of this analysis are the records of the
Comisión Nacional de Irrigación (National Irrigation Commission, CNI), the agency created within the SAF in 1926
to oversee Calles’ project of “revolutionary irrigation.” AHA documents used in this study are held in three archival
collections: Aguas Nacionales (National Waters, AN) and Aprovechamientos Superficiales (Surface Improvements,
AS), two similar collections relating to administration and water policymaking, as well as Consultivo Técnico
(Technical Consultation, CT), consisting of technical materials, surveys, and reports. In addition, this dissertation
also includes technical studies located at the Archivo Histórico del Palacio de Minería (Historical Archive of the
Palace of Mining, AHPM). This archive is home to the museum of the engineering school of the Universidad
Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), which it housed for more than a century until 1954. This dissertation also
includes various unpublished studies of the Mexican electrical grid dating to the 1940s, which are located in the
collection of engineer Gonzalo Robles (248) at the Archivo General de la Nación (National Archives, AGN). Also at
the AGN is the collection of Fernando Iglesias Calderón (241), which contained the private correspondence of
Ismaél Zúñiga, revealing many connections between foreign and local utilities promotion agents in Porfirian
Mexico. Printed material, mostly related to the engineering profession, was found in the AHA and AHPM. These
include Boletín minero, Memorias de la Asociación de Ingenieros y Arquitectos de México (MAIAM), and
Irrigación en México, among others.
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As Philip Abrams and others have observed, the state is not a “material object that can be
studied,” as perhaps incorrectly gleaned from the classical frameworks of Weber and Engels.34
But it does not follow that the state cannot be studied through its constituent material parts. The
state is a complex phenomenon involving both materiality and meaning. A return to questions of
materiality in the practice of power can serve as a complementary line of inquiry into the history
of the Mexican state. While Thomas Park Hughes’ call to view the “world as artifact” decades
ago has been influential among interdisciplinary scholars of technology and electrification, the
built environment has only recently begun to animate historical scholarship in Mexico and Latin
America, especially through the fields of environment and technology.35
While relatively new to the field of Mexican state formation, questions about the
technological foundations of social power have animated insightful scholarship in other fields

34
Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)”; Joseph and Nugent, “Popular Culture
and State Formation,” 19.
35

Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 18701970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 1. On the recent interest in materialism, there is no single work
or collected volume which describes this broad interdisciplinary shift. In the discipline of history, it might be most
readily observed in the flowering of environmental history into a vibrant field in its own right in recent decades, as
well as a growing interest in the history of science and technology and STS, and the growing together of
environmental and technological studies under the heading of envirotech. Consider also the emergence of related
subfields such as urban environmental history, transport-mobility history, energy history, etc. For an introduction to
the envirotech approach, as it is called, see Martin Reuss and Stephen H. Cutcliffe, eds., The Illusory Boundary:
Environment and Technology in History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010), 1–8. For an
introduction to envirotech in the field of Latin America, and particularly Mexico, see Wolfe, Watering the
Revolution, 6–12. A relatively recent essay on environmental history in Latin America speaks to the strengths of this
field in describing transnational processes and the many scales across which material flows have shaped this place;
see Mark Carey, “Commodities, Colonial Science, and Environmental Change in Latin American History,” Radical
History Review 2010, no. 107 (2010): 185–94. Another recent volume brings the methods of science and technology
studies (STS) to environmental history; see Dolly Jorgensen, Finn Arne Jorgensen, and Sarah Pritchard, eds., New
Natures: Joining Environmental History with Science and Technology Studies (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2013). This relationship between environment and technology was recognized by historians at least two
decades ago, see Jeffrey K. Stine and Joel Arthur Tarr, “At the Intersection of Histories: Technology and the
Environment,” Technology and Culture 39, no. 4 (1998): 601–40; Jeffrey K. Stine and Joel A. Tarr, “Technology
and the Environment: The Historians’ Challenge,” Environmental History Review 18, no. 1 (1994): 1–7.
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and disciplines. In anthropology, for example, there is an emerging body of work on
“infrastructure as objects of investigation.”36 Of particular utility is the idea that technical
systems hard-wire environments for certain types of development, calling on scholars to
interrogate what type of development is pursued, on what terms, and by whom. Viewing La
Boquilla as a piece of “hardware” created for a discrete purpose, I draw on the work of Stephen
Collier to describe successful federal efforts to “reprogram” this dual-use hydroelectric dam for
use in irrigation through a series of regulations and policy changes. In this sense, both the
evolving articulations of the dam and its auxiliary structures, as well as the paper trails these
produced, can be read as archives of the state in action in Chihuahua.37
Other recent scholarship has centered on the roles of energy systems in the practice of
power.38 While this has emphasized energy sources, such as petroleum, transmission and

36

Stephen J. Collier, “The Intransigence of Things,” in Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social
Modernity, Biopolitics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 205. See also Ashley Carse, Beyond the Big
Ditch: Politics, Ecology, and Infrastructure at the Panama Canal (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014).; Brian Larkin,
“The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” Annual Review of Anthropology 42, no. 1 (2013): 327–43. For a unique
approach bridging infrastructure and economics, see José A. Gómez-Ibáñez, Regulating Infrastructure: Monopoly,
Contracts, and Discretion (Harvard University Press, 2003). For a recent collected volume representing the burst of
interdisciplinary intellectual energy this subfield has generated, see Penelope Harvey, Casper Bruun Jensen, and
Atsuro Morita, eds., Infrastructures and Social Complexity: A Companion (New York: Routledge, 2016).
37

In this gesture to take seriously the uniqueness of processes of development in Latin America, and treat
Mexican developmental as original and pragmatic rather than derivative and reactive, this study owes an intellectual
debt to Paul Gootenberg, Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru’s “Fictitious Prosperity” of Guano,
1840–1880 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and, more broadly, Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How to
Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic
World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
38

Energy history necessarily draws from environmental history, the history of technology and STS, and
business history, as well as more traditional political, social, and cultural approaches. See, for example, Andreas
Malm, Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming (New York: Verso Books, 2016);
Peter A. Shulman, Coal and Empire: The Birth of Energy Security in Industrial America (Baltimore: JHU Press,
2015); Shellen Xiao Wu, Empires of Coal: Fueling China’s Entry into the Modern World Order, 1860-1920
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015); Christopher F. Jones, Routes of Power: Energy and Modern America
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); Andrew Needham, Power Lines: Phoenix and the Making of the
Modern Southwest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political
Power in the Age of Oil (New York: Verso, 2011); David Blackbourn, “The Culture and Politics of Energy in
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distribution systems like are especially helpful in demonstrating variegated and disparate
historical patterns of development. For example, in his study of canals, railways, and pipelines in
the eastern United States, Christopher Jones has argued that these “routes of power” were not
incidental, but central in hard-wiring landscapes for specific types of transformations.39
Moreover, these networks created “positive feedback loops” between infrastructure, investment,
industry, settlement, and consumption which tended to produce “landscapes of intensification”
defined by energy systems. To the extent that La Boquilla met certain needs in its construction,
while simultaneously producing new kinds of needs, goals, and possibilities, this dam was the
prime mover in a long-term feedback loop of development on the Conchos. Almost immediately,
actors from across society began to reshape the project for different purposes, revealing the
inescapable relationship of co-production between societies and the technologies they employ.40

Germany: A Historical Perspective,” RCC Perspectives, no. 4 (2013); Astrid Kander, Paolo Malanima, and Paul
Warde, Power to the People: Energy in Europe over the Last Five Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2013). For an example of an earlier work emerging from urban environmental history, see Martin V. Melosi and
Joseph A. Pratt, eds., Energy Metropolis: An Environmental History of Houston and the Gulf Coast (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007). Although Fernando Coronil’s older anthropological work focuses more on the
discursive practices of politicians than those of policymakers, his exploration of the relationship between energy
systems, “national” wealth, and the state in Venezuela is insightful. In particular, his recognition of the relationship
between regimes of energy and political power was ahead of its time, while his observation that such energy regimes
are important in understanding how Latin American political regimes differ from normative models, or are
perceived to differ from these, remains a problem two decades later. See Fernando Coronil, The Magical State:
Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
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Christopher F. Jones, Routes of Power: Energy and Modern America (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2014), 5.
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Jones, 8. Co-production refers to the notion that technology, as the vital link between society and the
world it inhabits, is constantly reshaped by these two forces, producing new ideas which in turn reshape society and
environment in a feedback loop. For the practical purposes of this dissertation, it refers to the way in which the
completion of La Boquilla created new social possibilities and ideas about development in Chihuahua, which in turn
invited new demands on the Conchos, creating a cycle of mutual reshaping. This concept is also helpful in resolving
one of the more difficult aspects of describing technological change: the problem of technological determinism, or
the extent to which technologies impose changes upon society, or fail to do so. The present study follows Hughes’
“soft” determinist idea of technological “momentum,” in which technologies do impose real and enduring changes
which nonetheless might be redirected by society. On technological determinism, see Merritt Roe Smith and Leo
Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge: MIT Press,
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Rather than a triumphant victory of man over the environment, as La Boquilla’s promoters
promised, this dam was shaped from the moment of its conception by contingency, negotiation,
and adaptation.41 It is this transformation of La Boquilla from an engine of mining to the
cornerstone of state-led irrigation which forms the narrative of this dissertation.
Historians of science and technology have an effective toolkit for describing such largescale power structures, even if these have been rarely employed in the study of the state. Joining
a cohort of interdisciplinary scholars in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), these
historians have demonstrated the utility of concepts such as co-production and technological
determinism in describing historical change. Two of the earliest and most recognizable among
these are Thomas Parke Hughes and David Nye – scholars who have defined the subfield of
historical electrification.42 While the impact of Hughes and Nye on the historical study of “large

1994). For examples of “hard” determinism, see Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson
(New York: Knopf, 1964); Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2010).
41

Although it is not billed as an energy history, Richard White’s idea of the Columbia River as an “organic
machine” warrants comparison here, especially in its observation that water flows are already energy systems prior
to human intervention. There are, of course, some significant differences between the Conchos and Columbia rivers.
The Columbia is defined by voluminous flows, transport, prodigious salmon runs, and dense labor and social
exchange networks. The Conchos, by contrast, was marked by cycles of flooding and drought, and supported
similarly dense networks of labor and exchange only after it was dammed. But the process of damming the Conchos,
as on the Columbia, attempted to create “a fully rationalized river, an organic machine,” which might serve to drive
the colonization of the north. In this sense, La Boquilla and its auxiliary dams were perhaps even more locally
important than those on the Columbia, as they transformed a previously inaccessible “geography of energy” into a
“geography of labor.” See Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York:
Macmillan, 2011), 9, 64.
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Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 1–17. The concept of large technical systems (LTS) as a viable unit of study
was pioneered by Thomas Parke Hughes, and provides the theoretical framework for his history of electrification in
the United States, Germany and England. In seeking to balance in his analysis the social context of electrification
with the real technical demands, “bottlenecks,” and capabilities of electrical technology, Hughes’ work reflected a
deep commitment to the assumptions of the SCOT school. This LTS approach has yet to be applied to Latin
American electrification. Drawing on the model offered by Hughes, the present study traces the evolution of La
Boquilla as a method for exploring wider social and political processes of state formation in post-revolutionary
Chihuahua. For an introduction to the LTS approach, see Bernward Joerges, “Large Technical Systems: Concepts
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technical systems” has been deep, it has also been geographically narrow. Centering on
electrification within major developed nations such as the United States, Germany, and Britain,
this work is virtually unknown to the study of power systems in Mexico or Latin America. While
groundbreaking in refining the conceptual frameworks, technical language, and methodologies
for understanding electrification as a world-historic process, the work of Hughes and Nye does
not explore the transfer of electrical technology, expertise, and promotion across borders, nor the
local implications of foreign ownership and administration of critical infrastructures. Until very
recently, the historiography of technology in Latin America has been notably sparse, and the
topic of electrification remains, for the most part, unexplored.43 This study approaches

and Issues,” in The Development of Large Technical Systems, ed. Renate Mayntz and Thomas Parke Hughes
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 9–36. By contrast, David Nye’s work focuses primarily on society, and the way it
responds to and engages with technological change. See, for example, Nye, Electrifying America.; David E. Nye,
Image Worlds: Corporate Identities at General Electric, 1890-1930 (MIT Press, 1985).
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A recent survey found that two major journals in the history of technology (Technology and Culture,
History and Technology) have published an average of only two articles per decade on Latin America since 1970.
Over the same period, three major Latin American history journals (Hispanic American Historical Review, Journal
of Latin American Studies, Latin American Research Review) have published 88 articles on technology, an average
of about 20 articles per decade. This data set showed a spike in interest during the 1980s and 1990s (48 articles,
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literature, the authors proposed that this relative paucity might reflect divergent disciplinary concerns – that is, that
historians of technology and Latin Americanists have rarely been in conversation. Major themes in Latin American
history, such as class, race, gender, labor, social mobilization, and inequality are rarely explored in the history of
technology. Moreover, a general wariness of dependency-inflected interpretations among Latin Americanists may
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“Technology in an Expanded Field: A Review of History of Technology Scholarship on Latin America in Selected
English-Language Journals,” in Beyond Imported Magic: Essays on Science, Technology, and Society in Latin
America, ed. Eden Medina, Ivan da Costa Marques, and Christina Holmes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014); Edward
Beatty, Technology and the Search for Progress in Modern Mexico (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015).
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America. See, for example, Amy Cox Hall, Framing a Lost City: Science, Photography, and the Making of Machu
Picchu (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017); Eve E. Buckley, Technocrats and the Politics of Drought and
Development in Twentieth-Century Brazil (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017); Willie Hiatt,
The Rarified Air of the Modern: Airplanes and Technological Modernity in the Andes (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016); Michael K. Bess, Routes of Compromise: Building Roads and Shaping the Nation in
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electrification in Chihuahua, and the transnational connections it necessarily implies, as a unique
problem space for rethinking state formation in the decades following the Mexican Revolution.
⁂
Starting from the assumption that the foreign-built hydroelectric dam La Boquilla
constituted a real element of state infrastructural power in Chihuahua – one which preceded the
emergence of the modern Mexican state – one might tell a very different story of the long
Mexican Revolution. Rather than a landscape of agrarian and industrial devastation, this was a
space of mineral bonanza which served the interests of federal officials and foreign investors
alike. And if we accept that foreign ownership was not inherently inimical to state expansion,
and that later efforts to “reprogram” the dam reflected not a principled rejection of foreign
ownership, but a pragmatic push toward other types of development, then we are left with a
conclusion which stands somewhat apart from conventional interpretations – that state power in
Chihuahua was built upon this foreign-owned infrastructure. Furthermore, the continued private
ownership of the electrical grid shows that the integration of La Boquilla into state irrigation
projects was not precisely a victory of the state over foreign interest. Rather, if infrastructural
power is essential to the state, and sizable funding is required to create and maintain such

Mexico, 1917-1952 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2017); J. Justin Castro, Radio in Revolution: Wireless
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(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016); Araceli Tinajero and J. Brian Freeman, eds., Technology and
Culture in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013); Wolfe, Watering the
Revolution; Candiani, Dreaming of Dry Land; Aurora Gómez Galvarriato, Industria y revolución: cambio
económico y social en el valle de Orizaba, México (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2016); Craib,
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América hispana: siglos XVIII y XIX (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2017); Matthew Vitz, “‘The Lands with
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1910 – 1950,” Hispanic American Historical Review 92, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 41–71. On the historiography of
technology in Mexico, see Beatty, Technology and the Search for Progress in Modern Mexico.
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infrastructure, then it is hardly surprising to note that both private and public capital is engaged
in such projects, both foreign and national. Although this was not the case in the historical
development of, for example, the United States or Germany, the limited availability of free
capital and technical expertise circumscribed the ability of places like Mexico to develop
domestic electrical industries. Thus, the deep capital interests involved in the creation of La
Boquilla, albeit foreign in nature, are normative rather than exceptional – a fact which seems
both self-evident and, paradoxically, largely unacknowledged in the historiography of modern
Mexico. In exploring the links between infrastructure and power, La Boquilla and structures like
it can tell new stories about the state in Mexico and Latin America.

26

CHAPTER 1: Concession, 1905–1909
After decades of autocratic rule under Porfirio Díaz, Mexico was a nation transformed by
the turn of the twentieth century. Telegraph and railway lines crisscrossed its rugged geography,
mining profits were on the rise, and infrastructural development projects were taking shape
across Mexico. Díaz and his cabinet of technocratic cientificos worked carefully to manage the
balance of financial power in Mexico and harness the expansion of global capital while
preventing any single nation from monopolizing the domestic economy. From a distance, the
involvement of England, Germany, France, Canada, and the United States in driving Mexican
modernization appeared hugely successful. But the great bounties of wealth generated by
Mexican elites and their foreign partners did not trickle down to the popular classes, and only
sparingly to the newly-minted commercial and industrial community which emerged in northern
Mexico.
In its grand scale and global integration, La Boquilla was a fitting monument to the
fading Porfiriato. The project was conceded to an elite Chihuahua lawyer and his Alsatian
partner but quickly grew to involve Canadian hydropower promoters, a Swiss engineer, and a
British engineering firm. The formal process of concession provoked a legal battle with another
German hydropower concessionaire, further revealing the Conchos as a battlefield in the
transnational struggle among metropolitan cores to promote infrastructural development abroad.
While these promoters emphasized to federal ministers the irrigation potential of La Boquilla, it
was soon obvious that the great US mining conglomerates operating in Chihuahua would be the
main beneficiaries of the dam. From its conception, La Boquilla was designed to favor
electrification over irrigation, and thus industry over agriculture.
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The crises which triggered the final collapse of the Porfiriato also caused major setbacks
for the dam builders, but they did not kill the project. Global investment capital grew scarce
during the Panic of 1907, while a major drought in Mexico soon after threatened to cause famine
in a nation already reliant on food imports. The links of patronage which held the Porfiriato
together were strained beyond their limits, giving way to popular revolts across Mexico. Just as
work began on this project, Díaz and his family were forced into exile in Paris, where he died a
few years later. But the potential of this project was not wiped away along with the Porfiriato. In
fact, the intercontinental links of capital and expertise upon which it relied proved more enduring
than the Díaz regime itself.
The Porfiriato is often contrasted to the period of widespread chaos which followed – the
Mexican Revolution (1910–20). Despite the apparent order and harmony of this period of pax
porfiriana, however, the Díaz regime was hardly monolithic in its composition. The multitude of
competing regional, ideological, and political interests implicated in the Porfirian system grew
especially evident after 1907, when a series of crises revealed deep fissures between various
social groups. In the documentary record generated by the proposal, concession, and construction
of La Boquilla, one can read a variety of intersecting interests at play, ranging from the
interpersonal to the international. In one notable example, federal officials forced dam
concessionaires to acquire flooding rights from wealthy landowners in the proposed basin, even
though there existed no contractual obligation to do so. In another, personal letters reveal that
federal officials moonlighted as representatives of major foreign corporations, lobbying
municipal and state planners on their behalf. By teasing out these intertwined strands of
institutional and individual interests, the perhaps unlikely construction of La Boquilla in arid
Chihuahua comes into sharper focus. Drawing on archives of planning and concession
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documents, as well as personal letters and notes, this chapter describes the multitude of nested
and overlapping interests out of which La Boquilla emerged.
Concession
In 1905, Chihuahua lawyer Joaquín Cortazar Jr. and his associate Pablo Ginther
submitted their first joint proposal to the Secretaría de Fomento, Colonización e Industria (SFCI)
to employ the waters of the Conchos River in irrigation and electrification.1 This river rose in the
heights of the Sierra Madre Occidental range and flowed through the desert altiplano of
Chihuahua before joining the “big bend” of the Rio Grande (known in Mexico as the Río Bravo)
along the Texas border near Ojinaga-Presidio. At a site known locally as la boquilla de las
babisas, 27 kilometers west of the railway town of Camargo, these men proposed a hydroelectric
dam which would transform a rocky canyon into an impervious vessel for storing water in this
arid environment.2 Known today as Lake Toronto, this reservoir would provide the water
reserves and elevated drop necessary for hydroelectric generation.
Records show that Cortazar and Ginther originally proposed a masonry dam with
multiple turbines drawing between 10,000 and 15,000 liters of water per second, which would
generate a minimum of 1,000 horsepower. While this was a significant project, this was far
smaller than the eventual size of the completed dam. In fact, the continual expansion of
concessions, imports, and overall scope of the project would become a recurring theme. Yet

1

Ministry of Development, Colonization, and Industry.

2
Camargo was known in the years before the Revolution as Santa Rosalía. AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097,
leg. 1, f. 1. The term la boquilla (lit. little mouth, nozzle) referred to the narrow canyon outlet to be dammed in this
project. While La Boquilla would eventually become both the formal and colloquial name of this dam, early
planning documents reference a variety of permutations of this local place name, la boquilla de las babisas
(sometimes babizas).
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while the scale of this damming project remained tentative, its aims were clear from the very
beginning. Cortazar and Ginther specifically mentioned the industrial potential of the region, and
the possible electrification of factories, mills, trollies, and public lighting. Interestingly, this first
proposal made no mention of mining, despite the fact that it was Chihuahua’s major industry.
This absence was even more conspicuous considering that, when the dam called La Boquilla was
finally completed a decade later, its entire electrical output initially served the mining center of
Parral exclusively, and not nearby urban, commercial and industrial centers. Thus, despite
promises of broad-based industrialization and hints of irrigation possibilities, it was always clear
that La Boquilla was envisioned first as an engine of Chihuahuan mining.
In the late Porfiriato, as through much of Mexican history, water resources were legally
the property of the state, and their private use was ostensibly granted as a federal concession only
where a public benefit could be demonstrated. In practice, however, this often led to unequal
access to resources, which were often monopolized by foreign capital interests, local elites, or
some combination of the two. Still, in the concession documents relating to La Boquilla, the
protocols of public utility were assiduously observed, even when the aims were transparently
self-interested. Cortazar and Ginther were careful to note that all waters would be returned
unadulterated to the natural flow of the river, allowing also for irrigation in the Conchos valley.
In their words, “our idea is only to utilize an element which is currently being wasted, and which
will be of great benefit to the public interest, naturally bringing forth [a] new source of wealth,
labor, and employment for an infinite number of businesses.”3 Accurately citing the federal law

3

AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 1, f. 1. Note: the Spanish word fuente can be translated in a variety of
ways, mostly related to water, including source, fountain, spring or well. “[N]uestra idea es solamente utilizar un
elemento que en la actualidad está desperdiciándose, y que vendrá a ser de grandes beneficios que redundarán en el
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of June 6, 1894, relating to water concession, they requested a five-year exemption from all
federal taxes, a one-time permit to import all necessary equipment duty-free, the right of
expropriation for the purpose of public utility, and a suspension of all prior and future
concessions on the same waters.4 In compliance with federal law, they published their petition
three times in the official newspapers of both the state of Chihuahua and the Mexican Republic
in March of 1905, apparently receiving no objections.
Although they were formally required to publicly solicit such objections, it seems
unlikely that this project was in any jeopardy of being denied. Documents show that, from the
beginning of this process, Chihuahua governor Enrique Creel was intimately involved in
promoting this concession, and it was his signature which was regularly used to notarize
documents submitted to the SFCI. In another example, when the ministry asked Creel to evaluate
the pros and cons of the project, he responded that it posed no discernible problems, while
promising to deliver 5,000 horsepower of motor force to the Encinillas Mining Company, the
Rio Florido textile factory, the flour mill at the Compañía Harinera de Chihuahua, and various
public lighting and traction interests.5 Due to the unique structure of the Porfirian state, which

interés público, trayendo como es natural esa nueva fuente de riqueza, trabajo, y ocupación a infinidad de
operarios.”
4

AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 1, fs. 7, 10. As the Conchos was the main tributary of the Río Bravo
(known in the United States as the Río Grande), and was thus an international river, the request was forwarded for
approval to the ministry of foreign relations (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores), which approved the concession
with no objections.
5
AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 1, fs. 37–8. Notably, Creel’s response on May 15 described a dam
between 18 and 20 meters in height, generating 5,000 horsepower – a five-fold increase in power output from the
original request five months earlier. The actual completed dam would be much larger still, standing nearly 70 meters
tall and featuring a generating capacity of 40,000 horsepower. This consistently increasing scale was a defining
feature of the project.
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relied upon regional elite groups acting as agents of federal interests, it appears that the decision
to allow this concession might have belonged to Creel alone. An internal SFCI memo indicated
the existence of a “special agreement” (acuerdo especial) between president Porfirio Díaz and
Enrique Creel which required the governor’s approval of any federal water concessions in
Chihuahua.6 Thus, with Creel’s enthusiastic approval made clear, SFCI officials approved the
project in principle in September of 1905 and began drawing up the necessary contracts.
As one might suspect, this was hardly a case of Creel supporting the efforts of two lucky
utilities promoters. In fact, these three men were already intimately linked, and this concession at
La Boquilla appears upon further study to be yet another example of Creel managing the
Chihuahuan economy as an extension of family interests. Although Joaquín Cortazar Jr. and
Pablo Ginther were identified in documents only Mexican nationals acting in their own private
interest, this claim does not hold water. Cortazar was the scion of an elite Chihuahua family
whose father had once held the governorship, and who himself was married to Enrique Creel’s
daughter Adela.7 And Ginther was an Alsatian-born engineer who had mined his way across
North America from New York to El Paso, settling in Chihuahua in the 1890s after a railway
accident, growing close to Creel and his associates.8 Thus, the very identities of these two men
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 1, fs. 40–41. In addition, nearly all correspondence between SFCI
officials and concessionaires before the Revolution was notarized by Creel. See, for example, AHA, AN, caja 102,
exp. 1097, leg. 1, fs. 163–9.
7

Mark Wasserman, Persistent Oligarchs: Elites and Politics in Chihuahua, Mexico, 1910–1940 (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1993), 80. Cortazar’s father was a Terrazas-Creel associate who briefly served as governor
of Chihuahua in 1903, during which time he allowed the creation of the Caja de Ahorros de la República Mexicana,
a bank owned by his son. Joaquín Cortazar Jr. would later serve as an officer in one of three Terrazas-Creel banks in
the post-revolution years.
8

Lucío Salas Urbina, Santa Rosalía de Camargo: ayer y hoy (Chihuahua, 2005), 68–70. According to this
local history based on an article published in 1924 by the Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Ciudad Juárez,
Chihuahua, he was born Paul Ginther Lienhart in Mulhouse, Alsace, France, in 1875. Ginther moved to New York
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reveal that this project in an isolated desert canyon was always engaged in regional and
international networks of capital, commerce, and technical expertise.
Enrique Creel was himself the son-in-law of Luis Terrazas, the powerful former general
and patriarch of a family network which was unrivaled in northern Mexico. By the outbreak of
the Mexican Revolution in 1910, this extended Terrazas-Creel clan ruled Chihuahua as a virtual
fiefdom and is often cited as the quintessential example of the Porfirian franchisee-federalist
system of political economy.9 This family exercised a virtual “stranglehold” over the regional
economy, from real estate to banking to cattle ranching to the emerging cotton industry, and
demonstrated a marked tendency toward aggressive vertical integration of their interests.10 This
family also used concessionary federal policies to its advantage, organizing and administering
profitable foreign investment in Chihuahua under the aegis of Mexico City regulators. Thus, it
would come as no surprise that the governor’s brother Juan A. Creel would eventually find a
position on the board of the company created to build the dam.11

at age 12, studied mining, and discovered the “5 Nobles” mine in Canada before moving on to Nevada and
California. He crossed into Mexico at El Paso in 1896 and, following a railway accident, visited the sulfurous hot
springs at Ojo Caliente near Camargo in 1898, where he remained thereafter. Today, calle Pablo Ginther is one of
the main thoroughfares in Camargo.
9

The unique role of the Terrazas-Creel family as both powerful regional economic elites and brokers of
foreign capital within the Porfiriato have been explored in various publications by Mark Wasserman. See, most
recently, Mark Wasserman, Pesos and Politics: Business, Elites, Foreigners, and Government in Mexico, 1854–
1940 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), esp. chap. 2, "Mexican Entrepreneurs", 31–57.
10

The Terrazas-Creel family and their associates held about 15 million acres in Chihuahua before the
Revolution, or almost a quarter of the total surface area of the largest state in Mexico. Wasserman, Persistent
Oligarchs, 74–75. It should also be noted that, while mining was far and away the dominant industry in Chihuahua,
it was almost entirely controlled by US interests by the turn of the century. The Terrazas-Creel family benefitted
from mining mostly though auxiliary industries such as real estate, banking, provisioning and, of course,
government.
11

AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 1, f. 73.
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Another episode which does not appear in the records of concession reveals again the
direct role played by the Terrazas-Creel clan in the economy of Chihuahua. Also in 1905,
governor Enrique Creel ceded land to the Guggenheim-owned American Smelting and Refining
Company (ASARCO) to build a new refinery near the capital.12 This facility and its associated
mines would eventually figure among the earliest and largest electrical consumers of the
hydroelectric dam concurrently being proposed on the Conchos. Thus, although the project at La
Boquilla was pitched as a private undertaking with a multitude of potential uses, the record
suggests rather convincingly that this was a Terrazas-Creel project intended to address the
soaring energy demands of Chihuahua’s US-controlled mining sector. Lacking the massive
capital inputs required to generate profits from mining in Chihuahua, this family nonetheless
understood how to use the legal tools of Porfirian state building, foreign investment and
technology, and local initiative to build and maintain massive reserves of private wealth and
political power in the Mexican borderlands.
Sometime between the informal agreement reached in late 1905 and the drafting of
contracts in early 1906, the scale of this project was vastly transformed. Even in the earliest
drafts drawn up by SFCI officials, the quantity of water conceded was listed at 50,000 liters (50
m3) per second, or more than triple the original request. Since this volume of water would require
multiple large turbines and generators and a far higher dam, this increase suggested a project far
larger than originally proposed. This constant expansion of claims would be one of the defining

12
“La fundición de Avalos, Chih.: Informe de su inspección,” Boletín Minero 13, no. 5 (May 1922): 599.
The plant at Ávalos was assembled hurriedly from surplus parts drawn from El Paso and Monterrey, and entered
operation in 1908. ASARCO officials called this plant in its first iteration the “junk heap.” After proving its utility
during the war, Ávalos was renovated in 1917 and connected to hydroelectricity from La Boquilla, producing a
significant increase in efficiency. See Isaac F. Marcosson, Metal Magic: The Story of the American Smelting and
Refining Company (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1949), 207–10, esp. 209. Also, Bernstein, The Mexican
Mining Industry, 53–4.
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characteristics of the project, and concessionaires regularly pushed back against contractual
obligations, from the timeline for construction to the monthly inspection payment. In particular,
builders regularly flaunted the stipulation that allowed duty-free imports at one time only,
submitting lists of import requests for many years.
On March 7, 1906, the contract between the SFCI and Cortazar and Ginther become
official.13 As indicated by the blank fields and pre-printed format, most of the language in the
final contract was standard Porfirian-era boilerplate. To the extent that it reveals the norms of
Porfirian-era policy in regards to the state, private interests, and the natural environment, this
document is interesting in and of itself. For example, in what appears to be the first draft of this
contract, dated February 9, 1906, Article 2 did not simply allow the construction of a
hydroelectric dam, but in fact required concessionaires to generate all available hydraulic energy
granted in the contract and either apply it to local industry or transmit it to a place where it might
be utilized.14 In this way, SFCI officials were able, within narrow parameters, to dictate terms to
private interests in development projects beyond the political or financial means of the federal
government. If, in fact, it was SFCI officials who proposed increasing this concession on the
Conchos to 50,000 liters per second, such a change would have effectively forced
concessionaires to build a larger dam. Other articles were similarly concerned with facilitating
development, preapproving the construction of necessary transmission and telephone lines,
canals, roads, and bridges, as well as any rights-of-way these required.15

13

AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 1, f. 67; leg. 2, f. 266. As noted in a letter from Ginther and Cortazar
to SFCI minister Olegario Molina.
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 1, fs. 40–41.
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In fact, the contract required the construction of bridges to facilitate local traffic.
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Another set of articles would prove controversial as the project neared construction,
especially when surveyors began to determine the lands to be flooded. Article 11, which was
unaltered, allowed for the free expropriation of national lands required for construction. But
Articles 12 and 13, which were cut and pasted into the pre-printed contract, allowed for the free
expropriation of private lands as well. Interestingly, these were pasted over a much longer, sixclause Article 12 which laid out in careful detail the procedures for expropriating private lands,
including the appointment of a third-party assessor, the adjudication of fair prices, and
compensation to landowners for surveying and marking activities. These new, abbreviated
articles stipulated only that concessionaires had a right to expropriation, and that any SFCI
approval of plans which indicated lands to be expropriated would “constitute the administrative
declaration and basis of said expropriation.”16 In effect, this contract gave the SFCI authority to
rubber stamp any expropriation plans submitted by Ginther and Cortazar, making alreadyconcessionary federal policy even more generous to these concessionaires.
There were also obligations by which the contract required the concessionaires to abide.
The government reserved the right to run two telegraph lines of its own along any poles which
were installed, for example. And the concessionaires had the right to import all necessary
equipment free of duty, but only on one occasion and under the conditions that such materials
and machinery be used exclusively for the proposed project. As will be shown later, both of these
import restrictions were violated regularly over the years. Although the concessionaires would
also benefit from a five-year exemption from federal taxes, the SFCI reserved the right to set
electrical usage rates, as well as reclaim the dam if it were abandoned, with a guarantee of
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“…de los planos que incluyan los terrenos por expropiar, constituirá la declaración administrativa y
fundamento de dicha expropiación.”
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compensation to its owners. The contract required the lands in question to be surveyed within six
months, and for plans to be submitted within a year. Construction was required to begin within
two years and be completed within seven. During this time, the company would be required to
pay 250 pesos monthly into an inspection fund, as well as deposit five thousand pesos with the
National Bank of Mexico to guarantee completion and compliance.17 Even with these
stipulations, this was an attractive set of terms to investors which soon attracted a flow of foreign
capital. Perhaps the contract’s penultimate article best summarized the spirit of the agreement:
“The Government will offer to the concessionaires the moral and material support within its
ability upon request to overcome any obstacles which might present themselves in carrying out
this Contract.”18
Despite the liberal term of this contract, there still loomed in the language the growing
tension between national interests and foreign capital – a tension which was especially prominent
in the borderlands. Ginther and Cortazar were permitted to subcontract work to any entity they
wished, public or private. They were also allowed to transfer all rights and obligations of the
contract to another company or individual, pending federal approval, as well as issue any stocks
and bonds necessary to finance the project. But concessionaires were explicitly forbidden from
partnering with any foreign government in completing the project, under penalty of forfeiture. In
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This included failure to comply with stated conditions, to adhere to the stated timeline of construction, or
to utilize water in ten years. The company was prohibited from transferring its contract without federal permission
or partnering with a foreign government.
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 2, fs. 199–200. Interestingly, although this article was present in
only one of the original contracts, SFCI officials decided to include it in the combined version. “El Gobierno
prestará a los concesionarios el apoyo moral y material que esté dentro de su posibilidad cuando éstos lo soliciten
para vencer los obstáculos que puedan presentarse al llevar a cabo el presente Contrato.”
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fact, all concessionaires would be considered Mexican – even foreign nationals – and would thus
subject to national laws.
In September of 1906, a year after the project was first approved, Ginther and Cortazar
informed SFCI minster Olegario Molina of the creation of the Compañía Agrícola y de Fuerza
Eléctrica del Río Conchos (Conchos River Agricultural and Electrical Power Company, hereafter
CAFERC), headquartered in Camargo.19 On paper, this still appeared to be a local concern, with
“Paul” Ginther (as he signed his own name) serving as president, Cortazar as secretary, and Juan
A. Creel as treasurer. Yet the presence of another man revealed the international connections
already at work in this project. The same month that the CAFERC was created, company
engineer Emil Bronimann submitted the first technical evaluation and budget estimates for the
project.20 Bronimann was a Swiss engineer who had long been involved in mining, damming,
and irrigation projects on both sides of the border. His expedited compilation of this extensive
and detailed evaluation, made in a rugged desert landscape with no rail access, suggests that
planning was already well underway when the CAFERC was formed in 1906. It also suggests
that, perhaps even before 1905, international interests had set their sights on the project at La
Boquilla.
If the contract and concession documents in 1906 still suggested a project of regional
scale, the first engineering report and proposal submitted by Bronimann to the SFCI revealed a

19
AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 1, f. 67. Molina was a prominent henequen magnate in the Yucatán,
a global industry which involved harsh labor relations with native Mayas. While served as SFCI minister under
Díaz, and broadly supported the president’s policy of economic liberalism, he was a vocal critic of the deepening
foreign penetration of Mexican economic interests by the early twentieth century.
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, fs. 138–230.
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grandiose project framed in the context of global technological expansion. While Bronimann’s
report was intended to persuade SFCI officials on the value of the project, and was often florid
and hyperbolic in its characterizations, it was not far off the mark in predicting that La Boquilla
would become among the most powerful and efficient hydroelectric dams in the world and the
largest in the Western hemisphere.21 Taking dams in Germany, Switzerland, and Algeria as his
models, Bronimann proposed a structure which would place Chihuahua at the leading edge of
global hydroelectric development.22 Ironically, this project was economically feasible due mostly
to the arid climate, rugged terrain, and sparse settlement, factors which had for centuries made
local development economically infeasible before the introduction of the railroad. The relative
lack of permanent settlement in the region correlated to low property and indemnification costs,
which constituted major expenses in similar projects in Europe and India. With the support of
federal regulators, CAFERC officials hoped to have these costs substantially reduced or waived
altogether.23 While dams in Europe typically displaced between 50 and 150 residents per square
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, fs. 160–62. According to Bronimann’s figures, only the
International Dam, then proposed at El Paso-Ciudad Juárez, was expected to flood a larger area (10,500 hectares as
opposed to 10,376 hectares), and this was a diversion dam meant for irrigation, not hydroelectric generation. La
Boquilla’s height of 63.5 meters would surpass all but the Theodore Roosevelt dam in Arizona (estimated at 73
meters), including those in India and Europe. Bronimann estimated the total cost of the project at $10 million
Mexican pesos, which would yield one horsepower per $318 pesos, or $400 pesos at the point of consumption – an
astonishingly low figure for the time. In fact, La Boquilla would cost double this sum by completion. Dam materials
were estimated at $3.5 million pesos, while the power plant was estimated at $153,000 pesos. Ten double turbines
were budgeted at $370,000 pesos, while 20 generators were to cost $440,000 pesos, and 60 single-phase
transformers were listed at $480,000 pesos which, along with other expenses, brought the total for electrical
equipment to $1.5 million pesos. Transmission required 230 iron towers, 5,100 double wooden posts, 2,600 single
wooden posts, 24,500 porcelain insulators, and 310 tons of copper estimated at $1,000 pesos a ton. This, along with
equipment for four substations, brought the transmission total to $1.5 million pesos.
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, f. 165.
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, f. 159. Only in the western United States, Bronimann argued,
could dams be constructed for less than $1 peso per cubic meter of water storage, and La Boquilla was competitive
with these. For example, the slightly-smaller Theodore Roosevelt reservoir under construction in Arizona was
expected to cost more ($8 million pesos as opposed to $5 million). In Europe and British India, where populations
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kilometer, Bronimann found that La Boquilla would displace only five residents, creating water
storage for less than one peso per cubic meter, a relatively minuscule figure which was
comparable only to projects in the western United States.
This survey described the general quality of the terrain, offering a vision of an irrigated
paradise freed from the shackles of routinism and scarcity. The vast majority of the lands within
the proposed basin, and indeed much of the region, were “still virgin [and] of little value” –
mostly chaparral scrublands which could not be farmed without access to water. What little
agriculture did exist in this canyon was mostly temporal – small-scale, seasonal farmlands in
riparian islands and shorelines which were prone to flooding and drought. With only a few
exceptions, there were no significant irrigation works in this area.24 Within the 11,035 hectares to
be flooded, an area larger than the island of Manhattan, there were an estimated 540 residents
living in 75 structures, primarily on large haciendas and a few scattered riverine properties held
in mancomún.25 Scrublands in Chihuahua were then valued between two and five pesos per
hectare while, at the other end of the spectrum, irrigated lands were sometimes valued as high as
$2,000 pesos per hectare. Bronimann estimated the value of lands to be flooded at $300,000
pesos.

were far denser, even much smaller dams cost significantly more to build. The Sengbachtal dam in Germany, for
example, cost $67 pesos per cubic meter of water stored, while projects in France and Spain averaged $19 and $7
pesos per cubic meter, respectively. Bronimann also included a detailed plan for irrigating 10,000 hectares below the
dam at a total cost of $2.5 million pesos: see AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, fs. 203–23.
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, fs. 160–1. Bronimann estimated the composition of the area to be
flooded accordingly: 9,950 hectares of land and 285 hectares of islands; 800 hectares of these were federal lands
consisting mostly of high rocky outcroppings; only about 850 hectares (7.7%) were productive temporal or irrigated
lands. The only properties featuring significant irrigation works were Nuevo Luis and La Labor Colorada, the latter
of which would only be flooded when the reservoir was at its highest. In fact, as the dam was again heightened
during construction, both of these properties would be at least partially flooded.
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Mancomún refers to agricultural properties worked and held in common, typically according to
traditional practices, for which no formal deed or title of ownership existed.
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As for the dam itself, Bronimann proposed a masonry structure 70 meters high and 260
meters across, built with 380,000 cubic meters of material. The 100-meter canyon walls would
create a narrow, deep and impervious channel ideal for reducing seepage and exposure to
evaporation. Bronimann calculated flows on the famously capricious Conchos, based on
projections and admittedly scattered data from rainfall measuring stations, at 1.84 billion cubic
meters annually. From this, he argued that the dam could easily draw the allotted 50,000 liters
per second (a concession of 1.58 billion cubic meters annually) to generate between 24.6 and
28.3 megawatts, or around 80 percent of the capacity of an installed 29.8 megawatts.26 On the
upper floor of the powerhouse, transformers would step up electricity from 5,000 volts to 60,000
volts for long-distance transmission on aluminum cables, due to the high price of copper.27
Bronimann estimated the electrical consumption of greater Chihuahua at 16 megawatts,
which jumped to 24.9 megawatts when one included the more distant Laguna region – the
industrial and agricultural center containing the cities of Torreón, Gómez Palacio, and Ciudad
Lerdo, 300 kilometers to the south.28 Daily electrical demand in the proposed distribution area
was estimated at 18.6 megawatts, with Chihuahua City and its nearby mining district of Santa
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, f. 151. The original water request of 50,000 liters per second
seemed limited and, to him, it was evident the promoters would need to petition the SFCI for an expanded
concession. In fact, as discussed later, the original 50,000 liters allotted far outstripped the ability of the Conchos to
provide water, and La Boquilla only rarely operated at capacity.
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, fs. 184–191. Using transformers to increase voltage allows for the
transmission of electricity over longer distances, and is called high-tension transmission. While Mexico City’s
electrical plant at Necaxa transmitted over longer distances at 34,700 volts, Bronimann planned to transmit at 60,000
volts, and some projects had already begun experimenting with transmission at 100,000 volts.
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This shows that, even in the earliest stages of planning, potential expansion was considered. The Laguna,
or the Comarca Lagunera, is a tri-city region (Torreón, Gómez Palacio, Ciudad Lerdo) on the Nazas River spanning
the states of Coahuila and Durango. It has long been among the most important agricultural centers in the north.
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Eulalia using 7.5 megawatts and the major mining district of Parral using 3 megawatts.29
Although this load was not expected to be continuous, the largest local industry was mining,
which could draw electricity around the clock, helping greatly in balancing the electrical load.
Overall, demand was expected to fluctuate between about 16.4 megawatts and 13 megawatts
during any 24-hour cycle. Discounted rates of 10 to 20 percent would be extended to residents of
nearby Camargo to stimulate local industry and maximize the electric efficiency lost in longdistance transmission. Proposed distribution lines would be run to Chihuahua (120 km),
Camargo (29 km), Parral (85 km), and Jimenez (80 km), typically following existing railroads.
Beyond these purely technical details, however, Bronimann clearly saw his task as
appealing to the vision and modernizing impulses of his bureaucratic audience. While, in its drier
moments, Bronimann’s survey described the technical details of a massive energy system linking
major mining and industrial centers, its more poetic passages offered a bucolic vision of leisure,
progress, and industry in Chihuahua:
There will be no shortage of entrepreneurs who, through the establishment of hotels and
boats of every class, will know how to make this place the object of countless excursions
by tourists and sportsmen [amigos de ‘Sports’]. The splendid climate of this State would
certainly attract more foreigners, were it not for the total lack of recreational facilities of
this class, and the Ojos Calientes (Hot Springs) in Camargo, famous for the great curative
power of their waters, will help to make this one of the most important towns in the
State.30
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, f. 182. In fact, the percentage of power eventually used by Parral
would be much greater.
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, fs. 158, 227. While this did not occur immediately, Lago Toronto
is today a regional destination for swimming, boating, jet skiing, and especially black bass fishing, a species
rumored to have been introduced for the entertainment of American or Canadian engineers. “No faltarán personas
emprendedoras, las cuales por el establecimiento de hoteles, y al alquiler de canoas de toda clase, sepan hacer de
éste lugar el objeto de numerosas excursiones de turistas y amigos de ‘Sports’. El espléndido clima de este Estado
seguramente atraería más extranjeros, si no fuera por la falta completa de lugares de recreo de esta clase, y los Ojos
Calientes en Camargo, afamados ya por el gran poder curativa de sus aguas, ayudarán hacer de la última una de las
poblaciones más importantes del Estado.”
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While attracting foreign dollars southward, Bronimann claimed that La Boquilla would
benefit Mexicans as well, poor and rich alike. Citing the lack of effective transportation in the
region, he warned that ongoing labor unrest and speculation made coal and oil unstable elements
upon which to build an energy regime. Through the expansion of hydroelectricity, as well as
proposed auxiliary rail, road and telegraph connections, he argued that La Boquilla would exert a
stabilizing and civilizing influence, spreading prosperity, generating industry, and even
improving the climate. Tracing the spread of civilization from the ancient Egyptians, Arabs and
Chinese to the Romans and Spanish and, most recently, Europe and the United States,
Bronimann argued that dam building was itself an expression of progress, demonstrating the
“greatest of importance of dams or large deposits of water in the rational economy of water and
the general wealth of a Nation.”31 Bronimann asserted that the Mexican government was
“morally and materially” obligated to support the engineers in their proposed task.
Although mining figured mostly in the background, Bronimann did address this industry
in the closing paragraph of his report. He granted that mining was the largest industry in the State
and, indeed, all of Mexico, and that it generated great wealth for foreign investors. But he went
on to argue that mining was, in reality of secondary importance to the general well-being, and the
great sums of money tied up in mining were mostly exaggerated, touching only a few. In
Bronimann’s telling, La Boquilla would not make irrigation an auxiliary activity to
hydroelectricity, but the primary activity. In fact, he pitched this dam as a means for pivoting
away from the foreign-dominated mining industry, instead investing in a project which would
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, f. 228.
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generate new industries, distributing wealth more evenly, and better serving the general wellbeing of the nation – “which should be the principal object of every democratic Government.” La
Boquilla, he said, would result in extended railways and affordable housing and transportation,
while also making economical the exploitation of mines throughout Mexico.32 As the scope of
Bronimann’s world was global and technical, there was ample reason to question his outwardly
altruistic motives in his proposal for Mexican development. But, in framing his project of
mining-oriented hydroelectric development as a benefit to the nation, he and his Terrazas-Creel
patrons seemed eager to overcome possible federal or popular objections to yet another project
enriching foreigners.
Delays
In early 1907, the project at La Boquilla appeared to be moving forward as planned. In
April, the CAFERC presented plans based on Bronimann’s survey to the SFCI, which were
accepted with only minor changes. In fact, SFCI regulators responded that the company should
request an increase to the 50,000 liters per second granted in their contract since the project was
of great national importance. Company officials were surprised to learn, however, that they
would be required to come to terms with all landowners in the proposed basin. A decision
rendered on May 1 made this last point explicit – while the company had permission to continue
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moving forward with the project, final approval would be withheld until ownership or permission
was proven for all lands to be flooded.33
This requirement caught CAFERC officials off-guard, as they correctly understood that
their contract freed them from the requirement to purchase lands. In responding to the SFCI’s
decision, company lawyer Manuel Levi wrote that it had caught him by “surprise,” since it flew
in “open opposition” to articles 12, 13, and 28 of the existing contract.34 Notably, articles 12 and
13 were those pasted into the original, pre-printed contract, and which guaranteed the right of
expropriation. On May 18, Levi made a formal request that this requirement be voided. As he
argued, the CAFERC had already purchased various economically worthless chaparral lands in
the region, which it had done only because it had received assurances from the SFCI that the
project already had federal approval. With significant investments already tied up in the project,
Levi argued that the company wished only to have the original contract enforced to the letter. At
least one SFCI official agreed. An unsigned internal SFCI opinion dated June 7 stated that the
complainant was right and that the language of the contract was very clear in allowing
expropriation.35 Yet this requirement to purchase lands carried the day, as two separate opinions
in June made clear. This debate reveals that, even within the SFCI, opinions on policy were not
monolithic.36 The matter was put to rest in September when an unnamed SFCI official in charge
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 2, fs. 265–269. “Mucha sorpresa me ha causado esa determinación
que viene en abierta oposición con los artículos 12, 13, y 28 del contrato celebrado con esa Secretaría…”.
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of agreements wrote: “Tell Mr. Levi… so that he is no longer in suspense on the matter, to
remember that he must present the approval of owners of the lands to be flooded.” A CAFERC
request seeking an extension on breaking ground was also denied – the company would still be
required to begin construction by March 20, 1908.37
In addition to this new land acquisition requirement, the company was also confronted
with an apparently unanticipated competing claim on the waters of the upper Conchos. In March
of 1906, as Ginther and Cortazar were already in the process of securing their damming claim,
another concession had been granted to Schondube and Neugebauer, an agent of German
electrical giant Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG), at a point upstream from La
Boquilla near the village of San Nicolás de la Joya.38 Schondube and Neugebauer was active in
development projects across Mexico at this time, including electric streetcar lines in Toluca,
Guadalajara, Tuxtepec, and Saltillo (Coahuila),39 the lighting of the Teatro Colón in Mexico
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van a inundar…”.
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City,40 plumbing in Querétaro41, and the construction of the locally-famous “bola de agua” water
tower in Celaya, modeled after a similar construction in Stuttgart, Germany.42 The personal
correspondence of a Mexican representative of British engineering firm S. Pearson & Son also
indicated that his client was engaged in a bitter struggle with Schondube and Neugebauer to land
a concession in Oaxaca in late 1909.43 This claim would have made the CAFERC project
infeasible, as the dam counted on all available water in the Conchos being available for electrical
generation. Thus, CAFERC moved to acquire and combine this concession with their own in
1907.
A survey of this proposed project, which was conducted on behalf of Schondube and
Neugebauer by an engineering student in 1907, shows that these two companies had been in
contact before this contractual consolidation. While in the field surveying the canyon near San
Nicolás de la Joya for a proposed dam 30 meters high, Julio Pani was informed by his client
Schondube and Neugebauer that they would enter into a joint development arrangement with a
“Canadian Electric Company.”44 He was visited by William Tye, identified as the company
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president, who instructed Pani to begin surveying for a dam 70 meters high. Engineer James D.
Schuyler described to Pani plans to install eight generators producing up to 19.7 megawatts. This
electricity, he was told, was destined for the mining regions of Parral, Minas Nuevas, and Santa
Barbara. At a cost of $6,620,700 (half for the dam itself), Pani estimated such a project would
pay for itself in three years. But he also estimated this expanded project was far too large for the
proposed site, and might never fill to capacity. In addition, these plans called for the flooding of
the entire town of San Nicolás de la Joya, which implied a significant indemnification costs if
lands were not expropriated outright.
Based on Pani’s estimates, it is perhaps clear why the CAFERC chose to acquire this
concession but not to develop it. The proposed dam was never built, despite federal efforts after
the Revolution to force the company to complete it. In September 1907, Schondube and
Neugebauer officials succeeded in reforming their contract, allowing for the much larger dam
mentioned by Pani, which had apparently been conceived in collaboration with CAFERC
engineers.45 However, after struggling over the logistics of developing competing claims
between two different companies, the CAFERC acquired the Schondube and Neugebauer
concession outright, although the terms of this transfer are not known. The CAFERC received
federal permission to combine these two concessions within one contract on July 19, 1909,
which effectively granted the CAFERC exclusive rights to develop hydropower on the
Conchos.46
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Late in 1907, the CAFERC’s plans for La Boquilla were set back for yet again, this time
indefinitely, with the onset of a global economic recession. A failed attempt to corner the copper
market on Wall Street in mid-October produced a cascading failure of bankruptcies, bank runs,
and stock crashes. The Panic of 1907, as it came to be known, dried up available capital in
lending markets, and made it difficult to finance large projects such as La Boquilla, which were
funded through complex bond and share arrangements. Although markets began to recover by
early November, company petitions to the SFCI requesting an extension of construction
deadlines indicated that financing remained a problem. In February 1908, for example, CAFERC
officials successfully requested a two-year extension for developing the project, citing economic
hardship.47 Construction on La Boquilla was required to begin by March 26, 1910, and
completed within three years of this date.48 Although neither company nor federal officials could
have known at the time, this delay pushed construction into the teeth of an armed insurrection.
With little communication between the company and federal officials, the project was effectively
postponed through 1908.
Land Acquisition
Activity related to La Boquilla began again in May 1909, when the Canadian character of
this project finally became official. According to CAFERC records of a meeting in Chihuahua,
the company elected a new board of directors. An engineer from Toronto, G.F. Greenwood,
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would assume the presidency, while a panel of men with Anglophone names would serve as
officers – S.M. Brookfield, W.D. Ross, and B.F. Pearson.49 As a lawyer, Cortazar retained power
of attorney on behalf of the company in their land purchasing efforts. While Ginther retained no
formal title, he would serve as the field agent in acquiring these titles, directing one of the most
notoriously violent episodes of this campaign. As was customary, this corporate reshuffling was
notarized by the governor himself, Enrique Creel.50
Despite the CAFERC’s official status as a Mexican company, it was perhaps the worstkept secret in Chihuahua that it was, in reality, a Canadian concern.51 At nearly the same time
that the CAFERC board changed hands, the Mexican Northern Power Company (MNPC) was
founded under the laws of Montreal, and soon both companies would have nearly identical
boards of directors, with “Paul” Ginther listed as the sole Mexican resident.52 In an arrangement
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common to late-Porfirian Mexico, the CAFERC became a free-standing company of the MNPC
– a proxy meant to combine concessionary resource policies in Mexico with the lax financial
disclosure requirements of Canada.53 This corporate structure was common to overseas utilities
promotion at this time, and especially to the banks of Toronto and Montreal, which were
responsible for a burst of hydroelectric promotion before World War I through Latin America –
from Brazil to Cuba to Mexico. Although La Boquilla was unique in its proposed scale in 1909,
it was just one project within this wave of Canadian infrastructural promotion.54
With the project formally under new direction, Cortazar requested once again that the
SFCI recognize the company’s right of expropriation. In a forceful, eight-page letter dated June
1909, he argued that the benefits to be conferred by this project far outweighed any potential
negative impacts, and would be a significant public benefit.55 Citing the water laws of June 5,
1888, and June 6, 1894, Cortazar argued that the right of expropriation was understood to be
essential in developing large-scale public works, and should be written into the existing contract
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despite the fact that such protections already existed. Although this petition was again
unsuccessful, the way in which this complaint was framed and delivered to federal officials
provides a revealing glimpse into the technological changes which had already transformed
Porfirian Chihuahua.
To argue for the essential importance of the dam at La Boquilla, Cortazar pointed to the
weakness of the existing energy regime in Chihuahua as an obstacle to further development.
Although the railroads had opened the vast deserts and mountains of the north, Chihuahua’s
profitable mines relied upon bulky and expensive imports of coal and petroleum, which could
not be efficiently delivered far from railway stations. Developing a cheap and reliable source of
energy like electricity was central to developing these mines, “sources of considerable wealth
which have not reached their full potential in the State, due to the costliness of fuel.”56 In
Cortazar’s telling, La Boquilla would kill two birds with one stone, providing a reliable energy
foundation for industry while also creating a vast reserve of water in the desert, which would
support both agriculture and the labor base upon which both of these sectors would rely. He
lamented that the water of the Conchos was every day being wasted, flowing uselessly to the sea
without improving the “sterile” and “uncultivated” lands through which it flowed. The “public
wealth” of Chihuahua, and thus the entire nation, relied upon the construction of La Boquilla.
With this importance thus established, Cortazar argued that the great capital investment
promised by the CAFERC justified the company’s primacy in claiming water rights on the
Conchos. He specifically requested that a formal declaration of water rights be issued, that the
right of expropriation be conferred to the CAFERC based on submitted plans as originally

56

“…fuentes de considerable riqueza que no han alcanzado llegar al grado de que sean susceptible en el
Estado, por lo dispendioso del combustible...”.

52

guaranteed in their contract, and that lands 50 kilometers downstream also be set aside for later
development by the CAFERC, using the same 50,000 liters per second already granted to the
company. Citing continuing financial hardship, he also requested a reduction to the deposit
already paid, as well as tax exemption on all activities for 25 years. Based on irrigation plans
later drawn up by the company, this included a large portion of the irrigable lands downriver.
What Cortazar was proposing was a significant expansion of the company’s concession, which
would have essentially placed much of the upper Conchos River under a private monopoly.
SFCI officials expressed sympathy but were ultimately unmoved by Cortazar’s plea.
Within the formal SFCI documentation of this time, it is easy to read competing interests at
work, but much harder to tease apart the individual strands. While the company clearly had the
support of the Terrazas-Creel government in Chihuahua, both material and moral, federal support
is harder to gauge. The SFCI documentation demonstrates an overall level of support, yet also
shows quite clearly that this was not without limits, reflecting perhaps known rivalries between
the Chihuahua oligarchs and Porfirio Díaz, or between the ministry’s laisses faire mandate and
the growing preoccupation of SFCI minister Olegario Molina with foreign ownership of Mexican
industry.
In this case, the SFCI upheld most of the CAFERC’s original contract but was undeterred
in demanding that landowners be compensated. Cortazar’s requested expansion was likewise
dismissed. A series of internal SFCI memos from June 1909 indicated that, while Molina
officially found Cortazar’s request consistent with contemporary water and land policy, it
conflicted with a presidential order from January 4, 1908, which prohibited any further
concessions from being granted along the Conchos River. Apparently, Porfirio Díaz also saw the
potential for irrigation in the region. Taking this series of memos and correspondence together, it
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seems likely that the CAFERC, and thus the Terrazas-Creel government, were surprised by this
federal interest in irrigation.57
By April 1909, the CAFERC abandoned its negotiation efforts and began the process of
acquiring land rights in the proposed reservoir above La Boquilla. Altogether, the company
would acquire full or partial control of fourteen properties in the region, most of which were
large haciendas, ranches, or other similar estates dedicated mainly to cattle grazing and smallscale agriculture near the river. Considering the vast size of the reservoir, this is a relatively
small amount of properties. Between April and October, Ginther and Cortazar secured rights to
seven such properties, which accounted for the vast majority of the area to be flooded, while
another property was added in January of 1910. Two more were added to the CAFERC portfolio
via SFCI-approved expropriation on March 28, 1911, after construction had already begun, when
no formal title could be found.58
In most cases, these properties were held by wealthy landowners. Most contained a
family home, housing for laborers, and a variety of work structures, and at least one contained
improved irrigation works. At the other end of the spectrum, however, there were at least three
properties held in mancomún. Without a formal title and often with little social or economic
means, residents of these properties were subject to outright expropriation. The size of these
properties ranged from more than 15,000 hectares to a few hundred, and most fetched about $5
pesos per hectare, roughly the rate for chaparral lands. At least three of these purchases were
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made with an agreement to name a price at a later date, often contingent on the completion of the
dam, thus leaving a final price unrecorded.59 While it unclear exactly how or why these
transactions were made, they suggest that their owners were of some means, and were supportive
of the project. Indeed, two wrote as much in their statements of permission.
While the quality of these lands and the prices they commanded were generally similar,
the conditions of each contract reflected the needs and concerns of the landowners themselves.
Some created easements and rights-of-way for railway lines and dam construction, while others
offered lands for sale on a conditional basis. A few sellers retained subsoil rights to the land even
after it was sold, with a special interest in petroleum, a substance which was unknown in
Chihuahua. Once again, nearly every transaction was notarized by Creel himself.
One sale in particular is instructive in understanding the relationship between society and
environment in the region. On October 12, the CAFERC secured what was to be the most
expensive land purchase, if not the largest. Juan Almazán agreed to sell 2,874 hectares of his
property Ancon del Burro y Armero for a total of $144,350 pesos, or nearly half of the
CAFERC’s land budget. This high price was due to the irrigation works on the site. Like most
lands in the region, 87 percent (2,500 hectares) of this parcel was listed as chaparral, while a
much smaller fraction was listed as temporal – 57 hectares valued at $175 pesos each. But this
property also contained 317 hectares of irrigated land worth $375 pesos each, which meant that
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11 percent of the surface area accounted for more than 80 percent of the value of the property.60
With irrigated lands valued more than 75 times greater than the arid chaparral lands surrounding
them, one can see the ways in which capital had already shaped this landscape. For a federal
government seeking settlement, industry and, ultimately, wealth, this property demonstrated that
the CAFERC’s promise of an irrigated oasis was well within the realm of possibility.
Yet while wealthier landowners found their interactions with the CAFERC amiable and,
often, profitable, poorer tenants came into much more violent contact with the company. While
sales records carefully list the sizes and prices of these larger properties, at least two mancomún
properties were expropriated and forcibly evicted without compensation, and company maps of
the project suggest there may have been others. While the SFCI required proof of ownership for
properties, this did not apply in cases for which a title did not exist. This SFCI requirement was
meant to protect property, and not necessarily the people who worked it.
These voices appear hardly at all in the correspondence between the CAFERC and the
SFCI, and official questions about these expropriations would not emerge until years after the
Revolution. But according to petitions sent by the farmers of San Miguel and San José de las
Babizas directly to presidents Plutarco Elías Calles (in 1928) and Lázaro Cárdenas (in 1938),
local authorities in the service of the “Creelista” electric company drove them forcibly from their
land. They alleged that, in 1909, Ginther himself appeared and, claiming federal support for his
activities, warned residents to leave, plundering their cattle and crops. Later, during the brief
counterrevolutionary presidency of Victoriano Huerta in 1913, they claimed that the CAFERC
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took advantage of the chaos, sending Ginther’s brother, band of hired guns, and an explosives
expert to evict them, leveling the settlement. According to their complaint, the rubble of their
former homes was used as fill in the dam itself. A 1912 newspaper article seemed to corroborate
this episode, referring to the “scandalous dispossession” suffered by landowners in the area at the
hands of the “powerful” and “unscrupulous” CAFERC.61 While it may be impossible to establish
the veracity of these claims now, it is clear that the SFCI did indeed approve the expropriation of
these lands, at least tacitly approving this dispossession.62
As 1909 drew to a close, the project at La Boquilla appeared to be back on track after two
years of setbacks. While no formal approval of plans had been given, the SFCI had offered
general approval of the project pending proof of land purchases, which were received in
November of 1909. A month later, the CAFERC received permission to legally combine their
Schondube concession with its own existing contract, thus effectively consolidating control over
the waters of the upper Conchos.63 The company was confident it would meet the
groundbreaking deadline of March 1910.
Yet the major event in Chihuahua at this time was not the planned dam, but the so-called
Border Summit between Mexican president Porfirio Díaz and US president William Howard Taft
on October 16, 1909. This was meant to be a crowning achievement for the Díaz regime, as no
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US president had ever visited Mexico. Their meeting on the border at El Paso-Ciudad Juárez was
meant to cement Mexico’s place among the modern nations of the world. As the local hosts, the
Terrazas-Creel family was intimately involved with the arrangements, and made sure that Díaz
was received with parades, banners, cavalry, and singing children as he made his way via rail
through the mining regions around Parral, passing through the CAFERC headquarters of
Camargo, to the statehouse in Chihuahua City, and finally to the border.64
Yet this celebration was, in retrospect, more of a swan song to the Porfiriato. Having
announced earlier in the year that he intended to step down after three decades of rule, Díaz
changed his mind in 1909, deciding to run against northern oligarch Francisco I. Madero, who
was campaigning on an anti-reelection platform. Almost exactly one year later, Madero would be
jailed for his opposition, triggering the first phase of the Mexican Revolution. Within months,
Díaz would leave for exile in Paris. Díaz had pushed Mexican modernization through
investments from abroad and shrewd political maneuvering at home. Having generated
tremendous wealth for some, especially in the borderlands, this modernization left most
Mexicans behind, and Díaz proved unable to contain the fierce protests of both a growing and
disaffected bourgeoisie and the impoverished masses in demanding more equitable economic
and political systems. Combined with a major crop failure in Mexico in 1909, these pressures
finally spiraled out of the control of the man who Leo Tolstoy celebrated as a “modern
Cromwell.”65
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⁂
The dam at La Boquilla, still awaiting construction, was a fitting monument to the
Porfiriato. It represented transnational networks of capital and technological exchange, served
the extractive and foreign-owned mining industry, and embodied both the modernizing impulses
of the era and the deep inequalities upon which it was built. It was equally fitting, then, that the
official program of the Taft-Díaz interview offered a glowing tribute to this project, and a
hagiographic portrait of its designer, Emil Bronimann. Echoing the same discourse of
technocratic liberation seen in Bronimann’s own proposal, the engineer was described as a
“wizard” capable of leading Mexico out of the “intricate labyrinth of shadows and scrub” and
into the light of civilization. Through the application of the three main avenues of human
progress, “Statistics, Electricity, and Hydraulics,” Bronimann was counted among the greatest
Mexican patriots as well as the “benefactors of humanity.” Supported by the altruism and vision
of governor Enrique Creel, who demonstrated his undying love of country by facilitating this
great and “transcendental” project, La Boquilla was cast as a tribute to universal civilization in
Porfirian Mexico.66
The irony was, of course, that while this triumvirate of genius was celebrated for
delivering peace, stability, and prosperity to Chihuahua, the dam was built in the midst of
devastating guerrilla warfare. Díaz soon died in exile in Paris and Creel, along with most of the
CAFERC management, spent most of the Revolution across the border in El Paso. La Boquilla
was grandiose, excessive, and negotiated between economic and political elites with little regard
for the needs of Chihuahuan society. In this sense, the project stood astride two very different
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historical contexts, finally generating power in an era very different from that of its concession.
For a variety of reasons, it would be more than a decade before Mexican state officials began to
translate La Boquilla to the new social and political realities of the long Revolution.
While deeply flawed in many of its assumptions about progress and civilization in
Mexico, this gushing celebration of La Boquilla was correct in one sense – the importance of La
Boquilla did indeed extend far beyond Chihuahua, and even beyond Mexico. After the flight of
Porfirio Díaz, who approved the project, it was transnational engineers and promoters who saw
La Boquilla through to completion. With contracts in hand, and federal administrative capacity
waning by the day, these international builders and local laborers continued their work entirely
outside the realm of federal involvement. During the early years of the Revolution, political and
economic life in Chihuahua continued largely unchanged, demonstrating a deep regional
integration into global markets and a relatively weak connection with Mexico City. Chihuahua
was already a space of global development even before the completion of this dam. The creation
of La Boquilla, and the infrastructural power it implied, threatened to drive Chihuahua even
farther from Mexico City – a fact which was noted with alarm by Mexican engineers.
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CHAPTER 2: Construction, 1910–1915
In June of 1910, incumbent Porfirio Díaz jailed opposition candidate Francisco Madero
just days before the presidential election, ensuring his own reelection. Yet this victory was to be
short-lived. After three decades of autocratic rule, Díaz had presided in recent years over a
recession and acute drought, straining the bonds of patronage upon which the Porfirian system
was built. An upwardly mobile bourgeois class felt increasingly excluded from public life by the
powerful Terrazas-Creel network, which represented Porfirian power in Chihuahua. The jailing
of Madero proved to be the last straw, triggering a widespread rebellion against the Díaz regime.
By the fall, Madero fled to the United States and published his Plan de San Luís, calling on all
Mexicans to rise in arms against the federal government. The Mexican Revolution had begun.
The construction of the hydroelectric dam at La Boquilla corresponded closely to the
events of the early Revolution in Chihuahua. Ground was broken in the last days of the
Porfiriato, less than a week before Madero was jailed. As in the rest of Chihuahua, work
continued unperturbed at first, save for intermittent railway stoppages. The most intense phase of
construction occurred during the brief revolutionary governorship of Pancho Villa (1913–14), the
same man who would later lay siege to the dam as a guerrilla leader. La Boquilla was completed
in 1915, just as Villa turned his army against federal forces, marking a violent turn in Chihuahua.
Although Chihuahua was a major revolutionary theater of war, La Boquilla was completed with
only minor setbacks, demonstrating the strength of economic and logistical ties between this
region and the outside world during the early Revolution.
The record of exchanges between company officials and federal ministers during this
period reveals the waning capacity of state power in Chihuahua, which collapsed entirely after
the reactionary coup of 1913. Communication consisted primarily of import lists and receipts
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used to charge or waive duty. However, these imports quickly began to number into the
thousands, clearly exceeding the processing capacity of federal ministers at the SFCI. These
showed that, despite the legal jurisdiction exercised by federal officials over the project, it was
implicated in existing global networks of exchange on a scale which defied state control, ranging
from Toronto, Montreal, New York and Chicago to London, Antwerp, and Zurich. Especially
when it came to cement, a product which federal ministers and regional business interests wished
to develop domestically, company and government officials engaged in pitched debates over
qualities and quantities permitted for import.
Taken together, this seemingly endless series of import lists and amendments between
1910 and 1915 shows that, through the early Revolution, federal ministers worked carefully to
balance foreign investment and domestic development at La Boquilla, with a special interest in
expanding the national cement industry. But it also shows that the ability of these ministers to
enforce compliance was always tenuous, and the CAFERC held tremendous leverage over
officials who, ultimately, wished the project to be completed as soon as possible. After the coup
of 1913, and the virtual collapse of federal governance thereafter, the company operated with
near-total independence, completing La Boquilla under the fog of war in September of 1915.
Using the record of import duties exchanged between federal ministers and company officials,
this chapter explores the tension between transnational commerce, federal regulation, and
domestic industry in promoting La Boquilla.
Groundbreaking
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According to a letter from the jefe político of Camargo to the SFCI, work began at La
Boquilla on June 10, 1910.1 Although the contract officially required the CAFERC to begin
construction in March, there is no evidence that federal regulators expressed concern about this
delay. Having confronted a global recession and an unexpected requirement to acquire land
rights in the lands to be flooded, it seems the company was granted a grace period. In any case,
communications between the CAFERC and SFCI remained relatively scarce until the summer of
1910.
Import records and receipts submitted to the SFCI show that the first orders arrived as
early as April 1910, when a shipment crane parts and electric pumps was sent from the Carr
Brothers in New York via steamer to the port of Tampico.2 These receipts also reveal a change
which the CAFERC had not made explicit to the SFCI. Sometime before construction began, the
CAFERC had contracted S. Pearson & Son (SPS), the global engineering firm of British
industrial magnate Weetman Pearson, to build the works at La Boquilla.3 Based on the volume of

1

AHA, AN, caja. 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, fs. 11–12, 87. The position of jefe político was an important
element of Porfirian rule, and functioned as a direct line of command between the capital and far-flung regions like
Chihuahua. These jefes políticos effectively superseded the authority of local governance, and headed armed forces
in their zones of control.
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AHA, AN, caja 115, exp. 1097, leg. 159, fs. 1–4.
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Also known as Lord Cowdray, Pearson was involved in many of the largest engineering projects in
Mexico. See Paul Garner, British Lions and Mexican Eagles: Business, Politics, and Empire in the Career of
Weetman Pearson in Mexico, 1889–1919 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Priscilla Connolly, El
contratista de don Porfirio: obras públicas, deuda y desarrollo desigual (México, D.F: Fondo de Cultura
Económica, 1997); Parra, “Lord Cowdray y la industria eléctrica.” A 1933 letter from CAFERC president Isaac
Thacker to the SAF (successor institution of the SFCI), which was still seeking to settle import-duty questions two
decades later, confirmed that SPS had abandoned the project in 1912, taking along many of the necessary
documents. No reason for this departure was noted. See AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 5, f. 56; caja 113, exp.
1097, leg. 145. Pearson’s participation at La Boquilla was also mentioned in Luis Palacios, “El problema latino
americano,” Memorias de la Asociación de Ingenieros y Arquitectos de México 25, no. 1–12 (1917): 54. Although
this was written in 1916, it said that the “Pearson Company” was building the dam, apparently mistakenly.

63

deliveries which began to arrive soon thereafter, it would appear SPS was well-prepared by the
time ground was broken, perhaps becoming involved in planning and logistics well before 1910.
Weetman Pearson was a close associate of Porfirio Díaz, and was involved in large-scale
infrastructural projects throughout Mexico before the Revolution. Most famously, SPS built the
port facilities of Veracruz, as well as the Gran Canal of Mexico City, a project designed to
finally complete the 400-year project of draining the capital city, which was built on a lake.
Pearson also built the Tehuantepec railway in 1907, which spanned the narrowest part of the
Mexican isthmus, connecting Hawaiian sugar plantations in the Pacific to refineries in New York
and markets in the North Atlantic. Pearson also created the Mexican Eagle Petroleum Company
in 1909 (later acquired by Royal Dutch Shell), the first such company in Mexico. He was
involved in electrification, drainage, and sewerage projects in virtually every part of the country
from Oaxaca to Monterrey. And in addition to the works on the Conchos, SPS was also involved
in planning federally-supported hydraulic works on the Nazas River in the Laguna, which never
materialized. In short, Pearson held a vast portfolio of large, state-sanctioned projects and private
concerns throughout Porfirian Mexico.4
While it might be accurately said that Pearson was uniquely embedded within the
Porfirian state, his interests spanned the globe in the early twentieth century.5 In Britain, among
many smaller projects, SPS built the military port of Dover, the Blackwall Tunnel under the
River Thames (1897), the Great Northern and City underground electric railway (1904), and
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Although Pearson’s activities in Mexico are widely known, this dissertation appears to be the first
research linking him to the project at La Boquilla, albeit only briefly.
5

Or, as Alma Parra has phrased it, SPS had inserted itself into the Porfirian project. See Parra, “Lord
Cowdray y la industria eléctrica,” 117.
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various dock facilities in London. In New York, SPS built the East River Railway Tunnels,
connecting Penn Station to Long Island City (1909), as well as the Downtown Hudson Tubes
(1909), connecting lower Manhattan to New Jersey, both of which are still in operation more
than a century later. Pearson was also involved in similar infrastructural projects in Colombia,
Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, China, Australia, India, and the upper Nile River in the decades
before World War I.6
In March of 1910, company records show that the CAFERC granted power of attorney to
Federico D. Adams (more commonly known as Frederick or Fred), a known SPS agent in
Mexico.7 While the specific purpose for this change was not stated, it is clear in a broader
context that the CAFERC had contracted without approval the services of global engineering
firm S. Pearson and Son, as allowed by the contract it held. Yet other documents suggest this
relationship may have been forged informally much earlier, perhaps even before the Taft-Díaz
summit of 1909. The personal correspondence of Ismael Zúñiga, the Porfirian-era jefe politico of
Ciudad Lerdo in the Laguna, revealed that Zúñiga was also an agent of Pearson’s interests in
Mexico, and was in communication with similar officials throughout the country in promoting
large projects. In a telegram dated October 7, 1909, Adams asked Zúñiga to inform SFCI
minister Olegario Molina that a contract had been signed with the “Canadian” company to build
a dam on the Conchos, as well as any necessary rail connections.8 Other letters seem to indicate
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Agustín Aragón, “Lord Cowdray y la ingeniera,” Revista Mexicana de la Ingeniería y Arquitectura 5, no.
8 (August 15, 1927): 453–81.
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 4, fs. 29–31. Adams was also named as an SPS agent in Aragón,
“Lord Cowdray y la ingeniera,” 456–7.
8

Ismael G. Zúñiga was the jefe politico of Ciudad Lerdo during the last years of the Porfiriato, one the
three cities in the important Laguna region, which had close economic and elite social ties with Chihuahua. The
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that Zúñiga had also lobbied Molina directly in support of Pearson’s participation in La Boquilla,
as well as similar proposed works on the Nazas River in the Laguna.9 This correspondence also
reveals that AEG agent Schondube and Neugebauer was engaged in heated competition with
Pearson to land lucrative concessions throughout Mexico in 1909, offering yet another glimpse at
how projects of Mexican development played out on the ground in the late Porfiriato.10 It also
calls into question the timing and nature of the relationships between Pearson, the CAFERC, and
the banks of Toronto and Montreal, as well as the way in which La Boquilla first came to the
attention of potential investors.11
Almost immediately after construction began at La Boquilla, the CAFERC moved to
consolidate the Schondube concession it had acquired at La Joya with its existing concession.
Communications with the SFCI show that the company sought to combine these two within a

position of jefe politico was appointed directly by the president, and was understood to exercise more direct
authority than the local governor. As the head of the mounted federal forces known as Rurales, tasked with
maintaining order throughout Mexico, the local jefe politico was typically seen as the local face of the Porfiriato.
With a direct line of communication to President Díaz and a wide mandate to investigate activities in northern
Mexico, the personal correspondence of Zúñiga offers a clear look at the intimate integration of business and politics
between 1909 and 1911. These letters and telegrams are held at the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), ramo
Particulares, fondo Fernando Iglesias Calderón (FIC), cajas 16–18. For letter between Zúñiga and Adams, see AGN,
FIC, caja 16, exp. 9, fs. 5–6.
9

AGN, FIC, caja 17, exp. 15, fs. 3, 6, 7, 9–13, 16, 18, 20. A series of letters in May of 1910 detailing
Zúñiga’s involvement in developing works on the Nazas on behalf of SPS made no mention of the CAFERC.
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AGN, FIC, caja 16, exp. 10, fs. 9–14. In fact, it seemed that another SPS figure, John Body, favored the
ultimately unbuilt Schondube concession site at La Joya over the CAFERC site at La Boquilla.
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In the popular imagination, Ginther is remembered in Camargo as the father of La Boquilla, although the
present research suggests that Bronimann also played a rather important early role in getting the project off the
ground. Further research on the timing of Canadian and British involvement – when and how these actors became
involved – might be instructive in clarifying how “local” this project really was. Based on the above information, as
well as the existence of competing German and Canadian claims on the Conchos, it would not be surprising to learn
that the project at La Boquilla was perhaps another proxy battle in a protracted struggle between German and AngloCanadian engineering interests over the spoils of Porfirian federal development policy across Mexico.
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single contract, ensuring that the terms it had secured in the construction of La Boquilla would
also apply to La Joya. Although this consolidation combined these concessions within a single
contract, identifying both as elements of a common development project, it nonetheless required
separate deposits to be placed, and also required the completion of both in fulfillment of the
terms of the contract. Although the company faced initial resistance from SFCI officials, a
revision was permitted in August of 1910, allowing the CAFERC to consolidate these separate
projects within a single contract.12 In fact, the project at La Joya was never even attempted, due
primarily to the devastation of the Revolution and the problems already pointed out by engineer
Julio Pani. It is not entirely clear if the CAFERC ever intended to build this dam, or simply used
the concession to monopolize the upper Conchos. By the end of the Revolution, as will be
discussed later, the CAFERC would work to free itself of this obligation it had, in 1910, spent
time and effort to consolidate.
Meanwhile, construction materials began to flow in through Tampico and El Paso by
May of 1910, and SFCI officials very quickly expressed concerns about the scattered, vague, and
ever-expanding import lists presented by the company and the growing volume of uncategorized
materials to which they referred. According to the complaints of SFCI officials, even lists of
anticipated imports often lacked quantities and were untranslated, while unexpected materials
like toilets, wool, paint, sandpaper and hydrochloric acid were submitted without justification.
The company had permission to import free of duty only materials deemed necessary to the
proposed project and was prohibited from importing locally-available basic commodities such as

12

AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 4, fs. 26, 61.
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food or firewood. The company was also prohibited from importing replacement parts, or tools
intended for repair, a measure apparently geared toward stimulating industrial development in
Mexico.13 And although these decisions were ultimately up to the SFCI, it would appear that the
CAFERC recognized that the ministry had a vested interest in the success of their project, as
these incomplete import lists continued to arrive for years. The company pushed back against
these import limits, pointing to the terms conceded to the Mexican Light and Power Company in
1903, which permitted duty-free import of all electrical equipment from the point of generation
to use, and established a four-year window for duty-free imports, rather than a one-time
concession.14 It might be accurately said that this issue of imports was never really settled.
Debates about the necessity and nature of imports would continue through the chaos of the
Revolution and for many years after. In the final tally, the CAFERC succeeded in having duty
waived on almost every item it requested, even when it took years or decades of protest.15
Deliveries began to pour in from across North America and the Atlantic world at a pace
which had federal bureaucrats scrambling to keep up. The record of communication between the
CAFERC and SFCI at this point turns almost entirely to imports – hundreds of invoices and
receipts pertaining to literally thousands of types of items imported at La Boquilla. While these
lists are themselves quite dry, when analyzed as a whole, they produce a mosaic revealing the
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This prohibition against locally-available products and replacement parts reveals the tension inherent in
technological transfer during the Porfiriato. Mexican engineers and bureaucrats were engaged in a project to both
attract foreign capital and technology and promote integrated development within Mexico. Sometimes these goals
proved irreconcilable. In these tedious but telling contractual details, and others like them, one can read the careful
balancing act of the political economy of Porfirian Mexico.
14

AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 4, fs. 12–17.
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In fact, this surge in imports – coupled with an apparently unclear process of approval – meant that most
of these early items created a backlog which required increased ministry attention in 1912, and again in 1917.
Federal officials would still be working to assess duty-free claims well into the 1920s. For an example of the 1912
backlog, see AHA, AN, caja 102–108, exp. 1097, leg. 8–80, passim.
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vast and complex networks of exchange which were implicated in the construction of La
Boquilla. And this dizzying array of imports make visible the long-distance logistics, the
compound transportation networks, the integrated markets, the highly-leveraged financial
devices – the elements of infrastructural power – necessary to the construction of a cutting-edge
hydroelectric dam in the high desert of northern Mexico in 1910. These lists, and the material
flows they reveal, demonstrate the importance of technology in shaping the practice of Mexican
state power in Chihuahua, even before the completion of La Boquilla.
The Mexican Central Railway was completed by US interests in 1884 and acquired by
Mexico in 1909. In the north, it began at the border at Ciudad Juárez-El Paso and ran through the
state of Chihuahua, connecting further south to the major centers of Torreón, Zacatecas, and
Aguascalientes en route to Mexico City. In the state of Chihuahua, at the minor station of
Camargo, the CAFERC’s private Camargo y Oeste line connected the remote dam site to this
main central artery. At Ciudad Juárez-El Paso, the Mexican Central Railway linked with various
major US railways, connecting La Boquilla to Kansas City, St. Louis, Chicago, Los Angeles, and
other commercial and industrial points north and east.16 And at Torreón, yet another line
connected the central railway to the industrial center of Monterrey en route to the port of
Tampico, which received deliveries from New York, Liverpool, London, and Antwerp, usually
in the care of the Cuban Steamship Company.17 Thus, while the natural environment of

16
These were the Southern Pacific Railroad, the Texas and Pacific Railway, and the Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railway.
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The Cuban Steamship Company delivered La Boquilla’s state-of-the-art turbines from Zurich,
Switzerland, via the port city of Antwerp. A representative example of the vast documentation relating to imports,
including a Cuban Steamship Company contract, can be found at, AHA, AN, caja 108, exp. 1097, leg. 87, 1–29.
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Chihuahua provided the canyon which would become Lake Toronto and the waters which would
fill it, the structure itself was freighted in with steam power across great distances in thousands
of rail cars and steamships.18 La Boquilla was as much a logistical marvel in 1910 as it was an
engineering marvel. And while the complex networks upon which it relied were not formal
elements of the Mexican state, the completion of La Boquilla redounded strongly in favor of
Mexican state power, as demonstrated by the implementation of irrigation projects in the late
1920s.
The different categories of these imports, which would ultimately number in the
thousands, demonstrate that the dam site bore little trace of human settlement at this point, and
required extensive supply chains. Before engaging in the difficult work of constructing the dam,
engineers first had to build a custom power plant, including a 5,000 barrel gasoline tank, multiple
boilers, many dozens of small generators and motors, and miles of tubes delivering compressed
steam all across the canyon. They also had to build facilities for supporting human life in a
challenging environment – the housing, water and sanitation systems, food supply chains and
preparation facilities required by laborers and engineers. Thus, steel and iron chains, hooks,
bolts, and screws were imported from Glasgow, Sheffield, Birmingham, and Manchester in the
United Kingdom, and Buffalo, Brooklyn, Erie, Pennsylvania, and Youngstown, Ohio. Cement
mixers, drills, jackhammers, and cranes were delivered, often in pieces, from Milwaukee,
Cincinnati, and Cleveland. Specialized electrical and hydraulic equipment was imported from
Schenectady, New York, Passaic, New Jersey, and Zurich, Switzerland. Prominent companies
such as General Electric, Westinghouse, Allis-Chalmers, and Ingersoll-Rand supplied
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The lone exception here was concrete, discussed later in this chapter.
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equipment, while daily needs were supported by commercial houses such as the Mine and
Smelter Supply Company and Krakauer, Zork and Moye, both of El Paso, or the Carr Brothers of
New York. The CAFERC imported "sugar plantation railway equipment” to move material
around the site from a company operating in New York, Honolulu, San Juan, Havana and New
Orleans.19 Chihuahua was a “borderland” in more than one sense – it was shaped not only by the
legal and social differences of the US-Mexico border, but also increasingly by global networks
of commerce, capital, and technological transfer.
Other imports begin to put a human face on La Boquilla, and remind us that this was a
massive project executed under difficult conditions by people who were otherwise absent from
the record. A 10,000-gallon cypress tank was brought in to hold water for workers and steam
turbines alike. Records also reveal the importation of three ice machines, relatively new
inventions, which the company claimed were essential to the well-being of the workers.20
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AHA, AN, caja 110, exp. 1097, leg. 106. This was the Gregg Company of Hackensack, New Jersey.
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AHA, AN, caja 110, 1097, 104, fs. 34–7. In 1919, in response to an SAF challenge to a company request
to import ice machines free of duty in 1912, CAFERC attorney Alberto Carreño asked that the minister reconsider,
since the installed machinery had already offered innumerable benefits to workers, “since due to the roughness of
their work, and the high temperatures experienced in the region, the constant provision of ice has been a true benefit
to the people occupied in the construction of one of the most important works in the republic.” He further appealed
to the minister’s sense of duty to the Mexican worker. “On the other hand, the current government has proclaimed
its desire to better support the working classes; and if the Company, for its part, at great expense, has found in its
means the force to provide them with material well-being, there is no doubt that it well deserves government support
in such proposition.” An internal ministry opinion stated that, taking into account the importance of the works, and
that the workers were isolated in the desert and deserved whatever comforts might be provided, the machines ought
to be allowed without duty. Still, the minister was not entirely moved, and only one of three machines was approved.
“Ahora bien, la Compañía me ha encargado que yo suplique a la Secretaría que se sirva reconsiderar ese acuerdo,
tomando en cuenta, que la maquinaria referida ha estado y está instalada prestando grandísimos servicios a los
operarios y empleados de la Compañía; pues dado lo rudo de sus labores, y las altas temperaturas que se
experimentan en aquella región, la constante provisión de hielo ha tenido que ser un verdadero bien para las
personas que se ocupaban en la construcción de una de las obras más importantes que existen en la república… Por
otra parte, el gobierno actual ha proclamado su deseo de mejor amiento de las clases trabajadores; y si la Compañía,
por su parte, y con grandes desembolsos, ha procurado en la medida de sus fuerzas procurarles un bienestar material,
es indudable que bien merece que el gobierno la ayude a la realización de tal propósito.”
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Receipts list dozens of import categories unrelated to construction – barbed wire, flashlights,
soap, fire extinguishers, safes, boots, kitchen ovens, rulers, typewriters, prosthetic limbs, Victor
vinyl records, and Remington shotguns, for example.21 Facing an archival record in which
thousands of laborers are entirely absent, and referenced by the CAFERC only as a potential
source of unrest if left idle, these imports remind us that even when integrated to these global
scales of change, La Boquilla was built in an isolated canyon in Chihuahua by thousands of
workers, many of whom had likely come to Chihuahua to work in the mines. The decision to
execute these works under such conditions, including the supporting railways and labor camps
La Boquilla required, again indicates the anticipated profitability of mining in Chihuahua.
Revolutionary Stirrings
La Boquilla was a project which straddled eras of Mexican history – it was a late
monument of the Porfirian state which came into service in an environment transformed
politically, socially, and materially by the Revolution. It embodied the global technological
changes of the turn of the twentieth century while also presenting a variety of possible futures to
the post-Revolution Mexican state, which sought to effect social change through large-scale
engineering projects. It is interesting to note, then, that La Boquilla was effectively born in the
same place and time as the Revolution itself – the northern borderlands in 1910. And as the
Revolution played out throughout Chihuahua, La Boquilla also continued under construction.
The dam began generating electricity at roughly the same time that the Constitutionalist faction
finally won the armed Revolution and began to consolidate power in Mexico City. In the first
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years after 1917, this Constitutionalist government struggled to establish both ideological
legitimacy and infrastructural power over Mexican territory. Meanwhile, La Boquilla’s operators
and foreign owners were forced to deal with guerrilla activity and sabotage largely without
federal support, demonstrating the limits of this state infrastructural power at the end of the war.
By the late 1920s, after a decade of operation largely without oversight, La Boquilla was
gradually conscripted into federal irrigation efforts, becoming an engine of state formation in the
Mexican north at the same moment that the Mexican state began to expand dramatically. In this
sense, the story of La Boquilla was very much a story of the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua.
Francisco Madero was part of a wealthy northern family who, like many of his
prosperous peers, chafed under the political and social limitations of the Porfirian system.
Seeking what might be interpreted as a bourgeois opening in Mexican politics, Madero had
announced his intention to run against the autocrat Porfirio Díaz in the elections of 1910, on a
platform implementing term limits (“no reelection”) and political and economic reform. Whereas
Díaz had previously announced his intention to retire from office, he changed course in 1909,
making clear that he intended to extend this thirty-year grip on the levers of the Mexican state.
After Madero announced his opposition and began to earnestly challenge the president’s
position, Díaz jailed Madero in June of 1910, the same week that work began at La Boquilla.
After spending the summer in jail, Madero escaped and fled across the border to San Antonio,
from which he issued his Plan de San Luis Potosí on October 5, 1910. This manifesto rejected
the legitimacy of the reelection of Porfirio Díaz and called fellow Mexicans to arms against the
continuing inequalities of the Porfirian economy. It also set a date for this revolution –
November 20, 1910. Although Madero himself missed this date, pockets of armed resistance did
emerge, first in Chihuahua and then across Mexico. In February of 1911, Madero launched an
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assault on Casas Grandes, Chihuahua, and within months, armed insurrection spread across
Mexico under a host of emerging revolutionary leaders. When this northern maderista army led
by Francisco “Pancho” Villa and Pascual Orozco defeated federal forces at Ciudad Juárez in
May of 1911, Díaz was forced to surrender, and left for exile in Paris within the month. Distant
though it was, Chihuahua was a central theater of the Mexican Revolution in every phase.
It should be noted that Madero, although he lives in historical memory as the first leader
of the Mexican Revolution, was far less revolutionary in his social program than many of his
supporters had hoped. Driven to arms by the total intransigence of the Díaz regime, Madero
implemented only moderate liberal reforms once in office, alienating in short time popular bases
of support led by the likes of Francisco “Pancho” Villa and Emiliano Zapata. Thus, while it was
clear a genuine Revolution had erupted in Mexico by 1911, it was not year clear what type of
“revolution” this would be. Many economic and diplomatic observers in Mexico and the United
States held out hopes that this uprising would be short-lived, ensuring the continuity of vitally
important flows of petroleum and metallic ores.
In Chihuahua, political reshuffling by Díaz had only moderate effects. In early 1911, the
autocrat ousted the creelista governor Alberto Terrazas and replaced him with regime loyalist
Miguel Ahumada, in an attempt to contain the violence. This drove the Terrazas-Creel family
from its perch at the apex of Chihuahuan society and, by 1913, most members had fled
northward to El Paso – the “ringside” of the Revolution.22 But Madero’s victory resulted in
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another change when Abraham González was installed as governor in June 1911, following the
collapse of the Díaz government.23 This carousel in the statehouse would continue for many
years even after the Revolution, as a large cast of governors of various political leanings and
affiliations rotated through, including Pancho Villa himself between 1913 and 1914. This lack of
continuity at the level of the governorship meant that, from the expulsion of Díaz in 1911,
through the Revolution and most of the 1920s, the state of Chihuahua lay outside the reach of
effective federal governance as well.24
Even though this initial phase of the Revolution had been fought and won in Chihuahua,
there is no evidence in the record that either the CAFERC or the SFCI believed the project at La
Boquilla was in danger. In fact, correspondence during this time is remarkably similar to that of
the pre-Revolutionary period. Communications consisted mostly of ongoing debates about
imports and the rights and duties stipulated in the contract.25 The record at this time was one of
quotidian concerns, making no mention of the armed struggle unfolding all around and
suggesting that neither party believed that foreign interests or vulnerable assets were threatened

played by El Paso-Ciudad Juárez before, during, and after the Revolution. Indeed, it might be said that this
“borderplex” has been situated at the ringside of modern Mexican history as well.
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102, exp. 1097, leg. 4, fs. 24–25.
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by the new Madero administration.26 It was the natural environment which presented the most
urgent threat to construction. After waiting months for flood waters to recede before pouring
concrete footers, CAFERC officials reported that the Conchos swelled again in March of 1911,
destroying the cofferdam, a temporary structure built to keep water out of the dam foundation. It
was this surge of water, and not armed violence, which set construction back until November of
1911.27
As discussed above, the debates over duty-free imports revealed the tension between
foreign investment and local development inherent in the Porfirian project. Through the review
of import lists, among other regulations, SFCI officials sought to ensure the efficient
construction of La Boquilla while also promoting local and regional development as a byproduct.
While SFCI officials consistently questioned the quality and quantity of imports pouring across
the border, records show that, in practice, the ministry exercised an ever-decreasing capacity to
make these import flows legible, and enforce limits upon them.28 While federal regulators legally
retained the right to determine the classification of duty-free imports, records show that this
system relied heavily on company self-reporting and the agency of non-state actors, such as US
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customs officials. This is yet another illustration of the tenuous quality of state infrastructural
power in northern Mexico at the end of the Porfiriato, where the logistical systems through
which development was effected were not firmly in control of federal authorities.
Although most imports were ultimately allowed, there was one category of imports which
the SFCI did attempt to enforce systematically, even though no mention was made in the
contract. As soon as construction began, multiple Mexican cement producers contested the
importation of foreign cement, arguing that it harmed the fledgling national cement industry.29
Records suggest that SFCI officials were initially sympathetic to these objections. Ministry
officials engaged in lengthy negotiations with the CAFERC, attempting to persuade the company
to come to a private agreement with these producers. In this case, SFCI ministers operated
mostly as intermediaries between foreign and national-regional interests, and not as agents of a
state apparatus capable of acting only by decree. This again speaks to the tenuousness of the state
in northern Mexico, and the multitude of interests which it sought to mediate. To further
complicate this situation, although these cement producers failed to mention it in their petitions,
the two of the three “national” cement producers which contested the CAFERC’s imports were
also owned by foreign interests.

29
AHA, AN, caja 103, exp. 1097, leg. 23, f. 54. The only other major category of import contested by
Mexican interests was dynamite, which was essential to the mining industry and increasingly manufactured from
nitroglycerine – a byproduct of the cotton agroindustry in the Laguna region. SFCI documents indicate that an
agreement to protect dynamite manufacture had existed since July of 1904 with Enrique Tron, Saturnino A. Sauto,
Luis Gurza and Tomás Reyes Retana. These men were granted permission by the SFCI to found the Compañía
Nacional Mexicana de Dinamita y Explosivos in 1901, using nitroglycerine from the soap and cottonseed oil
interest, Compañía Industrial Jabonera de la Laguna. Still, the SFCI allowed the CAFERC to import common black
powder dynamite for construction. A 1911 document indicated that the local industry was deemed unable to meet
the company’s needs, while a 1912 internal SFCI decision found that the requested imports were not considered
dynamite for the purposes of the contract, and could in fact be imported duty-free. It appears that the common black
powder category of dynamite was not considered the same as nitroglycerine dynamite. As no further mention
appears in the record, it seems that this settled the disagreement. On the Compañía Industrial Jabonera de la Laguna,
see contract dated December 20, 1901, published in Manuel Dublán and Jose María Lozano, “Número 16,296,”
Legislación mexicana XXXIII, no. 55 (1903): 433–41.
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Based on the inability of Mexican producers to meet cement demands, as well as the
sheer size of the project, it seems probable that La Boquilla was the largest concrete structures
ever attempted in Mexico before 1916, and ranked perhaps among the largest in the world. It is
easy to overlook concrete when discussing technological development, as it may appear
rudimentary. Concrete is a relatively basic substance made of an aggregate, such as gravel or
sand, mixed with the binding agent called cement, which is manufactured from limestone. It has
been manufactured and used for millennia, and concrete structures can still be found dating to the
Roman era. Chemical discoveries improved cement strength in the eighteenth century,
culminating in the development of “Portland” cement in the mid-nineteenth century, the variant
most commonly used today. Perhaps most importantly, unlike virtually every material which
preceded it, cement-based concrete is non-porous and impervious to water, a quality which
transformed hydraulic engineering, and thus the relationship between society and water. By the
time construction began at La Boquilla in the early twentieth century, the major technological
breakthrough in the cement industry was not related to the product itself, but to its transport.
Electricity and gasoline-powered machinery made its extraction, manufacture, and transport
more efficient, while extensive railway networks allowed for this heavy and relatively cheap
commodity to be moved over long distances cost-effectively. While ancient, and perhaps less
complex than an electrical generator, cement was intimately related to technological change at
this time and would become the most ubiquitous construction material of the twentieth century.
While La Boquilla was the foundation of an energy system, and later an irrigation system,
it was in its most basic sense a large stone and concrete wall impounding a vast amount of water
– a plug in a canyon mouth. And while it did house technologically-advanced hydroelectric
equipment, it was the explicitly low-tech elements of La Boquilla which were the most costly, a
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fact which lends some perspective to this protracted debate over cement imports. Even today,
with the world’s largest dams capable of generating as much energy as a space shuttle, the most
expensive and labor-intensive elements of dam construction still tend to be the most basic –
excavation and the costs of buying, delivering, mixing, and pouring concrete. At La Boquilla, out
of a proposed budget of $10 million pesos, which included land expropriation, salaries, and a
contingency fund, cement costs alone were estimated at $3 million pesos – nearly a third of the
entire budget and almost 90 percent of the cost of the dam itself.30 This was more than the
combined cost of the generating equipment inside the powerhouse and all aluminum
transmission lines, steel towers, and transformer substations used to distribute electricity over a
span of 200 kilometers from Chihuahua City to Jiménez.31 In fact, the cost of the imported Swiss
turbines and American generators, capable of producing 40,000 horsepower of electricity, was
estimated at well below $1 million pesos total, or less than a third the cost of all the cement in La
Boquilla. Although advanced generators and turbines would transform the falling waters of the
Conchos into electricity, the most expensive element of the project would be the stone and
concrete gravity dam itself, a fact which Mexican cement producers recognized quite clearly.
As early as May 19, 1910, before Pearson had formally broken ground, representatives of
cement producers Cementos Tolteca of Mexico City and Cementos Hidalgo of Monterrey
expressed concerns to the SFCI about the company’s proposal to import cement from the United
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AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 6, fs. 195–96. The estimated cost of mampostería – a category
including cement, stonework, and various material aggregates – was $3.48 million pesos, of which $3.03 million
pertained to cement.
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States.32 Little appears to have come of it at first, though, and by March of 1911, cement
products of all types – Portland, Roman, quicklime, and mortar – were arriving via steamer at
Tampico in loads weighing over 2,000 metric tons. By July of 1911, treasury ministry records
(Secretaría de Hacienda) estimated that more than 66,000 metric tons of cement products had
already been delivered at La Boquilla, with a value of about $1.14 million pesos, accounting for
a substantial portion of the project requirements.33 Yet it was clear that cement producers
continued to pressure SFCI officials to intervene on their behalf.
On July 21, 1911, an internal SFCI document revealed the outlines a proposed agreement
between the CAFERC and cement interests meant to protect the national cement industry. The
CAFERC agreed to absorb all the available production of Tolteca and Hidalgo, while preserving
the right to import cement from abroad if their needs could not be met. The company would also
be allowed to import cement if it could prove that the same quality of cement could be purchased
more cheaply abroad, after accounting for import duties.34 This agreement appears to have gone
into effect in December of 1911, and the record shows that the ministry began to enforce these
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terms immediately thereafter.35 In January of 1912, SFCI officials began to hold up large
deliveries of cement while calling on the company to account for their cost in comparison to
national producers.36 And this agreement appears to have been national in scope. An inquiry
from Tolteca sought to clarify whether hydroelectric companies in Puebla and Tamaulipas would
also be bound by these regulations. The SFCI responded that all water concessionaires under
federal jurisdiction will be required to use national cement.37
About this same time, an unsigned article appeared in a Camargo newspaper calling into
question the quality of the dam and, rather specifically, the cement mixes being employed, as
reported by anonymous workers at the site. Citing the recent catastrophic flood in Austin,
Pennsylvania, which killed 78 people, the author asked rhetorically how much greater loss of life
might occur at La Boquilla, which was four times taller. While Emil Bronimann was identified
by name as an engineer of great esteem and reputation, the article noted that similar great works
in the United States were overseen from start to finish by federal inspectors to guarantee safety
and compliance. The author noted that the plans for La Boquilla had been changed without
approval during the Revolution, increasing the height of the dam, before asking rhetorically why
such changes were necessary and whether the dam was still safe. This lack of oversight was
especially concerning, the author noted, as the aims of the “powerful” and “unscrupulous”
CAFERC had little to do with safeguarding life and property in the Conchos. Interestingly, the
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author made no mention of the CAFERC’s foreign character or the participation of Pearson, facts
which were often employed when critiquing the company.38
This article found its way into a documentary record comprised almost entirely of
bureaucratic paperwork. And attached to this article, to better illustrate its concerns, were photos
of the devastation wrought by the Pennsylvania flood cited by the author. As such, it seems to
have been presented as evidence supporting more direct oversight of the project – oversight
which was neither legally required nor likely to be provided. At first glance, its reference to the
unscrupulous and powerful company might be read as a complaint by dispossessed landowners.
But it made no argument for reparation, and the legitimacy of the project did not seem to be in
question. The specific reference to cement quality, especially in its timing, is interesting. Perhaps
this editorial was an effort by northern Mexican commercial interests, associated with Juan
Brittingham’s cement factory in the Laguna, to pressure the federal government to take a more
active role in the dam at La Boquilla? Perhaps it was thought that more oversight would favor
Mexican producers? It is not entirely clear what the underlying motive of this article was, who
wrote it, or how it came to be included in the SFCI’s files. But it does certainly appear to support
the complaints of Mexican cement producers at precisely the moment that they were appealing to
the federal government for support.
It would appear that the CAFERC felt compelled to come to this cement agreement, as it
began to push back against the proposed terms almost immediately, asking the ministry to take
into account the large quantities of cement already ordered, mostly from Allentown,
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Pennsylvania. Based on the apparent intimacy of some of this correspondence, it appears
CAFERC attorney Juan Casasús was a personal friend of then-SFCI minister Rafael Hernández,
who he continued to lobby on behalf of his client.39 Even these overtures were rebuffed in favor
of national industry, however. As Hernández explained to Casasús on March 5, 1912, he had no
choice but to enforce this requirement to protect national industry and, in the long run, liberate
Mexico from the “tribute” it was required to pay foreign countries with more advanced
manufacturing. Hernández instructed the CAFERC to split its forthcoming orders evenly
between foreign and national suppliers.40
This agreement changed again after March 1912, as a revolt by former revolutionary
leader Pascual Orozco interrupted transportation and communications across Chihuahua. As
populist revolutionary leaders grew disillusioned by what they saw as Madero’s tepid social
reform agenda, Emiliano Zapata issued his Plan de Ayala in late 1911, calling for popular,
agrarian revolution and naming Orozco the legitimate leader of the continuing struggle.
Although this revolt was quickly crushed by federal forces, it did complicate logistics in
Chihuahua for a time. Although a later inspection report from 1922 stated that work ceased at La
Boquilla during this uprising, records from the period suggest this was not entirely true. More
accurately, it seems that work initially continued uninterrupted, but railway stoppages eventually
cut off the supply of cement which. As Casasús was careful to remind the SFCI on May 31,
1912, this threatened to put 3,000 laborers out of work in the middle of an armed revolt.41
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Although orders had been placed months in advance, they failed to arrive, and company officials
suspected that deliveries were lost somewhere on the rails between Tampico and Torreón, or
Chihuahua and El Paso. Warning that the CAFERC was in danger of running out of cement
within the week, Casasús requested federal support in locating the company’s cement deliveries.
The SFCI made inquiries to the defense ministry (Secretaría de Guerra y Marina) and the
national railway (Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México), and it was determined by June 20 that
deliveries from Tampico had been released and would be arriving soon. Due to guerrilla activity,
however, nothing was known about the activities between Chihuahua and El Paso-Ciudad
Juárez.42 By mid-July, with the Orozco rebellion contained, these cement deliveries were
discovered in Chihuahua City, having been confiscated in the campaign against Orozco by
General Victoriano Huerta. On July 25, defense officials informed the CAFERC that Huerta had
been authorized to release these shipments immediately, allowing work to continue.43
As deliveries began flowing again, the CAFERC continued to face resistance from
Tolteca and Hidalgo for importing cement.44 Negotiations continued throughout July and August
over the quantities to be purchased, the Mexican companies which would profit, the duty status
of foreign cement already delivered, and the ability of the CAFERC to continue to order cement
from the United States.45 It is again unclear exactly what modified agreement was worked out
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between the SFCI, the CAFERC, and cement producers, but by August 6, it was announced that
Hidalgo and Tolteca had withdrawn their objections.46
Still, this was not the end of the debate. It would appear that this requirement that the
CAFERC purchase all available cement from Mexican producers was the personal project of
SFCI minister Rafael Hernández, who served only briefly. In what appears to be a private letter
dated August 6 between Casasús and SFCI official Manuel Vera (another friend, and holdover
from the Porfiriato), the CAFERC official complained that Mexican producers charged too much
for lower quality cement, and could not ensure timely delivery. In response, Vera reported that
this protectionist measure imposed by Hernández himself, who was a cousin of the new president
Francisco Madero, and who would serve as SFCI minister only between July 1911 and
November 1912.47 On August 12, Casasús informed the SFCI that the company would rather pay
extra than compromise their work: “it is preferable to spend many thousands of pesos before
running the risk of failure in a work of such importance as that which they are completing.”48
This final rejection of bureaucratic involvement in cement purchases seems to have been
motivated by the chief Pearson engineer on the project, W.B. Fuller. In a furious letter dated
August 9, addressed to the SFCI and written in English on SPS letterhead, Fuller completely
ruled out the possibility of doing business with Tolteca.49 According to Fuller, he was
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approached by a Tolteca agent and encouraged to buy from them. When he objected to the
quality of the cement, he was told the CAFERC could “take cover under an English Company if
anything goes wrong.” He asked rhetorically, “How is an English name, no matter how great, to
protect the people living below the dam? and [sic] what kind of man do they think I am to hide
behind a name rather than be sure in my own mind that the cement used in the dam was the best
obtainable.” For their part, Tolteca officials argued that the CAFERC continued to purchase
Allentown cement, contravening their agreement, even though Tolteca cement was of equal
quality. A letter from Tolteca manager D.H. Gibbs dated August 3 claimed that Tolteca was
“…undoubtedly recognized today the World [sic] over as the most responsible and reliable
makers existing, and I may say that there is no work of any importance (outside the States)
hardly in which their cement is not employed.”50 But Fuller was unswayed, refusing to do
business with either Tolteca or Hidalgo.
In September, a personal letter from treasury and railway official Jaime Gurza to SFCI
minister Hernández, written on behalf of Mexican industrialist Juan Brittingham, sought federal
intervention in forcing the CAFERC to purchase cement from Hidalgo and cutting off access to
US suppliers.51 A response from the SFCI clarified that the CAFERC was entitled to make half

1912 (known also as Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers). It was a rare example of US capital ceding to
British investment in Mexico at this time. Tolteca was acquired by Mexican producer CEMEX in 1989.
50

AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 61, fs. 126–29. Interestingly, the date of Fuller’s letter was very
close to that on which Pearson abandoned work at La Boquilla, according to a 1922 inspection report by Julio
Quiros. It may be that the dispute between Pearson and the CAFERC which resulted in SPS leaving the job was due
to increasing federal regulation of cement purchases.
51

It is not clear what relationship existed between Jaime and Luis Gurza, but owing to their close
relationship with Brittingham, it seems very likely they were related. US diplomatic documents listed Jaime Gurza
as an executive board member of the Mexican National Railway. See dispatches 796, 1260, and 820, dating August
7–16, 1911, in Fred Morris Dearing, “Discrimination Against American Citizens Employed on Mexican Railroads,”

86

of its total purchases abroad, and had been making good-faith efforts toward the purchase of
Mexican cement.52 Gurza, on behalf of Brittingham again, insisted that Hidalgo and Tolteca,
together with another manufacturer called Dublán, could provide the entire country with cement
at a lower rate than any foreign company.53Appealing to Mexican state interest in developing the
rural north, he argued that the company had sunk great expenses over three years to increase
production in anticipation of promised federal irrigation works. Instead, the company was
paralyzed by overproduction, with warehouses full of unused cement.54 Gurza cast these cement
producers as patriotic businessmen being undermined by foreign interests.
Still, it does not appear the SFCI changed course, and the agreement allowing half to be
imported remained the last word. Fuller and CAFERC officials accused Brittingham of being
unresponsive after the agreement was reached, as he presumably hoped the SFCI would prohibit
imports altogether. In the end, however, Brittingham was rewarded for his persistence. Although
the details are again unclear, on November 9, the SFCI permitted Cementos Hidalgo to be the
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sole Mexican provider of cement.55 In the final accounting, La Boquilla seems to be constructed
mostly of cement from Pennsylvania and stones from the riverbed of the Conchos, with some
additional cement from Coahuila.56
The CAFERC faced another setback when S. Pearson and Son abruptly abandoned the
project on August 15, 1912. Although the reasons were unclear, there are some hints in the
record which suggest what might have occurred. A later engineering inspection stated that work
had stopped on La Boquilla during the Orozco revolt of March 1912, and did not begin again
until August 15 of that year, the very same day SPS is reported to have abandoned the project.57
Work had also previously halted due to Francisco Madero’s revolt in 1911, perhaps raising
concerns about the instability of the region. It is also known that Pearson undertook a wider
corporate reorientation toward petroleum production in Mexico at this time. In addition, SPS
head engineer W.B. Fuller’s vigorous disagreement about the quality of cement, and the
company’s ability to choose providers, may also have contributed to this severing of ties.58
Whatever the reasons, many years later, CAFERC officials responded to requests for import
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receipts from 1911 and 1912 by noting that SPS had a disagreement with the CAFERC and left
with most of the relevant paperwork.59 Although it did not identify him by name, it is clear from
the inspection report that, after the departure of SPS, it was Emil Bronimann who oversaw
construction at La Boquilla on behalf of the CAFERC after 1912.60
Counterrevolution
Between groundbreaking at La Boquilla in 1910 and the departure of Pearson in 1912,
flash flooding and two armed uprisings had set work back by about eleven weeks. But
construction continued, and the dam site continued to employ thousands of workers. The revolt
in late 1911 between popular agrarian leaders and the new government of Francisco Madero was
quickly put down by General Huerta, which temporarily eliminated the military threat, even if
these leaders remained at large. At the dam site, with cement flowing freely again in late 1912
and turbines arriving from Zurich, the curtain wall of La Boquilla continued to rise with only
minor delays.61
This situation changed drastically in early 1913, in the period known as the decena
trágica (Ten Tragic Days), a counterrevolutionary coup which killed Madero and thrust the
nation further into chaos. On February 9, 1913, military officers and cadets still loyal to the old
regime marched on the capital, forcing the release of arrested counterrevolutionary commanders
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Bernardo Reyes and Félix Díaz, the nephew of the recently deposed dictator. Reyes was killed,
but Díaz survived and sought to reclaim the presidency. In response, Madero called on General
Huerta to defend the capital – the same general who had put down the Orozco revolt in
Chihuahua and released cement deliveries to the CAFERC. But in a double-cross, abetted by US
ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, Huerta joined the reactionary forces and demanded the
resignation of Madero who, along with his vice-president José María Pino Suárez, was later
executed. On February 20, Huerta was made president and established a counterrevolutionary
military dictatorship. Huerta’s relationship with the United States soon soured, however,
culminating in the naval occupation of the major Mexican port of Veracruz through much of
1914. Huerta also faced resistance from state governors, including northerners Abraham
González of Chihuahua and future president Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila, who called for
rebellion against Huerta in his Plan de Guadalupe.
By July of 1914, facing continued US pressure and a major military defeat at Zacatecas,
Huerta was forced to resign. His fall left the Mexican federal government far less stable than it
had been when Madero replaced Díaz in 1911, as multiple revolutionary factions now laid claim
to federal authority. Huerta’s popular legacy is one of treason and cruelty, and the stain of
illegitimacy is evident even in the record of La Boquilla. For years afterward, CAFERC officials
were called to account for payments made to the “illegal” government of Huerta.62 It is worth
pointing out again that Ginther’s infamous violent eviction of the residents of San Miguel and
San José de las Babizas, discussed in the previous chapter, occurred during this
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counterrevolutionary interregnum, a fact which only reinforced the local association of the
CAFERC with the Porfiriato.
Communications between the SFCI and CAFERC tapered off dramatically between 1913
and the establishment of the new Constitutionalist government in 1917.63 This was due in no
small part to the widespread dislocations of the Revolution at federal and state levels. In fact,
while far from the capital, Chihuahua was uniquely impacted by Huerta’s short rule. The
assassination of maderista governor Abraham González resulted in his protégé, Pancho Villa,
holding the governorship of Chihuahua through much of 1913 and 1914. And former rebel leader
Pascual Orozco also switched sides, fighting on behalf of Huerta in Chihuahua and dealing a
defeat to Constitutionalist forces in Camargo, for example. After the fall of Huerta and
subsequent Convention of Aguascalientes in July of 1914, Villa’s powerful división del norte
(northern army) became the de facto military and political force in Chihuahua.
Although it appears that the CAFERC missed its contractual deadline of March 26, 1913,
for completing the works at La Boquilla, this date fell during the Huerta regime, and there is no
evidence that SFCI officials pressed the company on this point. Other correspondence suggests
that the ministry struggled even to communicate with the company, let alone confirm
completion. SFCI documents – some uncharacteristically written by hand rather than typewriter
– suggest an inability to exchange even the most basic information at this time. Partial and
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commanding presence of northern Mexican commercial and industrial entrepreneurs, who would dominate Mexican
politics for over a decade. This group stood apart from the “Conventionalist” faction of the Revolution, represented
by popular leaders Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata, who felt that the Revolution was being coopted by bourgeois
interests. They took their name from the Convention of Aguascalientes in October of 1914, at which Zapata and
Villa formally split from the carrancista revolutionary project. The Conventionalists drew heavy support from
landless, rural and indigenous communities whose concerns were often very local.
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updated import lists submitted by the company had, after a backlog cleared in 1912, again
become unwieldy. Officials admitted they could not be sure exactly what was being imported, or
whether it was meant to be duty-free. An internal SFCI memo from December of 1914
concluded that the ministry had lost control over these imports. Worse still, it also stated that a
miscommunication between the SFCI and treasury officials sometime after 1910 resulted in the
CAFERC being informed that all imports would be exempted from duty, an error which had
gone uncorrected for years. By this point, documents showed that the SFCI all but gave up
counting, suspending review until information could be located and full lists could be
compiled.64 This attempt to make legible the material flows involved in the construction of La
Boquilla lasted for many years, with subsequent governments continuing to review old imports
in 1918, and audits occurring as late as 1932.65 In the end, nearly all major imports were
approved, and these reviews do not appear to have amounted to more than an annoyance to the
CAFERC. But these pages and pages of imports, numbering in the thousands, demonstrate the
expansive logistical apparatus required to enforce federal law in Mexico and, by extension, the
relative lack of logistical control in Chihuahua even in the best of times. In fact, it seems
reasonable to hypothesize that, by 1914, US customs agents in El Paso had more complete
manifests of imports to La Boquilla than did federal administrators in Mexico City. This ongoing
effort to review imports reveals not the presence of strong federal control over activities in
Chihuahua, but the absence of such control.

64

AHA, AN, caja 111, exp. 1097, leg. 112, fs. 67, 71–4.
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See, for just one example, AHA, AN, caja 111, exp. 1097, leg. 122, fs. 1–16.

92

Electricity was transmitted for the first time on September 30, 1915, more than seventy
kilometers from La Boquilla to the Palmilla mine in Parral.66 This connection was short-lived,
however, as fighting near the dam site soon interrupted production until July 1916, when
generation began and ceased again. By September of 1916, when Bronimann submitted his final
report on La Boquilla, along with affidavits attesting to the dam’s completion, he reported that
the dam had never been able to transmit more than one thousand kilowatts, or one-seventh the
output of a single generator. 67 At that time, only three of a planned four turbine-generator units
had been installed, although the dam was designed to accommodate six. Bronimann reported that
engineers were rotating the turbines into service just to keep them active. Having been rushed to
completion under the fog of Villa’s guerrilla campaign in Chihuahua, La Boquilla was unable to
immediately make use of the waters of the Conchos.
Beyond construction, it is difficult to know if any other activity was occurring at this
time, as communication remained minimal. Records show that CAFERC officials retreated at
some point during the Revolution across the border to the Anson Mills building in El Paso, just
as the Terrazas-Creel family had done.68 In addition, a receipt presented to the SFCI dating to the
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AHA, AN, caja 115, exp. 1097, leg. 165, fs. 49–51.
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AHA, AN, caja 115, exp. 1097, leg. 165, fs. 12–13. La Boquilla was confirmed completed on September
4, 1916, by local interim municipal president of San Francisco de Conchos, Eugenio Anaya. Interestingly, in his
handwritten testimony, Anaya noted that the technical inspection required an expert, so he brought with him and
“independent” engineer, Emil Bronimann, by whom an attached report was composed. Also, Anaya appeared to
have detailed knowledge of the contractual obligations of the CAFERC, which are noted as fulfilled in his two-page
testimony. The language of the affidavits seem to suggest that Bronimann, who was intimately involved at every
phase of this project, was attempting to offer his professional opinion through a third-party.
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When the Anson Mills Building was completed in 1911, it was the tallest in El Paso (145 feet), and one
of the few structural concrete buildings in the world. The building remains a center of cross-border commerce and
industry even today.
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summer of 1914 showed that the order was placed from Toronto, presumably by the Mexican
Northern Power Company, suggesting that some business was being handled from Canada.69 It
seems that, except for laborers and essential engineering staff, most company employees fled
Chihuahua around 1914. It also seems almost certain that Emil Bronimann was among those who
stayed, as he was the “intellectual author,” according to a letter attesting to the dam’s
completion.70 Owing to the vicissitudes of war and federal weakness, the dam was not completed
exactly according to the plans approved by the SFCI, a fact which was later noted
sympathetically by a Mexican engineer. Much as Ginther moved during the Huerta
counterrevolution to evict legal tenants in the area, it seems Bronimann took advantage of federal
absence to raise the height of the dam to 74 meters, flooding even more lands than had been
originally proposed.71 By the time this change was recorded, years later, there was little which
could be done to change it.
⁂
The impunity with which company agents acted after 1913 offers the most direct
evidence of the absence of state power in Chihuahua. Emil Bronimann unilaterally raised the
height of the dam, thus increasing the area to be flooded, while Paul Ginther violently drove
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AHA, AN, caja 112, exp. 1097, legs. 120–122.
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AHA, AN, caja 115, exp. 1097, leg. 165, fs. 52–3. An emphatic letter (September 26, 1916) from interim
municipal president of Camargo, Amado Treviño, stated that after Pearson left the project, it was left to the
CAFERC to complete the project itself, which counted on the “unbreakable force of will” of the “intellectual
author” of the project, Emilio [sic] Bronimann. The “grandiose monument” of La Boquilla, he wrote, would
“immortalize his name.” He also wrote that the transformer substation at Parral, “El Hormiguero,” as well as
distribution lines to the mines of La Palmilla, San Francisco del Oro, Santa Bárbara and Los Azules were already
complete by September of 1916.
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AHA, AN, caja 110, exp. 1097, leg. 105, f. 26. See also SAF memo in 1921 noting the same change,
AHA, AN, caja 111, exp. 1097, leg. 117, f. 38.
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farmers from their lands, removing an outstanding and potentially costly obstacle to completing
La Boquilla. That the company never faced any consequences for these acts, and Ginther claimed
to act on federal authority, suggest a major absence of state power in Chihuahua. When the
Terrazas-Creel family finally fled northward to El Paso after 1913, this vacuum would have been
total, leaving the company to its own devices.
The geographical and political isolation of La Boquilla after completion in 1915 might
have worked to the favor of the CAFERC were it not for the volatile state of Chihuahua at the
time. While the company avoided the control of federal and state government, it also lacked any
means for securing the dam site from villista guerrillas operating in Chihuahua, freezing
expansion and distribution. Although Pershing’s punitive campaign against Villa appears to have
passed within miles of the newly-completed dam, the rebel commander consistently evaded
capture, leaving La Boquilla idle. Having rushed this colossal work to completion through the
heart of the Revolution, CAFERC officials could do little more than watch the canyon above La
Boquilla fill with the waters of the Conchos.
While extensive efforts by federal officials to exert control over the foreign-built project
at La Boquilla are evident in the record, it is also clear that these efforts did little to alter the
activities of the CAFERC. Even during the Porfiriato, state infrastructural power was relatively
weak in Chihuahua and relied upon the Terrazas-Creel family to act as federal intermediaries.
Flows of commerce, capital, information, and transport linked Chihuahua more tightly to other
states in the borderlands than to the distant capital in central Mexico. This was a situation which
Villa understood instinctively, and which he also exploited to his advantage. Both the project at
La Boquilla and the villista rebellion which preyed upon it operated in an infrastructural context
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quite different from the rest of Mexico. It was this very difference, and its potential to determine
sociopolitical power in the region, that federal authorities both feared and coveted.
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CHAPTER 3: Confusion, 1916–1919
The most violent phase of the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua occurred between late
1915 and 1918, after Constitutionalist forces defeated Francisco Villa decisively at Celaya. This
battle settled the armed factional struggle for control of Mexico City but it did not extend federal
control over Chihuahua, where Villa’s defeated troops waged an extended campaign of pillage,
sabotage, and extortion. Villa’s renowned abilities as a military commander were rooted in an
intimate knowledge of the networks upon which the Chihuahuan economy was based, honed
over decades as a bandit, among other pursuits of varying legality. Villa knew precisely how to
leverage existing infrastructures to access the wealth of Chihuahua, allowing him to sustain an
insurgency in this harsh and rural environment for years. After villista forces killed US citizens
in early 1916, US President Woodrow Wilson launched a cross-border punitive expedition meant
to capture Villa, dead or alive. In his natural environment, Villa evaded capture by both US and
Mexican troops and remained in the field until peace was brokered in 1920.
La Boquilla was located at the very heart of Villa’s insurgency, along the main northsouth artery in Chihuahua halfway between the capital and the mining region of Parral. La
Boquilla and regional mining assets were targeted by villista bands repeatedly, paralyzing an
industry which had escaped major damage in the early Revolution. While La Boquilla was
completed in 1915, and technically capable of operation, this new dam sat idle and undefended
for years. In El Paso, where company officials had fled the spreading violence, sporadic
dispatches arrived from the dam site detailing regular attacks on life and property. These were
forwarded to federal officials, who were initially powerless to offer any aid in protecting La
Boquilla. By 1918, the CAFERC was entirely on its own in Chihuahua.
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Despite the immediate problems presented by ongoing villista raids in Chihuahua, there
was a more potentially problematic development emerging in Mexico City. The new
Constitution of 1917 proclaimed an entirely new relationship between the state, society, and the
natural environment, potentially threatening all company concessions on the Conchos River. La
Boquilla, which had still never distributed electricity, was threatened by both sides of the
Revolution in Chihuahua – villista guerillas in the field who held a logistical advantage over
state forces and Constitutionalist bureaucrats in Mexico City empowered by the new political
and social aims of the ongoing Revolution. With the waters of the Conchos ostensibly under
federal jurisdiction, engineers and politicians set their sights on La Boquilla as a tool of
statemaking in Chihuahua. As major flooding finally filled Lake Toronto for the first time in late
1917, and the Mexican Revolution entered its final act, officials at the CAFERC worried that La
Boquilla might be lost without ever generating a profit.1 Drawing on communications between
federal minsters and company officials, this chapter explores the efforts of the CAFERC to retain
control over its assets on the Conchos, as well as the debates about public utility these
necessarily provoked. It then turns to the engineering literature of the era, demonstrating how
federal bureaucrats began proposing almost immediately the integration of La Boquilla into state
irrigation projects.
Revolutionary Changes

1

AHA, AN, caja 115, exp. 1097, leg. 165, fs. 39–40. Company engineer Emil Bronimann stated in his
1916 report that the depth of the water at the dam was 64 meters by September 12, flooding 150 square kilometers.
On September 23, the level was 66 meters. Bronimann anticipated that the reservoir would reach its full depth of 70
meters by the end of the year.
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Although communications between the CAFERC and SFCI were still at this point
sporadic, a series of exchanges indicated that the company remained concerned about its
outstanding requirement to build a dam at La Joya, 120 kilometers upriver from La Boquilla.
Despite the profound social, economic, and political changes resulting from the revolutionary
struggle, CAFERC officials were still contractually obligated to construct this dam under the
penalty of forfeiture of both their concession and deposit. And since the CAFERC had joined
these two concessions within a single contract, there was apparent concern that a failure or delay
in building La Joya might serve as a pretext for the expropriation of La Boquilla. For this reason,
even before La Boquilla was declared finished, and while US troops still occupied Chihuahua,
the company began lobbying for a seven-year delay for construction at La Joya. The stated
reasons for this delay were linked directly to the works at La Boquilla – the great and
unanticipated sacrifices undertaken by the company, not to mention the danger still present in
Chihuahua, prevented the company from moving forward with this second project. As a letter
from “British” CAFERC official T.G. Mackenzie, representing “a Mexican company,” reported
in August of 1916:
The ‘Boquilla de Babiza’ dam; in spite of the immense difficulties encountered by the
company related to the domestic situation of the country, has been completed, having
been indispensable to this [effort] a great perseverance on the part of the Directors of the
company and the sacrifice of vast sums, invested primarily in the transport of the great
many construction materials which it had to bring from the United States at exorbitant
prices.2

2
AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 51. Mackenzie seems to have been granted power of attorney
after La Boquilla was completed. See, for example, details of this meeting of investors in December 1916, AHA,
AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 72. “La presa de ‘Boquilla de Babiza’; no obstante las inmensas dificultades con
que ha tropezado la compañía, a causa de la situación interior del país, ha sido terminada habiendo sido
indispensable para ello, una grande constancia por parte de los Directores de la compañía y el sacrifico de fuertes
sumas, invertidas principalmente en el trasporte de los muchísimos materiales de construcción que hubo que traer de
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Citing the great “sacrifices and expenses” already sunk into La Boquilla, as well as the great
importance of integrating La Joya into this hydraulic system – “which should be considered
complementary” – Mackenzie made the case that the company deserved an extension.3 By the
end of the year, from his office in El Paso, Mackenzie proposed to the SFCI a seven-year
extension on their contract to complete La Joya.4
This request was received in December 1916, but the situation of the country limited the
effective ability of the federal government to act. As the ministry informed the company, La
Boquilla had to be inspected by an engineer and confirmed as complete before any changes
could be made to the contract or any deposit could be recovered.5 Yet an SFCI memo at this time
revealed the ongoing problems in communicating between Chihuahua and Mexico City. When
the SFCI contacted an engineer in the Laguna about possibly confirming the works at La
Boquilla, Tranquilino Romero replied that the railroad between the Laguna and Chihuahua was
impassable. Turning to another topic altogether, he requested silver for outstanding expenses, as
there were so many scrips in circulation that it made exchange difficult, as well as the return of
his surveying instruments, which were submitted for repair long before.6 Owing to the

Estados Unidos, los que salían a precios exorbitantes, no habiendo sucedido igual cosa con la de ‘La Joya’, a que la
compañía, por las circunstancias, no ha podido dedicarle atención alguna…”.
3

AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 51.

4
AHA, AN, caja 115, exp. 1097, leg. 165, f. 7. An SFCI receipt of this petition in December 1916 stated
that Mackenzie was in El Paso, Texas; AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 11.
5

AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 11.

6

AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 9. A later inspection request indicates this was still a problem
five months later in April of 1917. AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, fs. 60–61.
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difficulties in the north, as well as administrative restructuring and relative federal weakness, it
would be six years before La Boquilla was formally inspected. The issue of regular contractual
payments to an inspection fund was also a raised by the SFCI at this point, as it took the position
after 1914 that any payments made to other governments were considered unpaid. In a letter to
the CAFERC, ministry officials informed the company that any payments made during the “socalled Government of the usurper Huerta or the Conventionalist administration” of Villa would
be considered unpaid, as these administrations lacked the standing to accept such payments.7
Although it had completed one large dam and held the concession for another, the CAFERC
remained in a state of limbo as it entered 1917, unsure whether it would be required to build a
second massive project or even whether it would retain the one it had already built.
Meanwhile, while the waters of the Conchos slowly filled Lake Toronto for the first time,
the victors of the Revolution began meeting in Querétaro to draft a new constitution. Former
anti-Porfirian allies Villa and Zapata turned against the new federal government and were
subsequently contained in their local bases of power in Chihuahua and Morelos, respectively. In
Mexico City, a new Constitutionalist government began to take shape under Venustiano
Carranza. On February 5, the Constitution of 1917 was ratified after mere months of drafting.
Still in effect, this document was unique at the time in its approach to the social functions of
government. Unlike previous constitutions, which were seen as protecting only the interests of
moneyed and landed elites, the Constitution of 1917 inaugurated a bold Mexican social
experiment which, in various iterations over subsequent decades, sought to guarantee labor
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AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, fs. 12–33, 36–37, 42, esp. 21. “…si alguno hizo en tiempo del
llamado Gobierno del usurpador Huerta o de la administración convencionista, porque no siendo tal Gobierno ni las
oficinas de Gobierno de la Republica, el pago no fue legal por haberse hecho a quien no tenía personalidad para
recibirlo; y por tanto se debe tener por no hecho…”.

101

rights, compulsory education, and a policy of resource use rooted in social justice. Although the
Constitutionalists lacked the support of the major populist leaders by this time, the incorporation
of elements of Zapata’s Plan de Ayala, for example, sought to integrate the popular classes into
the ongoing political Revolution to a degree never imagined by Madero. Although in retrospect,
many of the most radical aims of this document have proven aspirational at best, this constitution
at its inception signaled a significant departure in the philosophy and practice of governance in
1917 – a fact to which CAFERC employees, investors, and engineers were acutely attuned.8
Of particular concern to the CAFERC was Article 27 of this new constitution, which
recast national resources such as land, water, minerals, and the like as property of the nation.
This meant that private ownership of these resources was henceforth to be considered a privilege
granted by the federal government alone. This article also granted wide latitude to federal
authorities in dictating the use of natural resources by private interests to support social welfare,
as well as expropriation in the name of public utility. Foreign ownership of any natural resources
was prohibited within 100 kilometers of the border, except though Mexican-owned trusts.9 And
in all relations with the government, foreign concessionaires and their assets would be
considered Mexican, resolving disputes through Mexican courts and ministries, and never
appealing to their own government for support, upon pain of seizure of all assets. With

8

Grandin has characterized the Mexican Constitution of 1917 as “the world's first fully conceived socialdemocratic charter, predating similar documents in Europe and India, enshrining the right to organize unions, the
right to work, a minimum wage, equal pay for men and women, welfare, education, and health care.” Greg Grandin,
“The Liberal Traditions in the Americas: Rights, Sovereignty, and the Origins of Liberal Multilateralism,” The
American Historical Review 117, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 74–75.
9

For context, the capital of Chihuahua City is less than 200 kilometers from the border of Texas at
Ojinaga-Presidio.
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Chihuahua’s economy so deeply rooted in the US-dominated mining industry, this change
carried potentially grave consequences. As Bernstein summarized: “In this manner, property
rights in Mexico were revolutionized; economic liberalism was legally dead.”10
The cooptation of state systems by foreign interests was seen as among the most
egregious abuses of the Porfiriato, especially by the popular classes who had little to show for
Mexico’s modernizing boom. Article 27, along with other parts of the constitution, explicitly
targeted this model of political economy and laid a legal and philosophical foundation for later
federal projects of agrarian reform, land redistribution, and colonization which would emerge in
increasingly grand scales by the late 1920s. The most immediate concern of the CAFERC
regarded the nature of their assets and concessions – would they be recognized under Article 27,
and on what terms? Although the CAFERC was officially a Mexican company, this legal ruse
represented precisely the kind of ownership pattern targeted by the new constitution. Company
officials feared that Article 27 might prevent the CAFERC from using the very waters their dam
was meant to regulate, rendering La Boquilla a rather expensive monolith in the middle of the
Conchos.
Concerns with Article 27, and indeed the future of industry in Mexico, was not restricted
to the CAFERC. Foreign investors collectively interpreted Article 27 as a direct attack on their
interests and rallied successfully to ensure it was not enforced to the letter, even if this effort took
years of negotiation. Ultimately, United States diplomatic might was enlisted, with formal
recognition of the Constitutionalist government being conditionally withheld until assurances
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Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry, 117.
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safeguarding US property was made in the Treaty of Bucareli in 1923 – six years after Article 27
was ratified.11 US negotiators were primarily concerned with oil interests and made significant
concessions to ensure the survival of this industry. As Marvin Bernstein has noted, the State
Department “literally sacrificed American landholdings in Mexico in return for confirmation of
the pre-Revolutionary oil concessions.” He argued that, unlike oil producers who had openly
sought US protection during the Revolution, electrical and mining interests remained in the good
graces of the new Mexican government, since they sought no intervention and typically dealt
directly with Mexican ministries.12 And the CAFERC did retain its properties and concessions,
with assurances that it would be permitted to operate as planned for the foreseeable future. Still,
while the CAFERC might have emerged from the Revolution intact and on workable terms with
federal regulators, the political winds had most decidedly shifted. Gone was the boosterism of
Porfirian federal ministers and local elites, never to return. Where the CAFERC and its local
associates had formerly seen the Mexican state as an advocate, in the coming years, it would
become something more like a contentious partner.
Instead of deciding promptly on the concession at La Joya, ministry memos indicate that
government officials were having exactly the kinds of internal discussions that CAFERC
officials feared. Mackenzie had submitted a proposal to the newly-formed Secretaría de
Agricultura y Fomento (SAF, the successor of the SFCI) concerning possible fishing concessions
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Aboites Aguilar, La irrigación revolucionaria, 15–16. The short-lived Treaty of Bucareli, signed in
1923, effectively laid out the broad strokes of this agreement, settling for many US observers the question of the
retroactive application of Article 27. Although this treaty was rejected the next year by President Álvaro Obregón’s
successor Plutarco Elias Calles, and was not ratified by either country, the claims of the CAFERC and other
electrical companies did receive recognition. While the CAFERC was still Canadian, its client base was largely US
mining interests, and its concessions were also preserved. The Treaty of Bucareli also stipulated that debt payments
to the United States would resume and indemnization would be paid for damages and confiscations.
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Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry, 127.
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on the Conchos, apparently seeking to profit further from the waters of the Conchos. In an
internal communication dated July 27, 1917, wildlife and game officials requested a copy of the
existing CAFERC contract, and asked whether the company represented by the “English subject”
Mackenzie was, in fact, Mexican. The response from the SAF, the successor ministry to that
which had in 1906 consummated the company’s contract, would likely have concerned CAFERC
officials. On September 15, an SAF official responded that no contract could be found and that
the company could not be confirmed as Mexican.13
This general shift in the relationship between the CAFERC and the Mexican state was
prefigured, perhaps, by the institutional change mentioned above. With the inauguration of the
new Constitutionalist government, there occurred also an administrative reorganization of federal
ministries. Gone was the SFCI, headed before the Revolution by the porfirista henequen oligarch
Olegario Molina, to be replaced in 1917 by the Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento (Ministry of
Agriculture and Development, SAF). This ministry was led initially by Pastor Rouaix, a
revolutionary governor of the northern state of Durango who helped draft Article 27, and took a
direct role in agrarian reform and land redistribution projects.14 The presence of Rouaix alone
signaled a new relationship between the CAFERC and the Mexican state.
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AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, fs. 43, 45. There is no further documentation on fishing
concessions on the Conchos, suggesting this proposal was abandoned or denied. However, Lake Toronto has since
become a major sport fishing destination in northern Mexico, owing to the quality of the reservoir’s black bass.
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Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry, 115. While serving as the minister of commerce and industry,
Rouaix issued the Ley Agraria (Agrarian Law) of January 6, 1915, formally initiating federal reform efforts. As
reported by Bernstein, citing Aldama, Rouaix was known for his intelligence and non-partisan bearing, and was thus
tasked by Carranza with moderating the most radical demands of the Constitution of 1917.
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It was perhaps due to this general state of disorder – federal reorganization compounded
by guerrilla control in Chihuahua – that the CAFERC was unable to get any immediate decision
about its concession at La Joya. Writing on March 28, 1917, and referencing the letter of the
previous summer, CAFERC officials again requested an extension, citing the chaotic situation of
the nation and the “great efforts and sacrifices” required to complete La Boquilla during the
Revolution.15 Yet no resolution was forthcoming, and a company letter indicated that
management in El Paso was entirely cut off from the dam site near Camargo.16 With La Boquilla
completed but sitting idle, and management safely out of harm’s way in El Paso, the Conchos
River filled Lake Toronto and then overflowed La Boquilla, causing especially devastating
floods downriver in 1917.17 Still, the company’s most perilous days at La Boquilla were yet to
come.
Villista Attacks
Villa’s insurgent northern army became a violent problem for foreign investors in
Chihuahua from 1915 onward, as it began targeting mines and other fixed interests which had
previously escaped the ravages of war. In October of 1915, Villa’s forces were reported stealing
ore from a mine in Naica and smelting it in nearby Camargo.18 He was also accused of
threatening to confiscate the Guggenheim-owned ASARCO smelter at Ávalos, near Chihuahua,
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AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 34.
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AHA, AN, caja 113, exp. 1097, leg. 136, f. 1; dated December 14, 1917.
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Salas Urbina, Santa Rosalía de Camargo: ayer y hoy, 206.
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“La minería en México durante el año 1915,” Boletín minero I, no. 9 (May 1, 1916): 267–68; translated
from the Engineering and Mining Journal (January 8, 1916).

106

causing most of the company’s workers to be evacuated from the country. In January of 1916,
villista soldiers infamously killed more than a dozen ASARCO employees during a holdup on
the Mexico North-Western Railway near Santa Isabel, Chihuahua. Then in March, for reasons
which are still debated, Villa led a cross-border raid into Columbus, New Mexico, killing 18 US
citizens and making off with guns, ammunition, supplies, and livestock. The US government
responded to this provocation, sending General John J. Pershing in March of 1916 on what is
known as the “Punitive Expedition,” with the aim of capturing Villa and protecting US interests
in northern Mexico. After months trailing Villa across the borderlands, Pershing was forced to
suspend active search operations when federal Mexican forces threatened to cut off the foreign
army’s supply lines. Pershing was recalled in January of 1917, owing to the objections of the
Carranza government and intensifying war in Europe.19 This expedition centered mostly on the
state of Chihuahua and saw multiple engagements in the vicinity of La Boquilla. While the
Punitive Expedition failed to capture Villa, and threatened to bring Mexico and the US to war, it
did succeed in further isolating the guerilla leader, pushing him to ever more desperate measures.
With the collapse of the Porfirian government and the northward retreat of the TerrazasCreel network to El Paso, the CAFERC found its project in Chihuahua without the aegis of the
forces which had brought it into existence. Still, the dam site had escaped the direct effects of
armed fighting, and the CAFERC complained mostly of severed railways and telegraph lines
connecting La Boquilla to the outside world. It appears that Villa, like the federal forces who
would eventually oppose him, understood that vital infrastructures were more valuable when left
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Of note, it was the so-called Zimmerman Telegram which is credited for pushing the United States into
war against Germany. This intercepted telegram claimed to offer financial support to Mexico in return for joining
the war as a German ally, potentially forcing US troops to defend the southern border rather than joining the
European theater.
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intact. This changed by late 1917, as Villa’s supporters began to target La Boquilla, perhaps
realizing that their leader would never hold Chihuahua again. In a note to the SAF, the company
reported that on November 13, 1917, the dam site was attacked by a band of villista forces led by
Jesús Moreno, and not for the first time. The situation in previous months had been calm,
according to company representative Alberto Carreño, thanks to a federal garrison assigned to
the area. But recent events in Amendariz caused this unit to be recalled to Camargo, and attacks
resumed again, resulting in employees being held hostage for one thousand pesos. A later
complaint to federal authorities suggests that these attacks may have begun as early as December
of 1916.20 Citing the great national importance of the “colossal works” built by the company,
CAFERC attorney Alberto Carreño urgently requested that federal troops be reassigned to
protect the dam.21
Whatever immediate federal support which may have been provided was clearly
insufficient. On December 30, 1917, according to Carreño, villista Mauro Mendoza and forty
men attacked La Boquilla again, dispersing a federal cavalry detachment and killing three
soldiers. Afterward, houses and buildings were sacked, leaving remaining employees in the
desert without supplies. Carreño asked if it were possible, through the Secretaría de Guerra y
Marina (Ministry of Defense), to request a garrison of forty to fifty Yaqui infantrymen.22
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AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 64.

21

AHA, AN, caja 113, exp. 1097, leg. 136, f. 2.

22
The Yaquis were natives of the border states of Sonora and Arizona, among others. Due to the
inhospitable climate of this region, the Yaqui had long lived beyond the reach of the colonial and early national
states in Mexico, and considered themselves an independent people. During the Porfiriato and Revolutionary period,
Yaquis were forcibly impoverished, enslaved, sold, and resettled as workers and soldiers throughout Mexico, often
in sugar and henequen plantations in southern Mexico.
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Emphasizing yet again the importance of La Boquilla and appealing to the wisdom of the
minister, Carreño wrote: “nobody knows better than you the current and future importance of
these works to the industry and agriculture of the State of Chihuahua.”23
Whether this unit was created, or perhaps the federal garrison was returned from
Camargo is unclear, though no additional attacks were reported for almost a year. In
communications between the SAF and the defense ministry, the latter noted that additional forces
could not be supplied as “such a garrison already exists.”24 However, as CAFERC officials were
not present at the dam site, and communications were sporadic, it is possible the company had no
communication at all with La Boquilla, and thus no way of knowing the situation. For example,
in September of 1918, Carreño asked SAF officials if the ministry had inspected the dam site,
suggesting little to no communication between the CAFERC and any employees which may
have been present.25 Later exchanges in October and December indicated that train movement
between Torreón and Chihuahua were still nonexistent, preventing inspection.26
Attacks escalated again at the end of 1918 when rebel forces first began to target the
hydroelectric infrastructure itself. Carreño reported that on December 19, 1918, rebel forces
dynamited two steel towers upon which were suspended the main transmission lines to the El
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AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 46; dated February 1, 1918.
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AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, fs. 49–50, 55. “…con anterioridad ya existe establecida dicha
guarnición.”
25

AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 58.
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AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, fs. 60–1.
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Hormiguero substation in Parral.27 Guerillas remained in the area after the attack, preventing
repair of the towers.28 Carreño was careful to note the potential social consequences of this
attack, reporting that the mining industry in Parral was “completely paralyzed, leaving hundreds
of men without work.” Carreño’s tone in this letter, usually quite formal, demonstrated
increasing frustration. In complaining about two years of attacks, he said, “in all this time the
military authorities of the State have apparently made no real effort to combat the rebel bands of
this region.”29 He pressed again on the social and economic ramifications of these attacks: “the
affair could not be more grave or more transcendental because it is no longer just about the
damages imposed on company interests… but rather the general interests of the region, and not
only of capitalists, but also the hundreds of workers who are left without work due to the lack of
protection of the works created by the [CAFERC].”30 Listing the damages suffered by the
company which turned economic activity in the region upside down – pillage, hostage-taking,
death threats, and sabotage – Carreño wrote, “I fear greatly that if the appropriate authorities do
not offer due protection to the company, the day will come when… the colossal works which
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AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 64.
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AHA, AN, caja 113, exp. 1097, leg. 146, fs. 167–168. A later report on the transmission line between La
Boquilla and the Hormiguero transformer in Parral stated that the towers were toppled but the cables remained intact
and operational, clarifying that this act of sabotage was not immediately discovered.
29
“…en todo ese tiempo las autoridades militares del Estado aparentemente no han hecho ningún esfuerzo
real para combatir a las partidas rebeldes de esa comarca.”
30

“…el asunto no puede ser más grave y más transcendental, porque ya en esta ocasión no se trata sólo de
los perjuicios seguidos a los intereses de la Compañía, …; sino que se trata de los intereses generales de la región y
no solamente de los capitalistas, sino de los centenares de obreros a quien se deja sin trabajo a causa de la falta de
protección que han recibidos las obras realizadas por la [CAFERC].”
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have been realized in the midst of innumerable difficulties are destroyed.”31 In Carreño’s telling,
the interests of the CAFERC and the Mexican state were one in the same, as La Boquilla was the
economic engine of the entire state. It seems that Carreño’s strategy of emphasizing economic
interests and potential labor unrest was appropriate, as the internal SAF summary of this letter
highlighted this concern in particular.32 Still, federal reach in Chihuahua far exceeded its grasp at
this point, and no troops were dispatched. Tied up in red tape, it appears this letter was never
actually forwarded to the defense ministry as requested. Compounding this were enduring
communication problems. The activities of WWI censors alone, Carreño complained, delayed
letters between El Paso and Parral between six and eight weeks, not to mention the much longer
trip to Mexico City.33 La Boquilla remained besieged and largely idle into 1919.
The SAF received yet another communication reporting attacks from Carreño on April
11, 1919, in which he again emphasized the point that the CAFERC was essential to the north of
Mexico. After complaining that the company had to pay dearly to disperse the bandits and repair
transmission towers without federal help, he passed along an unsigned letter directly from the
dam site, worth quoting at length:
We have still been unable to get a garrison for La Boquilla and the villistas pass through
there freely almost every day. So far they have not inflicted any damage on the plant, but
from time to time they have made us give them food as well as clothing which we have
found absolutely impossible to refuse without bringing greater danger on our property. If
the Government had assigned a garrison, we would already be free of these nuisances and

31
“…mucho temo que si las autoridades correspondientes no prestan la debida protección a la Compañía,
día llegue en que sean destruidas la grandes, las colosales obras que en medio de dificultades sin cuento ha
realizado.”
32

AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 65.
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A series describing these complications can be found at AHA, AN, caja 113, exp. 1097, leg. 140, fs. 1–

10.
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dangers. It seems it is not yet understood that our plant at La Boquilla is the most
important and vital point in all of the state of Chihuahua. We have been left to our own
efforts and in such circumstances we have done what we must… The Government earns a
considerable income from the mining operations in the District of Parral, and this income
will be much greater when conditions improve, which is why a garrison in Parral is so
important; but they don’t realize that the entire district of Parral would be dead if any
accident were to occur at our power generation plant at La Boquilla.34

Carreño warned that sending a small garrison of ten or fifteen men to guard this massive
and dangerous site was worse than none at all, since it only invited trouble. A substantial
garrison was necessary to finally quell the problems at La Boquilla. He repeated again the social
importance of the dam: “This is about the District of Parral, when we speak of the destruction of
the plant at La Boquilla,” he stated directly, “but it must not be forgotten the link between certain
social phenomena and, as a consequence, that a serious disruption in Parral would extend to the
State of Chihuahua, and that a deterioration there would have repercussions on the general
welfare of the country.”35 In closing, he pleaded with the minister, “with insistence, that you take
into account this Legitimate desire of the Company which is so intimately bound with the
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AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 75. “Todavía no hemos podido obtener una guarnición para la
Boquilla y los villistas entran allí libremente casi todos los días. Hasta hoy no han hecho daño alguno a la planta,
pero de tiempo en tiempo no han obligado a darles alimentos y aun vestidos que nos hemos visto en la absoluta
imposibilidad de rehusar so [sic] pena de colocar en mayor peligro nuestras propiedades. Si el Gobierno hubiera
colocado una guarnición, ya estaríamos libres de todos estos desagrados y peligros. Parece que no se ha llegado a
comprender que nuestra planta en la Boquilla es el más importante y el más vital punto en todo el Estado de
Chihuahua. Hemos sido abandonados a nuestros propios esfuerzos y en tales circunstancias hemos hechos cuanto
hemos pedido. Nos agradaría mucho, sin embargo, que Ud. buscara la manera de llamar otra vez la atención de
gobierno sobre este asunto, haciendo patente la necesidad de que se dé una protección apropiada a nuestra planta. El
Gobierno obtiene un considerable ingreso de las operaciones mineras en el Distrito de Parral, y este ingreso se
aumentará cuando las condiciones se mejoren, y por esto se tiene una importante guarnición en Parral; pero no se
dan cuenta de que todo el distrito de Parral quedaría muerto si algún accidente ocurriera a nuestra planta generadora
de fuerza de la Boquilla.”
35

“Esta se preocupa por el Distrito de Parral, cuando habla de la destrucción de su planta en la Boquilla;
pero no hay que olvidar en encadenamiento que tienen ciertos fenómenos sociales y, en consecuencia, que una seria
perturbación en el Parral se hará extensiva al Estado de Chihuahua, y que un empeoramiento en éste tendrá que
repercutir en el bienestar general del país.”
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general welfare.”36 General Brigadier Juan Barragan, Jefe del Estado Mayor Presidencial,
responded that a garrison of such a size was impossible, as troops were already fully engaged in
suppressing banditry in the region.37
By the time the SAF received another communication from Carreño, it was clear that the
CAFERC representative was desperate to end the attacks on La Boquilla. On April 5 (apparently
soon after his previous letter), rebels entered La Boquilla again with a large force intending to
dynamite the dam and thus also destroy the company’s private railway to Camargo, which
followed the Conchos. “Great and prolonged efforts were necessary to dissuade them from this
intent,” Carreño wrote, “and were finally achieved, when they were obligated to new and
considerable sacrifices.”38 For this reason, Carreño argued, the company required urgent and
competent defense. A failure to provide this, he argued, would have catastrophic results, “not
only for the many interests I represent, but also for the Government itself.”39 Whether this was
the message which finally registered with federal ministers or troops simply became available is
unclear. But records indicate that, as of May 24, 1919, troops were finally ordered to secure the
site and protect CAFERC property.40 As no further missives from Carreño appear in the record,
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“Ruego a Ud., pues, con encarecimiento, que tome en cuenta este Legítimo deseo de la Compañía que tan
íntimamente está ligado con el bienestar general.”
37

AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 79.

38
AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 83. “Grandes y prolongados esfuerzos tuvo que realizar para
disuadirlos de este intento; y al fin lo consiguió, cuando fue obligada a nuevos y considerables sacrificios.”
39

“…porque puede ser la peor de todas no únicamente para los cuantiosos intereses que represento, sino
para el Gobierno mismo.”
40

Led by Generals J. Augustín Castro and Manuel M. Diéguez.
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it seems that the question of security was thereafter resolved.41 Villas’ last significant
engagement came at Ciudad Juarez in June 1919, when Mexican federal troops supported by US
forces in El Paso repelled an attack. Villa retreated from military activity and retired with his
remaining supporters to a large hacienda with a full pardon from the Constitutionalist
government in July of 1920.42
It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to know exactly what happened at La Boquilla
between late 1916 and 1919, as the record at this point is sparse and decidedly one-sided. The
lawlessness and destruction are widely known, and it seems likely that the dam was attacked on a
regular basis. But there is also no corroborating information. Federal forces at this point were
dependent on the company, whose management had fled to El Paso, to describe to them the
situation on the ground. With communications largely cut off, messages between Parral or La
Boquilla and El Paso were likely delivered via intermittent telegraph or rail lines. According to
CAFERC reports, trains at this time had to head east to San Antonio, and return to Mexican
territory through Eagle Pass-Piedras Negras (then still known as Ciudad Porfirio Díaz), or
Laredo-Nuevo Laredo, before continuing on to Mexico City via Monterrey.
It seems likely that La Boquilla was attacked, and that the CAFERC was required to pay
off bandits with scrip, specie, and supplies. Concurrently with the end of these attacks, it is
known that the Canadian parent of the CAFERC – the Mexican Northern Power Company – was
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AHA, AN, caja 106, exp. 1097, leg. 67, f. 90.
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Villa was later killed in ambush while driving through the streets of Parral in 1923. While a state
legislator was convicted in the conspiracy and served only months of a twenty-year sentence, federal officials linked
to then-President Álvaro Obregón and his successor Plutarco Elías Calles have long been suspected of involvement.
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reorganized in 1919 as the Northern Mexican Power and Development Company (NMPDC) to
avoid “default on its bond interest.” This suggests that mounting costs, perhaps due to pillage,
ransom payments, or cost overruns, had in fact reached a crisis point, requiring another round of
fundraising.43 But whether these guerrillas truly intended to destroy the dam is difficult to
determine, as are the quantities of ransom allegedly paid. All that is known is what was
communicated by the company, usually third- and fourth-hand, though a lawyer paid to advocate
for company interests. What these letters made absolutely clear, however, is that the CAFERC
saw La Boquilla as a potential engine of reconstruction in post-Revolution Chihuahua, and thus
deserving of federal protection. Based on the opinions of Mexican engineers and bureaucrats at
this time, it would seem that these officials concurred with this assessment.
Engineering a Revolution
It was clear to federal planners that the profound structural inequalities of the Porfiriato
would have to be confronted if the emerging Constitutionalist government were to consolidate
the legitimacy which had eluded Madero. The Constitution of 1917 made the political ideals of
this new government clear, and created an opening or proposing alternative futures for Mexico.
Yet this document was still largely aspirational and was not immediately translated into concrete
policies, measures, or projects capable of meeting the demands of the Revolution. That is, while
it was clear Mexico was in the midst of a fundamental and historic transformation, it was not yet

43
As told by Nelles and Armstrong, this restructuring appears to have occurred only on the Canadian side,
and documents in Mexico continued to refer to the Compañía Agrícola y de Fuerza Eléctrica del Río Conchos. The
CAFERC remained in operation and in Canadian hands until 1929, when it was acquired by the American and
Foreign Power Company, a subsidiary of the Electric Bond and Share Company (EBASCO), which was itself a
General Electric holding company. See Armstrong and Nelles, Southern Exposure, 253, 344; also Mira Wilkins and
Harm G. Schröter, eds., The Free-Standing Company in the World Economy, 1830–1996 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 397.
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clear exactly what sort of transformation this would be, or what kind of state would emerge. But
based on the stated agrarian and redistributive aims of the Revolution, as well as the new federal
claims made on natural resources described in Article 27, it was rather clear from an early date
that large-scale, state-led engineering projects would be important elements of the ongoing
Revolution. In this section, drawing on Mexican engineering journals between 1917 and 1919, it
becomes clear that Mexican engineers saw themselves at the vanguard of federal agrarian and
development policy.44 Through the material transformation of the Mexican environment, these
engineers saw in the Revolution a unique opportunity to remedy the root causes of social
inequality inherited from the Porfiriato.
Although the Mexican Revolution represented an explicit break with the economic
liberalism of the Porfiriato, there were important continuities as well. Notable among these was
the continuing importance of technological expertise both before and after the Revolution.
Although the Victorian-inflected language of civilization and progress demonstrated by
Bronimann was somewhat attenuated by the Revolution, there remained an enduring faith among
engineers in the role of technology in social development.45 As the old Porfirian ministries like
the SFCI were reorganized by the new Constitutionalist government, a new cadre of nationalist
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Clifton Kroeber showed that federal bureaucrats after 1905 began increasingly to explore the possibility
of large-scale irrigation projects as a remedy to chronic agricultural underproduction and rural poverty, setting the
stage for later projects. In his analysis, the failure to address this problem in the late Porfiriato led directly to the
Revolution of 1910. This dissertation argues that the burst of engineering interest in irrigation after 1917 was largely
a response to the new Constitution of 1917, which presented an entirely new set of tools and guidelines to planners
seeking to implement large-scale projects. See Kroeber, Man, Land, and Water, 53–61.
45
Porfirio Díaz was famous for his technocratic cadre of cientificos, led by French-Mexican treasury
minister José Yves Limantour. This group was instrumental in attracting foreign expertise and capital in Mexico’s
late-nineteenth century modernizing “miracle,” albeit only in the service of wealthy elite interests. Like Díaz
himself, who died in exile in Paris, most of these cientificos fled the Revolution, and never again held power over
federal offices in Mexico City.
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engineers began to propose projects like irrigation which spoke to new social relationships and a
new approach to Mexican political economy.46 And this continuity in technological progress was
linked to another, more material continuity – the ongoing importance of foreign capital,
technology, and expertise in realizing state-led development.
The fact was that many of the most pressing problems facing Mexico in the years after
the revolution – agricultural underproduction, a lack of critical infrastructure, an arid and
mountainous landscape, and a small and export-oriented industrial base – were necessarily
engineering problems. Indeed, for many of these engineers, it seemed that Porfirian projects of
“modernization” had introduced systems designed primarily to extract wealth from Mexico,
rather than support the generation and accumulation of wealth locally – a classic dependencytheory interpretation.47 As engineering literature of the period shows, the same Article 27 which
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Although the literature of engineering in Mexico is relatively thin, there are some notable exceptions. See
Michael Ervin, “The Art of the Possible: Agronomists, Agrarian Reform, and the Middle Politics of the Mexican
Revolution, 1908-1924” (PhD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2002); Beatriz Ayala, Graciela Herrera, and
Nuria Pons, Ingenieros en la Independencia y la Revolución (México, D.F.: UNAM, 1987); Eduardo Chávez,
Ingeniería y humanismo (Villahermosa: Gobierno del Estado de Tabasco, 1988); Alberto Moles Batllevell, La
enseñanza de la ingeniería mexicana, 1792-1990 (México, D.F.: UNAM, 1991); Matthew Vitz, “‘The Lands with
Which We Shall Struggle’: Land Reclamation, Revolution, and Development in Mexico’s Lake Texcoco Basin,
1910 – 1950,” Hispanic American Historical Review 92, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 41–71; Candiani, Dreaming of
Dry Land, 171–75; Cruz Freire and López Hernández, Ingeniería e ingenieros en la América hispana; J. Justin
Castro, “Modesto C. Rolland and the Development of Baja California,” Journal of the Southwest 58, no. 2 (July 14,
2016): 261–91; Wolfe, Watering the Revolution, 1–20.
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Coatsworth, Growth Against Development, 186. This was the central argument of John Coatsworth’s
classic cliometric study of the Porfirian-era railways system, and one which continues to influence thinking about
foreign investment in Mexico. While his research showed that the 20,000 kilometers of railways laid during this era
did produce efficiencies, create “forward” industrial linkages, and stimulate the economy, it also drove up land
prices, promoted speculation, and privileged urban elite interests over those of regional peripheries. In the final tally,
Coatsworth argued that the “social savings” generated by the railway was almost entirely captured by Mexican elites
and foreign investors, especially those linked to the northern mineral industry, ultimately promoting
“underdevelopment” and a regressive redistribution of wealth. Yet even where the railway did not promote general
economic welfare, Coatsworth noted that it did, in fact, transform state practice – "If railroads did not stimulate the
development of managerial talent and new forms of private sector organization, they did inspire a marked increase
in competence within the state apparatus.” While the early electrical industry, and especially the CAFERC,
demonstrated many of the same tendencies toward underdevelopment, this industry was two generations younger
than the railways and would be far more important to development in Mexico after the Revolution. Unlike the
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sent shockwaves through foreign embassies and boardrooms presented for Mexican federal
agencies an opening to redefine the relationship between the environment, technology, and
society in Mexico.
The language of revolutionary engineering was notable in the direct connection it drew
between civil engineering (especially in relation to water) and social engineering. This, again,
represented both breaks and continuities with the Porfiriato. The cientificos of an earlier era
sought to measure progress in Mexico against a global yardstick of civilization, as did
Bronimann, and thus paid scant attention to the unique qualities of Mexican society. This
reflected the positivist assumptions of modernization theory – that technological change was
inherently good, and its promotion would serve to elevate all members of Mexican society to a
higher degree of civilization. In this way of thinking, “progress” was a universal aspiration, and
it was considered quite natural that more technologically advanced foreign actors such as
Pearson or the Bank of Toronto would lead these efforts. While the language of progress began
to reflect a more nationalistic perspective after 1917, this emerging cohort of engineers
concurred with their Porfirian predecessors that large-scale development projects were both
desirable and necessary. But unlike the Porfirian cientificos, who saw progress as a beacon of
light capable of inspiring all to self-improvement, these engineers had a very specific interest in
transforming sectors Mexican society directly through their works, with a special concern for the
indigenous and agrarian classes. Rejecting Porfirian assumption that modernization for the few
was a benefit to all, one engineer called for the “emancipation of Mexico” from outmoded social

railway, which retains a strong cultural association with Díaz, I argue that the electrical industry was consciously
and intentionally transformed by federal authorities in the post-Revolution era to more closely reflect the aims of the
new nationalist Mexican state.
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patterns and economic relationships upon which Díaz’ supposedly political economy had been
founded, and through which the United States still continued to exert excessive influence.
Instead, mining engineer Benjamín Arroyo argued that “a better and more orderly and intelligent
use of the human capital (lit. “fuerzas vivas,” living forces) of our selfless country” would
provide equality and prosperity for all. As engineers, Arroyo called on his peers to take a leading
role in reorganizing these “living forces” in state-led projects of land redistribution, agrarian
reform, social uplift and, perhaps most importantly, irrigation.48
This tension between elite (or perhaps “middling”) engineering interests and the
perceived shortcomings of lower social classes was a recurring theme of engineering discourse.49
Engineers believed that material transformation could engender a corresponding social
transformation, making the civil engineer an important agent of social change. As an unsigned
editorial from a mining journal in 1917 stated, “Once agrarian feudalism is destroyed through
appropriate legislation, the growth of agriculture will come to be an enormous factor of national
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Arroyo, “Editorial: La emancipación de México,” 221. It is hard to overstate the importance of irrigation
to engineering discourse and policy in the post-Revolution era, as it reflected an interest in global development
(especially in the US) while also tying together many of the most important strands of the Revolution – land
redistribution, agrarian reform, social welfare, public investment, and a general push toward development.
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As in Wolfe’s exploration of engineering in the Laguna, which draws from a wide range of theoretical
sources, this analysis concurs that Mexican engineers in the post-Revolution period were no passive
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Shadow of Melting Glaciers: Climate Change and Andean Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 6;
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California Press, 2002); Scott, Seeing Like a State.

119

wealth and one of the most effective means for the intellectual and moral improvement of the
indigenous majority.”50Another engineer argued that agrarian reform was central to transforming
peons into “free citizens,” and might elevate their “intellectual and moral level… to the point
required by the organization of modern societies.”51 Yet another engineer called on his
colleagues to throw themselves into the important work of engineering social transformation,
“thus giving [Mexico] the improved conditions it requires to play a greater part in the concert of
civilized nations.”52 In fact, one engineer argued that the common intellectual thread between the
many different approaches to the “agrarian problem” was the idea that all sought as their
“culmination, endpoint or desideratum” the improvement of “our indigenous class.”53 Thus, the
push by federal planners to use La Boquilla was not merely an irrigation project, but a push to
transform the society of Chihuahua itself.
If agricultural reform was the key to social reform, then social reform was directly
dependent on water projects. Engineers identified a direct link between hydraulic engineering
and the society they wished to create. As revolutionary veteran and new SAF minister Pastor
Rouaix was quoted saying, “where there is water, one might think of civilizing colonization,
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“Editorial: las inversiones en México,” Boletín minero III, no. 1 (January 1, 1917): 1–2.
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This was first delivered in 1915 at a conference of the Asociación de Ingenieros y Arquitectos de México
by engineer José Covarrubias, “Conferencia sobre la cuestión agraria,” Memorias de la Asociación de Ingenieros y
Arquitectos de México 25, no. 1–12 (1917): 1. “…a fin de que su nivel intelectual y moral pueda elevarse hasta el
punto que requiere la organización de las sociedades modernas.”
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Vicente Gálvez, “Apuntes sobre la importancia de los estudios hidrológicos en la república mexicana,”
Boletín minero IV, no. 2 (August 1, 1917): 121. “…dotándola así de las mejores condiciones para que tome mayor
parte en el concierto de las naciones civilizadas.”
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Leopoldo Palacios, “La irrigación como factor social,” Memorias de la Asociación de Ingenieros y
Arquitectos de México 23, no. 7–12 (July 5, 1915): 196. Palacios was formerly an engineer in the Comisión
Nacional Agraria created in 1912, specifically tasked with addressing the “agrarian problem.”
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there might be progress, there will be peace.”54 Under Díaz, irrigation efforts were sporadic and
usually served private interest. Although the SFCI held jurisdiction over irrigation in Mexico, it
had done little to expand irrigated agriculture in Mexico. Thus, the bureaucratic reorganization
which produced the Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento (SAF) also produced a ministry with a
more direct interest in pursuing irrigation projects.
Porfirian policy toward water, like most natural resources, was oriented toward profitable
exploitation by wealthy national and foreign interests, with only passing regard for the social
function of such works. Especially in Chihuahua, these were largely associated with private
colonization projects which had little impact on Mexican society. The defunct Caja de
Préstamos, a state-sponsored lending institution under Díaz founded in 1908, was patronized
primarily by wealthy landowners pursuing capital investments on their own properties. As one
engineer concluded, the spate of private irrigation colonies in Chihuahua in the late Porfiriato did
more to promote land speculation, tax avoidance, and foreign debt issuance than agricultural
improvement.55 State-led development in this era was interpreted more accurately as statesanctioned rent-seeking which did little to generate the basic infrastructure essential to social
harmony and expanding state power.
Encouraged by Article 27, engineers in the post-Revolution era proposed a program of
hydraulic engineering which would serve the immediate purpose of feeding a population reliant
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Rouaix was from the northern state of Durango, and involved in some of the first agrarian reform efforts
even during the Revolution. Quoted by engineer and geologist in Gálvez, “Apuntes sobre la importancia de los
estudios hidrológicos,” 121. “…donde hay agua se puede pensar en colonización civilizadora, se tendría progreso,
habrá paz,”
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Palacios, “El problema latino americano,” 53–54; dated 1916.
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on food imports and the long-term strategy of building the infrastructures necessary for social
reform. Without a comprehensive national hydrological survey, however, one engineer noted that
Mexican would remain mired in the past.56 In a conference on the “agrarian question,” engineer
José Covarrubias sketched out the broad contours of the problems faced by planners, and the
centrality of water in addressing these problems. He noted that 40 percent of Mexican territory
was owned by just 11,000 landowners, who “employed” 2.6 million peons on exploitative terms.
Including their families, this meant that 8 to 10 million indigenous and mestizo people were kept
in perpetual servitude while potentially productive lands of Mexico remained unimproved.57 A
lack of irrigation works and the persistence of patterns of agricultural routinism meant that, even
if these lands were seized, they lacked access to water. Thus, a rational and centralized program
of irrigation would be necessary to the project of rationalizing Mexican society as a whole.
One engineer who had a particularly powerful influence on thinking about water at this
time was Leopoldo Palacios, a member of the Revolution-era Comisión Nacional Agraria
(National Agrarian Commission, CNA) who, by 1917, had become the head of colonization at
the newly-formed SAF.58 In his opinion, irrigation was the problem of the new century, from the
US and Canada to Cuba, Brazil, Egypt, and Russia.59 But whereas in most of the developed
world, people fought over land, in the Americas land was plentiful. The underdevelopment of
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Mexico, and Latin America generally, was not a problem of resource scarcity, as in Europe, but
of unequal distribution of labor and property in a plentiful environment. As an example of what
might be achieved in Mexico, Palacios pointed to Chihuahua, where foreigners had already
successfully launched ten private colonies, more than any other state, with little benefit to
Mexico. In the previous century, Mexican federal policy succeeded in settling only 16,000
Mexican colonos and attracting only 21,500 foreigners, figures which paled in comparison to
places like Argentina and the United States, which received immigrants by the millions.60
Palacios was not necessarily proposing an influx of foreign settlers, as he and others saw in the
Mexican popular classes a large labor pool. Rather, he sought to underscore the fact that the
Mexican federal government had done little to promote development or implement policies of
the type which, in other places, attracted settlers without offering the kinds of concessionary
terms given to the CAFERC, for example. What was needed was new federal irrigation policy
geared toward the needs of Mexican society, rather than capital interests. Through such a policy,
he argued, Mexico might embark on a project of “autocolonization” – colonizing rural Mexico
with the landless poor and Mexican emigrants repatriated from the United States.61
Palacios’ views on the United States as a model for irrigation reflected the more general
mixed opinions shared by Mexican engineers. While he complained that Mexico had been failed
by Díaz and his foreign partners, he also looked favorably on irrigation projects in the US
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most valuable in the capital and expertise they brought into the country.
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Southwest, which might be used as models for Mexican irrigation. As in the United States, he
sought to create a class of smallholding farmers through federally-supported irrigation works.62
The problem was that Mexico was not an agricultural nation, but a mining nation, and lacked the
agro-industrial tradition of its northern neighbor. Pointing to the great hydraulic engineering
projects of the western United States specifically, he argued that Mexico must look outward, and
be tutored by engineers abroad. If Mexican colonies were to attract “spontaneous” colonization
from foreign and national farmers alike, they must be made profitable, and only irrigation could
regularize agricultural profits in the mountainous and largely arid country of Mexico.63 Water,
investment, and human capital must be made to flow together.
As an example of spontaneous colonization in Mexico, Palacios pointed to the cottongrowing Laguna region and its “American”-style city of Torreón, which had attracted
commercially-minded settlers and investors from Mexico and the United States during the
Porfiriato. This region did not rely on direct government management or “socialist sermons,” but
local initiative supported by federal investment in hydraulic infrastructure. Through a systematic
program of large-scale irrigation, Palacios argued that the waters of Mexico could be made to
exert the same attractive force upon settlers as silver and gold had in the mountains and oil had
along the sweltering Gulf of Mexico.64
In another publication on the social importance of irrigation, Palacios argued that Mexico
had failed its small farmers, especially in the northern borderlands, who fled to the United States
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during the famine of 1909. Anticipating the assumptions of the “revolutionary irrigation” of
Plutarco Elias Calles a decade later, he argued:
“[M]any of these emigrants, disowning their inhospitable homeland which did not know
how to feed them, have returned, how?, with rifle in hand, and they are the most
important and numerous element of the revolt… The worker who has a piece of fertile
land which produces enough to live on does not cast himself easily into revolution;
instead, he becomes conservative. The Maderos are not the rule, but the exception… It is
a well-known law that Agriculture is the key to social welfare.”65

Only a regime of smallholding agriculturalists could achieve the goals of the Revolution, he
argued, and attract foreigners while repatriating Mexicans living north of the Rio Grande.66 He
called on the federal government to lift import duties, provide credit, administer land
distribution, and do whatever necessary to promote the influx of capital, technology, and
immigrants from abroad.
While a rejection of political and economic meddling by US agents was among the
central complaints of the Revolution, it was clear from the literature that engineers of the era had
a qualified respect for their northern colleagues, ranging from grudging approval to outright
emulation. These engineers pointed especially to the great hydraulic works being undertaken by
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the Reclamation Bureau in the western United States – an environment similar to much of
Mexico – in seeking out models for development. Palacios, for example, noted with admiration
that in the western United States, “they do not hesitate to execute complicated and costly works”
to preserve precious water resources, comparing this unfavorably to Mexico, where such water
was allowed to flow outward, and often northward, where US engineers put it to productive
use.67 Covarrubias offered the example of Mormon settlements at the Great Salt Lake in Utah, as
evidence that smallholding land tenure and large-scale irrigation were, in fact, compatible.68 In
his opinion, the United States served as both a model and a competitor. He warned that a failure
to quickly and efficiently utilize Mexican waters would result inevitably in their use by US
engineers and farmers – “If our ineptitude, if our attachment to old traditions, if the misguided
egoism of a privileged class causes us to develop our life in backward forms which other more
advanced people have abandoned as inimical to progress, it would be in vain that we attempt to
stop ourselves amidst the torrent flowing to the rest of humanity. We will be swept away and
others more able than ourselves will introduce the organizations we have rejected.”69 Thus, while
the Revolution is generally seen as having a distinctly anti-Yankee character, it seems clear that
communities of engineering expertise remained in close contact with their northern peers. And as
the Revolution ushered in a new era of state-led development, this transnational community
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continued to work together in Mexican state-led development projects, including the irrigation
district of Delicias below La Boquilla.
For engineers and planners, La Boquilla came to represent the possibilities of this new
era. It was widely understood that the dam was a foreign-owned venture which was deeply
integrated into the US-dominated mining sector. But, like Bronimann, Mexican engineers also
saw in Lake Toronto an unprecedented reserve of water resources which might be employed in
transforming the Conchos valley. La Boquilla was designed to accommodate both electrification
and irrigation, a fact noted by Mexican engineers with a new and potentially powerful federal
mandate. Palacios identified La Boquilla by name as a possible model for a national program of
irrigation development and proposed a careful study of water utilization at Lake Toronto. He also
recommended a suspension of hydroelectric and irrigation concessions throughout Mexico,
pending a full federal survey of national water resources. Such a suspension was placed on the
Conchos, which marked the first step by the new government in incrementally integrating La
Boquilla into the Mexican state.70
Palacios argued that La Boquilla demonstrated the importance of direct federal
participation in developing a program of irrigation. In his generous estimates, Lake Toronto was
capable of irrigating 600,000 hectares (nearly twice the size of Rhode Island) but was only
planned to irrigate 20,000 hectares.71 This was problematic precisely because La Boquilla
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presented an ideal set of circumstances for implementing a federal irrigation project – it enjoyed
an economy of scale, was close to railways and, most importantly, it was already built,
presenting no major costs to state or federal authorities. Without federal intervention, he
suggested, La Boquilla would continue to operate mostly as an electrical system, allowing the
waters of the Conchos to flow wastefully to the border. La Boquilla could be used to lure
experienced Mexican farmers back across the border from Texas, but only if it was made to
serve agricultural interests. If nothing else, he wrote, it was “distressing to see the contrast
between the fertile American valleys and sad Mexican wastelands separated by the narrow band
of the Bravo.”72 Palacios proposed using federal water monopolies to build dams, only very large
ones, as quickly and cheaply as possible.73 Indeed, with bureaucrat-engineers lobbying for
national surveys, federal ownership of natural resources, and a program of social engineering, it
might be said that 1917 was the year that Mexico City began “seeing like a state.”74
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⁂
In describing La Boquilla to federal officials, engineer Emil Bronimann regularly referred
to his project as a “fountain of wealth” for Chihuahua and the nation – a “marvel” of the
twentieth century.75 But La Boquilla came into service in an environment transformed politically,
economically, and socially by Revolution. Just as it was unclear in 1917 what kind of state would
emerge in Mexico, so too was it unclear exactly what sort of fountain La Boquilla was to be, or
who it was intended to benefit. Optimistically, and perhaps selfishly, Bronimann predicted a
“new era of peace and prosperity,” as well as rightful recognition and compensation for himself
and the CAFERC for their colossal efforts. “This great Dam of La Boquilla will earn, if not
today then in the future, all the merit it is due,” he wrote, “for having opened the road toward the
more rapid, rational and economical development of the enormous latent wealth which natural
currents of water offer to inhabitants of the most arid and depopulated regions of this country.”76
Having survived the armed Revolution, Bronimann predicted that La Boquilla would provide a
constant flow of wealth, both public and private, for the foreseeable future.
But La Boquilla was an ambiguous fountain, with a multitude of potential uses and
means of generating wealth. As a dual-use hydroelectric dam, with both hydraulic and electric
capabilities, La Boquilla drew a multitude of claims on its use, from bureaucrats and farmers to
miners and engineers from Mexico and beyond. An emerging discourse of hydraulic
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development among Mexican engineers and bureaucrats, encouraged by the Constitution of
1917, made clear that La Boquilla would eventually figure as a centerpiece of irrigation in
Chihuahua, much to the chagrin of its Canadian ownership. The company’s constant emphasis
on private sacrifices made in support of the public good in Chihuahua speaks to an enduring
concern with this looming specter of expropriation.
Despite the big irrigation ideas offered by Palacios and others, however, the Mexican
state projected little control over Chihuahua by the end of the Revolution. Pressing practical
realities prevented any federal irrigation efforts on the Conchos for the foreseeable future. Facing
existential threats, both internal and external, the fledgling state taking shape in Mexico City had
little funding to offer the new ministry of agriculture and development (SAF), and no means to
act on its mandate for federal irrigation. Beyond placing a moratorium on concessions on the
Conchos River, federal officials could do relatively little to steer the operations of the
CAFERC.77 Due to the absence of federal authority in Chihuahua until the late 1920s, La
Boquilla remained oriented almost exclusively to its original purpose – powering US-owned
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mines in the region. The opening for irrigation created by the Constitution of 1917 would
produce no real changes for another decade.
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CHAPTER 4: Reconstruction, 1920–1925
The end of the armed Mexican Revolution is usually dated to 1920, when the
Constitutionalist faction led by Sonoran general Álvaro Obregón seized the Mexican state
apparatus. Having killed his former compatriot Venustiano Carranza, who wished to hand the
presidency over to civilian authority, Obregón won formal election to the presidency on
December 1, 1920. While there were regional uprisings in the ensuing years, Obregón completed
his first term in relative peace, consolidating political, social, and military power in Mexico
City.1 As he began to implement the aims of the Constitution of 1917 into law, this period
inaugurated the state-building phase of the “long” Mexican Revolution. Or, as historian Luis
Aboites summarized, “the Mexican Revolution created the opening for a new social force,
previously unknown in such form: the State.”2
While the Constitutionalists worked to consolidate power in central Mexico, however, the
distant borderland state of Chihuahua struggled to recover in relative isolation. In the decade
before the Revolution, the population of Chihuahua swelled by 24 percent, due to increasing
industrial and commercial activity and high wages. But, as a major theater of fighting, this
population stagnated during the war, falling by one percent. Were it not for the influx of an
unknown number of Mexican emigres returning from the US, these losses might have been much
greater. Agriculture had always been weak in the arid north, and after years of lost harvests,
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Aboites Aguilar, La irrigación revolucionaria, 56. There were scattered regional uprisings between 1921
and 1923, none of which succeeded in challenging federal authority. The most serious was the revolt of another
compatriot, former interim president Adolfo de la Huerta, who fell out with Obregón over presidential succession.
The delahuertista revolt hit Chihuahua and Veracruz in 1923, but was quickly suppressed.
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decimated cattle herds, and lasting drought, starvation became a very real concern. Thus, while
this decade marked a phase of state formation in Mexico, Chihuahua existed in the early 1920s
as a place without a state.
Amid this devastation, there was one bright spot on the horizon in Chihuahua. After a
few years of dormancy at the end of the Revolution, the regional mining industry returned to full
production by 1920 and experienced production boom almost immediately thereafter. Many of
the factors for this boom have been explored at length. While production briefly ceased during
the Revolution, over the long term, instability drove the consolidation of production assets under
a few multination corporations. At the same time, technological advancements in processing
increased efficiency and made existing mines more profitable, while the war in Europe drove up
mineral prices. Together, these factors drove a bonanza which set Chihuahuan mines apart from
the rest of Mexico and, indeed, much of the world.
But another major factor driving this boom remains almost unexplored. A massive
hydroelectric dam called La Boquilla had only recently been completed by Canadian promoters
on the Conchos River and began operations in the last years of the Revolution. This structure
was first connected to the major mining district of Parral and, by the mid-1920s, expanded
distribution to provide cheap and renewable energy to every major mineral asset in Chihuahua
south of the capital. According to contemporary Mexican engineers, La Boquilla singlehandedly
powered the mining sector of Chihuahua in the 1920s, providing desperately-needed revenues to
a fledgling federal government in Mexico City, and unwittingly becoming a major engine of
reconstruction in post-Revolution Mexico.
La Boquilla was a dual-use system, and the vast reserve of water it impounded – Lake
Toronto – was capable of serving both agricultural and mineral interests. But a severe drought in
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the early 1920s made clear that it could not reliably serve both, triggering debates over the best
use of the waters of the Conchos. While La Boquilla’s foreign owners sought to expand
hydropower development downriver, thus maximizing electrical generation, Mexican engineers
and bureaucrats sought to use this private asset as the foundation for a sprawling irrigation
district below the dam. In this sense, La Boquilla revealed both the potential and the limits of
Chihuahua’s natural environment, as well as the aims of different political, social, and capital
stakeholders. Although this divergence in developmental visions favored federal authorities by
the end of the decade, it nonetheless demonstrated the central role of infrastructure in creating
and projecting state power, even when such assets lie outside the formal scope of the state.
Drawing on previously unused surveys and planning documents, contemporary engineering
publications, and secondary literature, this chapter describes how La Boquilla came to sudden
prominence after the Revolution, powering the economy of Chihuahua and drawing the attention
of Mexican planners with its vast water reserves. It then examines how this infrastructure
become entangled in debates about the proper roles of state and private interests in accessing
natural resources, investing capital, implementing technological transformation, and building
networks of power in the long Mexican Revolution.
Metals
As prominent engineer José Herrera y Lasso observed, Mexico was essentially a mining
nation. While there were a variety of regional industrial and commercial sectors, he believed that
mining was Mexico’s one true industry, “not only because of its importance or its antiquity, but
also for being that which has systematically contributed since distant times to the sustenance of
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the State.”3 The extraction and distribution of mineral wealth had linked practices of social
power in Mexico to global networks since the colonial period. And the dramatic intensification
of mining in late nineteenth century Chihuahua made this border state Mexico’s mining center
“par excellence,” ranking second nationally in silver production and first in zinc and lead, while
also producing trace quantities of gold and copper.4 By the time Herrera y Lasso wrote his
summary of mining in 1924, Chihuahuan mines were world-famous for the rich complexity of
their ores, their capital and technological intensity, and their integration into global mineral
markets through North American corporations. While other sectors and mining regions in
Mexico struggled to recover from the Revolution, the mineral boom in Chihuahua generated
much-needed revenues for the fledgling government in Mexico City, even while state power in
the borderlands ranged from weak to nonexistent. In this sense, Chihuahua was a powerhouse of
state reconstruction in the early post-Revolutionary period.
Chihuahua’s vast and complex mineral resources were known to Spanish officials as
early as the seventeenth century. Precious metals were discovered in Parral in 1631, and Santa
Eulalia in 1711, but the presence of hostile nomadic peoples prevented lasting European
settlement in what was then called Nueva Vizcaya through the early colonial period. In 1790, a
treaty with various Apache peoples allowed the Spanish crown to grant lands in the region,
leading to scattered settlement along the Conchos and its tributaries. However, presidios in the
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José Herrera y Lasso, “La industria minero-metalúrgica en el año de 1924,” in La fuerza motriz en México
(México, D.F.: Secretaría de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo, 1927), 101. Herrera y Lasso was among Mexico’s most
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the first energy survey of Mexico. “…no solo por razón de su importancia y antigüedad, sino por ser la que
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region were abandoned during the struggles for Mexican independence from Spain (1810–21),
relinquishing military control of the region. In 1831, local forces in Chihuahua declared war on
the Apache, but it was not until after the Mexican American War (1846–48), and subsequent
annexation of the northern third of Mexican territory by the United States, that federal forces
from both nations were committed to this violent campaign. By the 1860s, with growing
territorial pressure from westward settlement and Comanche expansion in the United States, the
Apache were forced into open warfare. By the 1880s, Mexican officials declared the Apache
threat extinct in Chihuahua, although smaller military activities continued into the early
twentieth century.5
The late development of Chihuahua’s mining industry was due as much to environmental
factors as historical forces. While other mining centers like Zacatecas, Pachuca, and San Luís
Potosí developed relatively quickly, the natural remoteness and inhospitable climate of
Chihuahua ensured that precious metals remained in the ground and outside the orbit of colonial
control. As John Coatsworth famously noted in his history of the railway, the Mexican landscape
is a space where “nature conspires against economy.”6 Chihuahuan ores were discovered far
from roads, population centers, and water sources, exceeding the operational capabilities of
burro-powered supply chains through territory held only tenuously by central and regional
authorities. In addition, these complex ores presented technical challenges to smelters which
deterred large-scale investment in the region, favoring instead traditional, small-scale mining and
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smelting practices. This was fundamentally an energy problem, as it prevented the efficient
concentration of human labor at the work site necessary for the backbreaking work of mineral
extraction, processing, and transport. It was precisely for this reason that hydropower would soon
prove so transformative in Chihuahua.
Two major developments heralded the arrival of a major phase of economic
intensification in Chihuahua in 1884. Firstly, the Mexican Central Railway (Ferrocarril Central
Mexicano) connected the federal capital to Ciudad Juárez-El Paso, nearly a thousand miles away,
for the first time. In addition, this marked the end of the campaign against the Apaches and a
corresponding influx of investment capital and local commercial development. Over the next
generation, the powerful Terrazas-Creel family network would come to dominate both the
politics and economy of Chihuahua. This family first became involved in the bedrock industries
of the state – livestock, finance, and small-scale mining. But as European and American capital
continued to push out local investors, it also created new commercial opportunities. The
Terrazas-Creel family did not seek to compete with foreign investors but rather to facilitate their
activities, diversifying into textiles, foods and beverages, banking, urban transport, and
innumerable other enterprises.7
Mining remained the central industry of Chihuahua, however, while all other activities
tended to facilitate mineral extraction. The total value of mining production in Chihuahua in
1880–81 was just over $1 million pesos. By 1903, this figure was $23 million pesos, the majority
of which was generated by foreign enterprises. US investment in the mining industry was
particularly intense. In 1873, Americans had $2 million pesos invested in Chihuahua, almost
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exclusively in mining. By 1902, this figure across all sectors was $30 million pesos, and by 1907
it had reached $50 million pesos.8 While this represented all investment in Chihuahua, the bulk
of this figure was involved directly in mining or auxiliary activities.9
The introduction of the railroad transformed the calculus of profit in Chihuahua’s mining
sector. It facilitated the cost-effective concentration of labor, not only in the form of workers and
their tools but also in the form of petroleum fuel. 10 In earlier times, bulky ores were mined
unsystematically by gambusinos, small-scale miners with scarce capital and little technology.
Ores were then smelted inefficiently on-site or hauled overland at great expense by burros
(known as motores de sangre, or blood motors) to small custom smelters known as hornos de
adobe. Railways were used to distribute concentrated energy in the form of hydrocarbons to onsite generators, which constituted the energy system of most mines in Chihuahua. The creation of
the railroad coincided with a wider rationalization of the industry in northern Mexico, forging
direct material links between remote silver mines, high-efficiency central smelters calibrated to
specific ore types, petroleum refineries and, ultimately, global mineral markets. And this
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transformation was self-reinforcing – as mining became more profitable in Chihuahua, it
attracted ever larger sums of investment capital, which in turn increased efficiencies and, thus,
profits. Combined with the concessionary policies of President Porfirio Díaz, which placed few
limits on foreign investment, the late Porfiriato was marked by a surge in mining-related
development in Chihuahua.11 It was this transformation which made a project like La Boquilla,
unimaginable a decade before, suddenly feasible.
In the final years before the Revolution, advancements in mineral refining also set the
stage for a production boom. The flotation process solved the riddle of Chihuahua’s complex
ores, dramatically increasing their value and facilitating new investment. An experimental
flotation plant in Parral had failed in 1908, but mining engineers in Cananea, Sonora, began to
adapt the process successfully from US models during the Revolution. It was finally perfected
locally in 1910, transforming the metals industry. The flotation process is used to separate
valuable metals from bulky and economically worthless rock, especially in sites where
percentages of minerals are very low or mixed with other metals.12 In this process, ores are
crushed into a powder and mixed with water and a flotation agent such as oil. Precious metals are
captured in the agent, while unwanted materials settle to the bottom. While this process changed
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mining around the world, it had an especially strong impact in Chihuahua. The region’s complex
silver ores typically contained high relative quantities of lead and zinc, which were difficult to
separate and forced miners to pay a premium at the smelter. In addition, there were limited
industrial applications for lead and zinc before World War I, making these minerals
unmarketable byproducts. But the flotation process actually lost efficiency when silver ores were
too “dry,” or contained insufficient quantities of lead, making it ideally suited to Chihuahua.
While the flotation process reduced the cost of refining Chihuahua silver, rising lead and zinc
prices improved rates of return, promoting further investment. At the same time, while flotation
plants were relatively cheap to build, they had high operating costs and expertise demands,
favoring corporate ownership.13
While new production processes increased efficiency, the mining industry experienced a
consolidation by foreign corporations in the early twentieth century. As part of this
consolidation, large smelting companies began acquiring mines to secure regular flows of ore.
By the 1920s, mining in Chihuahua was dominated by the Guggenheim-controlled American
Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO), while Peñoles-American Metal, a GermanAmerican concern, held much of the neighboring Laguna region. Unlike other mining regions in
Mexico, where falling investment and mineral depletion led to lagging production, north-central
Mexico emerged from the Revolution on the brink of a mining bonanza.14
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As a major theater of the Mexican Revolution, much of Chihuahua was devastated by
warfare. Critical infrastructure was destroyed or sabotaged, investors had fled, fields were left
fallow, and the great cattle herds for which Chihuahua remains famous were decimated.15
Agriculture was always a precarious enterprise in Chihuahua, and this devastation combined
with the onset of drought made starvation a very real threat in many places. Yet many engineers
and bureaucrats realized that the key to securing economic solvency and political order in
Chihuahua was literally right under their noses.
Engineers reported that mining ceased entirely in late 1914, due to disruptions in
transportation and the closure of various production facilities.16 Production quickly rebounded,
however, and Chihuahua remained a major silver-producing region in 1915 when Mexico
produced almost a third of global silver, second only to the United States.17 But increasing
guerrilla activity by Pancho Villa’s forces slowed production in Chihuahua after 1915, as he
began to target local assets. Seeking to force production, federal authorities threatened
expropriation for miners who ceased activities during the Revolution, to little effect. Between
1917 and 1919, only 12 percent of mines and 21 percent of metals plants were in operation in
Mexico.18 And while many Mexican facilities restarted production after 1917, the region of
southern Chihuahua near Parral experienced ongoing disruptions from villista forces until 1920,
when Villa finally retired from the battlefield.
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A series of mining surveys conducted between 1917 and 1920 provide an interesting
view on the ground during this period, revealing an urgent federal interest in resuming
production as quickly as possible. Centered on the silver mines of Santa Eulalia and the
associated Ávalos smelter, near the capital of Chihuahua, these surveys show that the real and
lasting damage wrought by the Revolution did little to hinder a rather speedy recovery by mining
interests. A 1917 survey by mining inspector Ernesto Honigmann revealed that only a few mines
were then in operation in Santa Eulalia, producing mostly zinc, which then commanded high
prices. Production was limited most by a lack of reliable transportation and communication, and
rolling stock and pack animals were in short supply. At the Ávalos smelter, owned and operated
by the American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO), a skeleton crew maintained the
facility in operating condition while ores were sent northward to El Paso for processing.
Honigmann suspected that these ores were not being properly assessed for tariffs, contributing to
an outflow of mineral wealth from Mexico to the United States.19 Indeed, other such surveys
reveal an interest in grasping the scale and nature of the mining industry and implementing a
rational program to resume production and generate federal tax revenues. In assessing mining
interests these surveys took note of ownership, assets and capitalization, operations, strike
activity, employment (including children), pay schedules, injury and fatality reports, and medical
facilities at various mining operations.20 In keeping with the ideals of the new Revolution,

19

Honigmann, “El futuro del mineral de Santa Eulalia, Chih. [2 of 2],” 358. Dated August 1917.

20

Simeón Ramírez, “Informe sobre las minas de ‘The Buena Tierra Mining Co. Ltd.’ de Chihuahua,”
Boletín minero 7, no. 3–4 (1919): 266–68; Simeón Ramírez, “Informe sobre las compañías ‘El Potosi Mining Co.’ y
‘Chihuahua Mining Co. Ltd.,’” Boletín minero 7, no. 3–4 (April 1919): 261–64.

142

worker safety and well-being would figure into federal assessments of the industry for the first
time.
Honigmann concluded in 1918 that any hopes of returning to previous production levels
in Chihuahua depended directly on Ávalos smelter near the capital. El Paso was poorly suited to
smelting complex Chihuahua ores, and the Peñoles plant at Torreón was already congested with
ores mined locally in the Laguna. The engineer called on federal officials to pressure ASARCO
into resuming activities. This return to former production models would also effectively disrupt
the activities of eight hornos de adobe which had cropped up during the Revolution – clandestine
smelters which operated on the black market, undercutting federal efforts to capture a percentage
of Chihuahua’s mineral wealth.21
On January 31, 1919, a survey by engineer Simeón Ramírez revealed that production at
the Ávalos smelter was indeed returning to normal. Noting that ASARCO was then
headquartered in the Mills Building, El Paso, he reported that the plant was again receiving ore
from most of the major mining regions in southern Chihuahua, including Santa Eulalia, Parral,
Santa Bárbara, Cusihuiriáchic and Almoloya. The primary product at Ávalos was lead, which
was exported in bars to Perth Amboy, New Jersey. With direct rail connection to the national
railway, Ávalos was located at the nexus of the American-owned Kansas City, Mexico and
Orient Railway, the British-owned Mexico Northwestern Railway Company, and the private
mining railways of the Potosí Mining and Chihuahua Mining companies in Santa Eulalia. The
plant employed a daily average of 1,060 workers, while 25 US nationals served in engineering
and administrative positions. As this report noted, the plant operated on the outskirts of
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Chihuahua City like a self-contained town of 3,000, with lodging for workers, a club, a hotel,
and a planned school.22 Thus, even before the formal end of hostilities, the major smelting plant
in Chihuahua was back up and running at full capacity, with plans to expand production.
What Honigman did not mention was that Ávalos was already ill-prepared to meet the
needs of the Chihuahua mining industry when it was first built, and would require a major
expansion to serve the growing industry. Ávalos was called the “junk heap” by workers because
it was built hurriedly out of spare parts scavenged from properties in El Paso and Monterrey. As
a manager later wrote, “Unfortunately, the smelter had been built never to run. It was only a bluff
to avoid the construction of a competitive plant by some other concern. Consequently, all the
scrap from all the other plants had been used in its construction and there was some doubt as to
whether it could be made to run.”23 With competitors in Monterrey and Aguascalientes, and
Charles Schwab’s mineral interests seeking to expand into Chihuahua, the Ávalos plant was built
as a placeholder on land ceded by Governor Enrique Creel, who was “clamoring for a smelter in
his bailiwick.” 24 It took until 1910 to get Ávalos up and running, but so quickly did it stimulate
local mining production that managers began considering expansion as early as 1914. By the end
of the Revolution, the unanticipated importance of the smelter and soaring mineral prices gave
ASARCO officials confidence in the plant’s future, and expansion plans were drawn up. The
company committed to installing more ovens and switching non-smelting activities from the
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company’s own steam-powered thermoelectric system to hydropower transmitted from La
Boquilla. With the acquisition of coal deposits in neighboring Coahuila for smelting, a rare
commodity in Mexico, the plant was prepared to handle 3,000 tons of ore daily, effectively
quadrupling capacity by 1920.25 Another survey of the plant detailed the installation of dozens of
electric motors to power conveyor belts, winches, and cranes, and crushing and sifting
equipment.26 After this expansion, Ávalos became the largest lead smelter in the world, forcing
ASARCO to reorient its plant in El Paso toward smelting Arizona copper.27 By the summer of
1920, a bulletin in a US mining journal crowed: “Santa Eulalia – Operations in this district are on
a larger scale than ever.”28
The major mining region of Parral in southern Chihuahua was undergoing a similar
transformation by the end of the Revolution. Hydropower from La Boquilla was first transmitted
to these mines in 1915, but sabotage and other guerilla activity interrupted both electrical
generation and mining until 1918. The first aluminum transmission line from La Boquilla ran 75
kilometers through the desert from the powerhouse to the transformer station called El
Hormiguero, near Parral, and also served nearby mining centers of Santa Bárbara and Minas

25

Ramírez, “Informe sobre la fundición ‘American Smelting & Refining Co.,’” 270–71.

26

“La fundición de Avalos,” 599–621. In a rare glimpse at the disparities between Mexican and American
workers, this report listed pay and amenities: In 1922, there were 68 employees: 31 foreigners earning between $200
and $1,333 monthly, and 37 Mexicans earning between $100 and $450 monthly. In addition, there were 852
Mexican laborers earning between $1.25 and $7 daily. Employees have housing and hotels provided free with water,
wood, and light.
27

Bernstein, The Mexican Mining Industry, 53–54.

28

“News by Mining Districts,” Engineering and Mining Journal 109, no. 24 (June 12, 1920): 1333.

145

Nuevas.29 A report in early 1920 stated that the Alvarado Mining and Milling Company, one of
the largest in Parral, was upgrading and retrofitting equipment to double output, relying solely on
hydroelectricity. As this report noted, this link to cheap and plentiful electricity stimulated
investment in far more powerful equipment, including a series of new aerial lifts, one of which
carried ore two miles from the mine to the plant. A new winch system would more than double
the effective depth of extraction from 900 feet to 2,000 feet while raising loads weighing up to
12,500 pounds. And three new pumps would extract up to 4,800 gallons of groundwater per
minute, far outperforming steam-powered pumps.30 Across the state of Chihuahua, by the end of
the Revolution, mining interests were engaged in full expansion.
Mineral prices dropped during a brief post-WWI depression from 1920–21, but this was
short-lived. As debates began to swirl in Mexico City about changes in tariff policy, the market
rebounded on its own, according to Marvin Bernstein. By the fall of 1921, mining companies
could not find enough rail cars to move their ores, and by the spring of 1922, a “full-fledged
mine revival” was underway. While some continued to press foreign mining interests about
unpaid taxes and underproduction during the Revolution, Mexican mining policy through most
of the 1920s, as during the Porfiriato, prioritized production and generally supported the interests
of foreign corporations. The golden age of Mexican lead and zinc was nigh.
By 1924, mining in Chihuahua had become a global phenomenon, and Mexican
observers noted with pride the unique harmony between labor and capital. Suffering no major
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strike activity, Mexican mines were among the most productive in the world. In addition, the
closure of major zinc mines in Australia and falling lead production in Spain and Germany put
Mexico at a competitive advantage. Silver remains the mineral most closely associated with
Mexico, and indeed it surpassed the United States in 1924 to become the world’s largest
producer.31 Chihuahua (19 percent) was the second-largest producer of silver, trailing only
Hidalgo (29 percent). And roughly 95 percent of all Chihuahua silver ores were extracted from
the area in and around Parral.32 This meant that, in 1924, more than 7 percent of global silver
production came from a handful of Chihuahua mining districts alone, all of which were powered
by the dam at La Boquilla.
Yet it was lead and zinc production which truly set Chihuahua apart. Between 1921 and
1924, Mexican annual lead output increased from 60,513 to 165,063 tons, nearly tripling in three
years. By that point, Chihuahua produced 56 percent of all lead and 68 percent of all zinc mined
in Mexico. By the end of the decade, Mexican zinc production had doubled without opening any
new mines, almost all of which was exported to Belgium (24,659 tons in 1924). These were
drawn primarily from the mines of Santa Eulalia, Los Lamentos, and Santa Bárbara, the last of
which was the major zinc mine in Mexico. Mexican lead production was second only to the
United States in 1924, with 12.4 percent of global production.33 More than half of Mexican lead
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was produced in Chihuahua (56 percent), with a value exceeding all Mexican gold production. 34
By the end of the 1920s, railroads struggled to keep pace with ore extraction, and mining
employment was double what it had been at the outbreak of hostilities in 1910.35 This burst of
mining production was an economic transformation facilitated through the introduction of
hydropower.
Electricity
In his history of the Mexican electrical industry, Ernesto Galarza claimed that
electrification and mining were so closely linked that health of the electrical industry was
directly dependent on the state of foreign metal markets.36 While this perhaps overstates this
relationship, the fact is that mining and electrification were inextricably linked in Mexico in the
1920s, and both industries were controlled by North American interests. Or, as a Mexican
engineer noted at the end of the decade, mining was driven by two forces: electricity and US
capital.37
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Article 27 of the new Mexican Constitution of 1917 extended far greater federal control
over natural resources and sought to curtail the foreign-financed modernization projects of the
Porfiriato which were considered exploitative. In his surveys of Mexican mining, Honigmann
pushed for a more thorough application of Article 27 in the north, to little effect. Focusing on the
expansion being undertaken at Ávalos in particular, he wondered whether investment capital and
the “adventurous character of the foreigner” were not stimulating development in Santa Eulalia
which was “more fictitious than real,” focused more on generating “unlimited profits” than real
recovery. 38 Another unnamed engineer, while celebrating in an editorial the advances made in
the industry, called into question the terms of this emerging relationship between Mexico and
international corporations. Without identifying ASARCO by name, he painted a dim portrait of
the “tributary” nature of foreign mining operations in Mexico, anticipating by decades concerns
about dependent development in Latin America.39
But while the Revolution swept away the political economy of the Porfiriato, it could not
wipe away every economic relationship upon which it was built. As demonstrated above, the
economics of mining only improved after 1910. More than ever, the new federal government in
Mexico City relied on revenues generated by Mexico’s most important industry, and ministers
were unwilling or unable to force harsh terms on foreign owners. Before the Revolution, the rate
of Mexican mine ownership was only about 3 percent. By the 1920s, this figure had fallen to less

38
Ernesto Honigmann, “El futuro del mineral de Santa Eulalia, Chih. [1 of 2],” Boletín minero 4, no. 3
(September 1917): 243. “El dinero y el carácter aventurero del extranjero han contribuido por una parte a una
especie de apariencia de restauración de Santa Eulalia más ficticia que real y por otra a producir lo único que la
codicia de ellos busca en recompensa: ganancias financieras sin medida.”
39

“Editorial: La evolución de la minería en México,” Boletín minero 3, no. 9–10 (May 1, 1917): 443.

149

than 2 percent, with no indications that the trend would soon be reversed. In Chihuahua,
ASARCO enjoyed through the 1920s a wholly convivial relationship with the Mexican
government, even while stridently rejecting any anything resembling labor unionization. Over
and again, the intent of Article 27 was deemed prejudicial to the immediate needs of the
economy and shelved for later. 40 With federal permission, ASARCO acquired coal fields in
Coahuila, built a cyanide mill at Santa Bárbara and, by the mid-1920s, consolidated nearly every
mining interest in the state of Chihuahua.41 Mining continued to prosper with the benefit of lax
federal oversight, high mineral prices, technical improvements in production, and flows of cheap
and reliable hydropower.
It is difficult to overstate what a transformative impact hydropower from La Boquilla had
on the mining industry in Chihuahua through the 1920s. As one engineer noted at the end of the
decade:
La Boquilla was built… with the principal aim of utilizing the water to irrigate a vast
uncultivated region with little success. On the other hand, from the perspective of power
generation, it could not have been more successful, as it has been connected almost
entirely to the mineral-metallurgical industry, exceeding demand.42

This new energy source, delivered almost instantly though aluminum and copper wires, was
cheap, smokeless, and exponentially more powerful than the animal and human bodies which
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had worked these mines for centuries. Electricity was used to power lamps, air and water pumps,
elevators, trolleys, compressors, motors, and all manner of mining equipment. These machines
made inaccessibly deep and flood-prone mines profitable again, increasing the production of
existing properties without the need for costly exploration and excavation. But perhaps most
importantly, electrical distribution eliminated the need for the long and fragile supply lines of
petroleum which had crippled the industry during moments of the Revolution. This transition
from a regime of local, petroleum-fueled power sources to regional electrical distribution was
directly related to the mining boom of the 1920s and, by extension, federal recovery efforts.
The efficiencies produced by electrification impacted miners as well as their machinery.
One engineer claimed that permanent lighting increased productivity by 33 percent, creating
conditions similar to a “well-lit factory.” No longer required to carry their own source of
lighting, workers could use both hands freely and walk at a normal pace, as if on the surface.
Interestingly, while this eliminated the need for candles, one engineer recommended carrying
one anyway, since it could signal the presence of noxious gasses undetected by incandescent
bulbs.43 Another engineer noted that the removal of gasoline-powered generators and
thermoelectric equipment from the mine also removed exhaust and steam from this enclosed
working environment, further eliminating environmental risks for workers.44 The introduction of
pulleys, winches, hoists, cranes, elevators, and electrified railways increased speed and
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efficiency while reducing the tremendous wear and tear the mines inflicted on the people who
worked them.
It is not clear from these journals, however, how miners themselves viewed
electrification. While electricity mitigated some traditional dangers, it introduced a new range of
hazards. This was especially true for laborers who, unlike engineers, did not always understand
the threats posed by electricity, and spent most of their time in the mines. One article, for
example, suggests that miners were known to attempt to light cigarettes on the sparks between
electrical contacts. Addressing laborers directly, this article admonished: “To receive an electric
shock is no act of bravery; it is more like a demonstration of ignorance and carelessness.”
Drawing on guidelines from the US Bureau of Mines, it cautioned workers to be careful around
power lines, take them offline for service, and keep explosives clear of electrical sources.45 Just
as interestingly, it set policies prohibiting workers from operating electrical motors and other
traction equipment. This is a reminder that even as electricity freed workers from some of the
more backbreaking elements of their job, it also introduced a new set of policies reinforcing
technological divisions of labor – divisions which often intersected with existing distinctions of
race, class, and nationality.46
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Reflecting on the “the triumphs won by electricity” in the field of metallurgy, one
engineer claimed that electrical discoveries would eventually solve most of the challenges of
mineral exploitation in Mexico.47 And if electrification had proven a boon to the mining industry,
so too had mining supported electrification. In a survey of the electrical industry, Herrera y
Lasso observed this relationship in action, pointing out that “Mines and smelters are the greatest
clients of electrical plants, as much in the soundness and terms of contracts as in the quantity of
energy contracted.”48 One of the great challenges to early electrical expansion across the globe,
along with long-distance transmission, was balancing system loads. Most early electrical systems
were installed in industrial settings, in which electrical generation and use could be closely
tailored to production schedules. But as generation improved, and exceeded the demands of
individual industrial users, expanding distribution systems began to connect different types of
clients. Large electrical generation systems cannot be easily taken offline, requiring producers to
constantly seek out complementary types of clients and, thus, ensure a regular and predictable
usage patterns. To complement the usage of their industrial clients, many early electrical
producers promoted off-peak usage though low-cost domestic electrification, the development
and aggressive marketing of home appliances, and even creating electrified amusement parks at
streetcar terminals.49
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But the situation in Chihuahua was unique in the soaring demand already in place in its
generator-powered mines. As Herrera y Lasso summarized, “If this were the occasion to write
the history of the economic life of the great hydroelectric companies which operate in the
country, we would see that at the beginning of operations, almost invariably, there appear one or
a few mining companies as the first subscribers.”50 Mining clients allowed hydropower
companies to avoid this potential bottleneck altogether by drawing large and steady flows of
power around the clock, eliminating the need for complementary load balancing. As a result, La
Boquilla’s corporate owners had no need for domestic or commercial customers, and instead
simply sought to link as many mines as possible to their system. In this sense, Chihuahua in the
1920s was a “landscape of intensification” in which mining production and electrical expansion
drove one another in a feedback loop.51
For these reasons, beginning in 1920, officials at the Compañía Agrícola y de Fuerza
Electrica del Río Conchos (CAFERC) sought to expand electrical transmission and distribution
as quickly as possible and put La Boquilla to full use for the first time.52 Company representative

expansion was more closely related to addressing problems on the supply side (drought-related underproduction),
than limited or unbalanced demand which usually confronted early systems. Thus, Chihuahua defied the typical
model of electrical expansion in which supply far outstrips demand in the earliest stages. See Hughes, Networks of
Power, 79–80; Nye, Electrifying America, 1–28; Jones, Routes of Power, 5.
50

“Si fuera esta la ocasión de hacer la historia de la vida económica de las grandes empresas hidroeléctricas
que operan en el país, veríamos que en los comienzos de la explotación, casi invariablemente, aparecen una o varias
negociaciones mineras como los primeros suscritores de la compañía ministradora.”
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Despite its Spanish-language name, the CAFERC (Conchos River Agricultural and Electrical Power
Company) was a Canadian concern founded by promoters at the banks of Toronto and Montreal for the purpose of
building and operating La Boquilla. This consortium built hydroelectric infrastructure across Latin America in the
years before WWI. See Christopher Armstrong and Henry Vivian Nelles, Southern Exposure: Canadian Promoters
in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1896–1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 253.
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Alberto Carreño began to submit to the Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento (SAF) requests to
waive duty on a range of imports, from replacement parts to aluminum and copper wires to
cement.53 There had been a lapse in communication between the company and this federal
ministry in the last years of the Revolution, and it is clear from the record that the SAF had
suffered a drain in institutional memory in the interim. Ministry responses were tentative and
demonstrated an unfamiliarity with many details relating to La Boquilla. Having not yet been
formally inspected, SAF officials requested information about the state of the project, which had
been completed years earlier. It was perhaps due to this lack of oversight that the company hoped
to quickly and quietly expand its distribution system, which did not figure in the company’s
contract. For example, the CAFERC was certainly aware that replacement parts were prohibited
from duty exemption in their contract. In addition, lengthy debates over the quantity and quality
of domestic and imported cement resulted in an accord years earlier which was, presumably, still
in effect, but which the CAFERC seemed to ignore.54 The company requested import duty
waivers for these prohibited items without submitting any plans describing their use.55 This
series of exchanges carried on between 1920 and 1922, and reads like a federal ministry
attempting to reassert authority over a company which had perhaps operated too freely in the fog
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Ministry of Agriculture and Development.
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AHA, AN, caja 113, exp. 1097, leg. 146, fs. 36, 45. SAF ministers required the CAFERC to explain why
more cement imports were required when the dam was already complete. The CAFERC replied that it was necessary
to build a backup steam generator at Parral, as well as expand the transformer station at El Hormiguero. With
national producers presumably involved in reconstruction efforts, the CAFERC complained that the Mexican
national cement industry was no longer capable even of meeting even the needs of Mexico City, let alone the entire
country.
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of war.56 Yet the prospect of electrified mining in Chihuahua was compelling to federal officials
as well, and as plans were presented and duties were eventually waived, the scope of the project
came into focus. The CAFERC was proposing nothing short of electrifying every mining interest
in Chihuahua south of the capital, from Santa Eulalia to Parral. And while the SAF continued to
press the company on detail after detail, these inquiries did not derail electrical expansion. By the
early 1920s, the foundations of what would become the northern Mexican power grid were in
place.
It is telling that, while the SAF had many questions about the company’s plans, they had
little to say about the lack of domestic and commercial electrification planned. This set the
pattern of electrical expansion in Chihuahua apart from common historical models and indeed
ran contrary to the company’s original emphasis in supporting all manner of industry and
commerce in the state. While some distribution was planned for the nearby railway town of
Camargo, as well as the capital, these were clearly auxiliary to the system’s primary function – to
power Chihuahuan mining. A survey of all company assets in 1922 confirms that urban
electrification was not a priority for the company or federal officials. 57 La Boquilla was the
source of an energy system rooted in mining.
It was not until 1922, a full seven years after completion, that federal officials finally
inspected La Boquilla. This survey confirmed what company engineer Emil Bronimann had
already reported: he had built the dam larger than the proposal approved by the ministry’s pre-
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Revolution predecessor, the SFCI.58 This survey also offered some of the first empirical evidence
of a problem which would plague La Boquilla for years to come – the dam was simply too big
and too powerful for the river. Within the first decade of operation, the 50,000 liters per second
conceded to the CAFERC regularly exceeded the entire flow of the Conchos in dry years.
Furthermore, while the company had received approval to build four penstocks to power their
generators, La Boquilla was in fact built to accommodate six penstocks. The company described
these two additional penstocks as conditional, to be used only in case of accident, repair, or
future expansion. But these two additional penstocks have apparently never been used,
suggesting they were always aspirational. At the time of inspection, only three penstocks were
operational, and only one generated power at any given time.59 In 1922, this reduced generation
was due solely to the company’s inability to distribute electricity. But almost as soon as these
connections were made, and La Boquilla began to approach full generating capacity, water
scarcity and irrigation demands laid bare the fact that La Boquilla was not capable of supporting
both mining and agricultural interests.
A survey of the electrical industry conducted by Herrera y Lasso through the mid-1920s
further revealed the importance of new hydropower technology to mining in post-Revolution
Mexico, as well as the unique importance of La Boquilla. In 1925, the engineer estimated that
electrical systems used on-site at mines accounted for 40.4 megawatts of electricity, about 4.4
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megawatts of which were private hydroelectrical systems.60 By comparison, La Boquilla
possessed a theoretical 30 megawatts of installed generating capacity, and thus alone represented
six times the installed capacity of all private mining hydropower in Mexico and approached
three-quarters of all private mining electrical capacity.61 Although La Boquilla rarely operated at
full capacity, and was not ostensibly dedicated to mining, there is no question that La Boquilla
was the most powerful engine of mining in Mexico in the 1920s. Turning to the hydroelectric
capacity of Mexico, Herrera y Lasso estimated a total of 250 megawatts generated at 69 plants.
This meant that La Boquilla alone accounted for something between 10 and 12 percent of all
hydropower capacity in Mexico, including private plants and public systems. With mines and
smelters drawing nearly the entirety of this load, the importance of La Boquilla in rebuilding the
Mexican state in Chihuahua becomes clear.
Hydropower transformed the Mexican electrical industry during and after the Revolution
and accounted for nearly two-thirds of all generation in Mexico by the time of Herrera y Lasso’s
study. He estimated total electrical generation at 392 megawatts, roughly the output of a single
coal-fired plant today. Of this total, 124 megawatts were employed in mining, or about 30
percent.62 Herrera y Lasso was bullish on electrification and urged federal officials to apply
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Article 27 in supporting electrification efforts. Quoting former mining engineer and future US
President Herbert Hoover, then serving as Secretary of Commerce, Herrera y Lasso argued that
power companies were “agents of the State,” and should be given great latitude in acquiring the
sites and resources necessary to complete their work, while the state itself should be given
eminent domain in facilitating this growth.63 Looking on La Boquilla as a model for national
development, the engineer estimated tentatively that Mexico’s major rivers might someday
generate more than 15 million horsepower, or more than 1,000 megawatts.64 Interestingly, this
estimate underestimated future improvements in hydroelectrical technology while overestimating
the regularity of Mexican rivers. More to the point, however, it ignored the claims on national
waters being made by federal authorities interested in irrigation and assumed that the two might
operate in harmony.
Water
While La Boquilla was employed in the early 1920s as an engine of mining, it was a
dual-use infrastructure which invited new claims on its use. After the Revolution, Mexican
engineers and planners began to explore the potential irrigation applications this structure
presented. As the largest dam in Mexico, impounding one of the largest reservoirs in the world,
La Boquilla was seen as the key to implementing unrealized irrigation schemes which had been

63

Herbert Hoover, “Government Policies in Relation to Power Development and Distribution,” presented
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proposed in the region for decades. Yet these proposals were complicated by federal weakness in
the 1920s, and a corresponding lack of funding. Thus, even as La Boquilla continued to generate
revenues for foreign shareholders and federal coffers, local officials in Chihuahua attempted to
fund irrigation projects at the local level through private investment. Although these efforts
ended in spectacular failure, for reasons discussed below, they would later serve as the blueprint
for federal irrigation projects at the end of the decade.
The Conchos River north of Camargo had been eyed as a suitable site for large-scale
irrigation as far back as 1825, when the state legislature passed a law promoting colonización, or
settlement and development in the region. These early efforts produced little change, however,
and the few existing irrigation works in Chihuahua before the Revolution were small-scale,
private, and unrelated to government development efforts. Chihuahua governors Abraham
González and Francisco “Pancho” Villa both initiated studies on the possibility of irrigation on
the Conchos during the Revolution, certainly motivated by the recent completion of La Boquilla,
but these did not move beyond proposals.65 Yet officials in Mexico remained interested in using
this dam to support such projects, as evidenced by a federal moratorium on private development
on the Conchos during the late Porfiriato, which was confirmed by the new Revolutionary
government. Between this ban and the language of the new Constitution of 1917, company
officials expressed a clear concern that the real profitability of their new investment was
threatened.
In October of 1920, a new governor was elected in Chihuahua with the backing of
President Obregón and broad support from middle-class and capital interests in the state. Ignacio
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C. Enriquez was the son of a Chihuahua politician who, like many revolutionary leaders in the
north, hailed from a burgeoning entrepreneurial class which felt excluded by the entrenched
Terrazas-Creel network. As interim governor during the Revolution, Enríquez made a name for
himself by returning property confiscated by villista forces and taking a stand against the abuses
of local military leader Francisco Murguía.66 He graduated from the school of agriculture at the
University of Illinois in 1910 and served briefly as Consul General of Mexico in New York. He
returned to Mexico during the Revolution, participating alongside Obregón in diplomatic
meetings with US General Hugh Scott in El Paso in 1916. It was Enríquez who attempted,
unsuccessfully, to reconcile Obregón and Adolfo de la Huerta when the latter rose unsuccessfully
against the president in 1923.67 Although he retired from public life soon after, Enríquez remains
closely associated with the new Revolutionary government in Chihuahua.
Enríquez used this platform early on to advocate for an irrigation district in Chihuahua,
using La Boquilla as its foundation.68 In his acceptance speech for the governorship, attended by
President Obregón, he proposed a project of agrarian reform through the legal and gradual
deconstruction of the massive Terrazas-Creel latifundia in Chihuahua. In its place, he proposed a
system of private smallholding supported by new structures of credit and irrigation in the style of
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the United States and Europe. In 1921, he passed a law reforming Article 5 of the state
Constitution to enshrine agricultural cultivation of lands as a right and implement eminent
domain powers.69 This law set land prices and identified almost 275,000 hectares intended for
purchase, laying out in broad strokes the foundation of the irrigation project he envisioned. Since
federal authorities had already determined that the State of Chihuahua had no legal standing to
serve as a federal concessionaire, Enríquez worked around this decision by creating the
Compañía Irrigadora del Conchos (Conchos Irrigation Company), to be headed by his engineer
brother, Benjamín R. Enríquez.70 Not content to wait on federal initiative, Enríquez was the first
to make real efforts toward marshalling Lake Toronto in support of the revolutionary irrigation
projects.71
In this recognition of the opportunities presented by La Boquilla, Enríquez was
unambiguous. As one observer noted in December of 1920, “The employment of the waters of
the Boquilla dam, converting the vast deserts into productive valleys similar to those of the
Laguna or along the Colorado River, is one of the most urgent things the new governor is trying
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to implement.”72 The Enríquez brothers developed a project explicitly billed as an “extension” of
the dam at La Boquilla.73 With a proposed budget of $20 million dollars, a sum many times
larger than the annual expenditure of Chihuahua, they sought to attack the agrarian problem in
Chihuahua though land redistribution, smallholding, colonization, and irrigation.74 By February
of 1921, Benjamín was identified in the pages of a US industrial publication as the “chief
engineer of the irrigation department of the State of Chihuahua,” promoting a plan to use the
dam owned by the “Northern Mexico Power Company” to create an irrigation district covering
200,000 hectares in the Conchos valley, a 130-kilometer canal, and a second dam impounding 1
billion cubic feet of water on the San Pedro River.75 While Enríquez here offered a different
estimate – $15 million dollars – the article made no mention that the project remained unfunded.
Beyond federal instability, Enríquez faced another series of problems which threatened to
kill the project. The region was struck by drought and famine from 1920 to 1923, further
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hampering recovery and forcing Chihuahua to continue to rely on food imports.76 A series of
statewide funding efforts, including gambling licenses along the border, failed to generate
required revenues, and $6 million pesos in promised federal funding for the Enríquez project
never materialized. Although Enríquez apparently convinced Obregón that the project was
feasible and necessary, neither could find the means for funding this project within Mexico.
The CAFERC vigorously objected to the Enríquez proposal and sought to safeguard La
Boquilla by expanding company control over the Conchos. On January 21, 1921, CAFERC
attorney Alberto Carreño submitted a competing request to the federal ministry of agriculture.
Repeating a leitmotif associated with this project, he identified La Boquilla as a “fountain of
progress and wealth” worthy of federal support in a truly shocking request.77 He wrote, “Of late,
the Company I represent has the conviction that the power it has been able to provide to the
mining industry in that region of the country has been the only thing which managed to prevent
the paralysis of work of numerous business interests and leave unemployed countless workers
who would have certainly complicated the social problems of the Republic.”78 As recompense
for single-handedly powering recovery in Chihuahua, the company sought a concession along
the entire course of the Conchos below La Boquilla all the way to the Texas border, a distance of
275 kilometers. Carreño sought a term of 15 years to develop an unnamed number of
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hydroelectric projects on the river, with plans to be submitted at a later date.79 As he made clear,
this proposal was entirely unrelated to irrigation projects, and the company sought only to
increase generating capacity and secure access to the flows of the Conchos.80 What the company
sought was, in effect, a monopoly on the Conchos River.81
At roughly the same time, the federal ministry of agriculture (SAF) created a department
of irrigation (dirección de irrigación), the first such institutional dependency tasked with
managing irrigation in Mexico. Irrigation projects had formerly fallen under the broad
jurisdiction of the Porfirian-era SFCI, the predecessor of the SAF, which mostly rubber-stamped
large capital projects of private utility. With the reorganization of the SFCI in 1917 into separate
ministries of agriculture (SAF) and industry (SICT), both emerged with clearer mandates, if not
the means to pursue them.82 Although such an irrigation agency was long overdue, the urgent
need for oversight along the Conchos and the high stakes implied may have precipitated its
creation. In any case, the SAF’s new department of irrigation took an immediate interest in
supervising CAFERC requests.
Residents of Saucillo, an agricultural community located downriver from the dam,
opposed the company’s request on the Conchos. According to representative Carlos Muñoz, this

79

AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 2, n.p.

80

AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 2, n.p. “Indudablemente se ha incurrido algún error por parte de la
Secretaría al asegurar que esta solicitud de aguas es para utilizarla en el riego de terrenos, pues bien claro hago
constar que esas aguas entre la Boquilla de Babizas y Ojinaga habrían de utilizarse para el desarrollo de fuerza
motriz.”

81

AHA, AN, caja 102, exp. 1097, leg. 2, n.p.; published in the Diario Oficial on September 9, 1921.

82

Secretaría de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo (SICT, Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Labor).

165

proposed concession would constitute “truly anti-constitutional monopoly” over national
resources. Early responses by the SAF suggest that the residents of Saucillo were correct in their
concerns, and had the sympathy of the ministers. But these residents soon ran up against a
common obstacle in Mexico. Seeking to establish the standing of these petitioners, SAF officials
demanded proof of ownership of lands and water rights of the residents of Saucillo, which they
could not produce. Using language typical of traditional agrarian communities, in which land is
held in common and no formal title exists, the petitioners argued that they had cultivated the
lands of Saucillo “from time immemorial, the possession of which they have enjoyed in good
faith, publicly, and without any contradiction.”83 Although this community had existed as such
for perhaps decades or centuries, officials found that the residents of Saucillo had no standing,
and in any case had submitted their objections after the stipulated term.84 No further exchanges
exist in the record of the SAF, and it appears the complaints of these residents were thereafter
excluded from the conversation.
It seems the company’s petition was defeated not by residents of Chihuahua, but its own
ambitious scale. Such a concession would have been exceedingly generous even by the standards
of the Porfiriato, and was simply too massive and politically explosive in the context of an
ongoing political and social revolution. Moreover, the company’s lack of interest in irrigation
would have inhibited federal irrigation development, perhaps permanently. The official reason
for denial was technical – the request did not conform to the current norms and policies of water
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concessions. But based on the scale of the proposal, and the timing of its submission, it seems
likely that the CAFERC never anticipated that the SAF would grand the company control of over
the entirety of the lower Conchos. In its confrontational tone, it reads more like a protest of both
federal and state-level irrigation designs which would inevitably impose new conditions on
operations at La Boquilla.
This exchange is helpful in understanding the complex and overlapping relationships in
which the CAFERC found itself after the Revolution. On the one hand, La Boquilla was a
powerful engine of mining in Chihuahua in the 1920s, much to the delight of many engineers
and bureaucrats. But La Boquilla also represented the key to irrigation, for which the company
held no interest. There is some evidence that federal officials tried to resolve this apparent
contradiction by brokering some form of public-private partnership. In May of 1921, CAFERC
president T.G. Mackenzie attended a meeting in El Paso with Ignacio Enríquez and Obregón
protégé Plutarco Elias Calles, at which the latter promised to lobby the president for $5 million
pesos in funding.85 And while the CAFERC was reluctant to cede any of the privileges granted in
its existing concessions, it finally came to terms with the State of Chihuahua in October of 1921.
In exchange for $2 million pesos in indemnization, the company agreed to drop its opposition to
Enríquez and guarantee the release of 40 cubic meters per second from La Boquilla for the
purposes of irrigation.86 With this negotiating victory, Enríquez boasted that “the government of
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Chihuahua is in a position to resolve more easily than in any other entity of the Republic the
intricate agrarian problem, and without spending a single cent.”87
Yet this victory remained hollow without the requisite funding to complete the project.
With no federal funding forthcoming and scarce free capital in Mexico, Enríquez looked abroad
for partners. In late 1921, he met President Obregón in Mexico City with a consortium of
potential US investors. Their interest and appetite for risk must have been especially keen, as the
US State Department had yet to recognize the revolutionary Mexican government of Alvaro
Obregón, and recommended against investment in Mexico at the time. Representing various
industries, these men were led by Arthur J. McQuatters, already well-known in northern Mexico.
McQuatters was president of the Alvarado Mining and Milling Company, which held the
Palmilla mine, one of the oldest and richest in Parral, as well as the railway connecting this
region to Durango.88 He was also, along with his colleague Franklin Remington, an officer of the
Foundation Company, which had invested $70 million pesos in Mexico in 1921.89 Cognizant of
the political conditions in Mexico, these investors sought presidential assurances that their
investments would be recognized, and that they would be permitted to continue investing in the
auxiliary industries promoted by this irrigation project.90 With this agreement in hand, it seemed
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that Enríquez had finally managed the thread the needle of capital, technology, and political
expediency.
But this agreement soon proved politically toxic. The group led by McQuatters was not
really interested in irrigation along the Conchos, and funding for the Enríquez project was
contingent upon approval of a larger project elsewhere in northern Chihuahua. McQuatters had
his eyes on the former latifundia of Luis Terrazas, which extended more than 10,000 square
miles in the north of Chihuahua – an area nearly the size of Massachusetts.91 In fact, McQuatters
had tried and failed to purchase this land in 1920. In coordination with McQuatters, President
Venustiano Carranza arranged for these confiscated lands to be returned to Terrazas to facilitate
this transaction, but the sale collapsed in May of 1920 along with the carrancista government.92
When contracts were signed on this resuscitated deal in February of 1922, it provoked a
powerful political backlash which Enríquez had clearly failed to anticipate.93 Plans were
presented to create a Mexican-based company to subdivide and irrigate these lands and resell
them affordably to national farmers. But voices from across the social spectrum objected to US
investors using Mexican lands, only just pried away from the oligarchic Terrazas-Creel family,
to turn a profit. Agricultural groups, unions, and mining and railway workers at local and
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national levels came out against the plan, organizing protests at the Chihuahua legislature and
presenting the attorney general of Mexico with an accusation of treason against Enríquez.
Although this accusation was thrown out on the order of Obregón, an ally of Enríquez, the deal
was beyond saving.94
The most menacing opposition came from Pancho Villa, only recently retired from the
battlefield in Chihuahua, who told the president that such a deal would result in “gunshots”
within three months.95 With drought spreading in Chihuahua and peace seemingly fragile,
Obregón could ill-afford another popular uprising in the state. In March 1922, the president
formally “expropriated” the Terrazas property, while also canceling the contract and opening
back-channel negotiations with Terrazas to purchase the property outright. McQuatters and
company were indemnified for expenses already sunk in the project.96 Ever the technocrat, it
seems Enríquez never understood the popular resistance to his project. In his eyes, he had
managed to redirect foreign capital toward a project of national interest at a time when federal
coffers were nearly bare. Moreover, he argued that the federal government had no authority to
intervene in this private deal, again failing to grasp the nature of the complaint against his
scuttled his project.
Although Enríquez continued to promote his project, nothing came of his efforts. As late
as the fall of 1922, Enríquez was still acquiring the necessary permissions in the region, even if
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no funding yet existed.97 On December 16, 1922, the Mexican legislature approved the project,
budgeting an initial $6 million pesos for construction in 1923. But these funds were never
disbursed, and no work ever began. Enríquez offered his resignation to the president in early
1923, which was rejected.98 Soon after, when Adolfo de la Huerta rebelled against Obregón, it
was Enríquez who attempted unsuccessfully to broker peace between the two former allies. The
governor-engineer retired from public life after his term ended in 1924, leaving his dream of
irrigation in Chihuahua unrealized. Following this retirement, his brother Benjamín attempted to
revive the project with the new governor, Jesús Antonio Almeida. But the same problems
continued to plague their efforts – federal weakness, capital scarcity, regional drought, and local
instability in Chihuahua due to the delahuertista revolt. While the mines of Chihuahua hummed
with hydropower from La Boquilla, reaching a position of global importance, the Conchos valley
below the dam remained much as it had been for centuries.
In a way, the Enríquez irrigation plan did live on, even if the engineer had failed to
implement it himself. Records from the federal ministry of agriculture show that the plan
proposed by Enríquez drew the immediate attention of the new irrigation department of the SAF,
triggering an internal review of the project’s feasibility.99 A 1922 survey conducted by engineer
V. Solis reveals the scale of federal interest. Assessing seven canyon mouths for possible use in
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hydroelectric and irrigation damming, this assessment used the Enríquez plan as a foundation for
proposing long-term and large-scale development projects in the region. And while engineers
found his calculations to be wrong, overestimating the real flow of the Conchos, this plan would
later serve as the starting point for creating the damming and irrigation network begun in the next
decade.100 In the coming years, new President Plutarco Elías Calles would take a great personal
interest in national irrigation projects, particularly in the arid north. Calles elevated the
department of irrigation to an independent body in the ministry of agriculture in 1924, creating
the institutional infrastructure necessary to undertake such a campaign. Thanks to the work of
Enríquez, and the prior construction of La Boquilla, the Conchos River figured high on the
agency’s list of projects, much to the chagrin of the dam’s Canadian owners.
⁂
The Enríquez plan ultimately failed due to its association with the McQuatters investment
group, not the CAFERC. But while the Canadian electric company resisted this irrigation
scheme, the distinctly anti-Yankee timbre of Mexican revolutionary politics that had defeated it
offered little comfort. The strong resistance to perceived foreign profiteering, the fixity of the
company’s assets, and the nationalization of natural resources in post-Revolution Mexico left the
CAFERC in an exposed position, potentially skewing the calculus of business irretrievably.
Although a mining boom drew heavy and constant electrical loads, implicit federal claims on the
waters of the Conchos threatened to render La Boquilla unprofitable with the stroke of a pen.
The company fought vigorously to protect their existing claims and celebrated the failure of
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Enríquez and McQuatters. But officials also recognized that these victories were fleeting, and
federal designs on irrigation set company interests on a collision course with Mexico City,
casting doubt over the future of the CAFERC.
On the other hand, however, this necessary integration of La Boquilla within federal
irrigation projects also demonstrated the limits of the Mexican state in 1920s Chihuahua. The
federal budget relied heavily on taxes from Chihuahua’s foreign-owned mines, which in turn
drew power from the falling waters of the Conchos at La Boquilla. Whatever political problems
La Boquilla might have posed, it nonetheless represented the economic engine of Chihuahua,
without which valuable Mexican silver, lead, and zinc might remain underground. The Torontobased CAFERC was an indispensable stakeholder in Mexican state-building in Chihuahua in the
1920s, even if, ironically, the dam itself operated outside the reach of this state. Moreover, the
precariousness felt by company officials was mutual. While the CAFERC may have felt
vulnerable to the winds of revolutionary change, Mexican engineers and bureaucrats lamented
that a scarcity of capital and expertise compelled them to partner with actors who did not
necessarily share their social aims. This partnership of necessity held until the late 1920s, when a
growing Mexican state began to exert its strength in the region, and the CAFERC was acquired
by multinational General Electric affiliates.101
This tension between mining and irrigation embodied in La Boquilla points to two
important and interrelated conclusions. Firstly, although direct foreign investment might have
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been politically problematic in post-Revolution Mexico, indirect foreign involvement at La
Boquilla was not only permitted in the 1920s, but critically important. Setting aside the
nationalist rhetoric of the period, the Revolution did not succeed in eliminating all foreign
economic involvement in Mexico, nor did it seek to do so. In contrast to petroleum interests,
mining and electrical interests adopted an open negotiating posture toward the new
Constitutionalist government, allowing them to come to terms without invoking US diplomatic
might. Chihuahua’s transnational mining boom in the 1920s was unique in Mexico, but it did not
represent an exceptional category of public-private relationship, nor did it occur despite federal
attempts to root out foreign interests. Quite to the contrary, such ostensibly “foreign”
participation in national development was common to Chihuahua, to Mexico, and to Latin
America more broadly, and is thus best considered a normative feature of state formation.
With that said, the relationship between the CAFERC and state actors was fluid and
requires qualification. While the conditions of post-Revolution Chihuahua favored the relative
autonomy of company activities, there was a clear long-term trend toward federal control over
the waters of the Conchos River which necessarily involved the dam. La Boquilla may have
supported state formation efforts through electrification, but that did not mean federal officials
were content to allow the CAFERC to operate independently. The federal moratorium on
concessions on the Conchos, the SAF reviews of the Enríquez plan, and the strengthening of
institutional agency over Mexican waters all pointed to a growing and persistent state interest in
developing the region below the dam. Federal commandeering of company assets to serve these
projects was not necessarily inevitable, but was made so through the allocation of greater
resources after 1924. Thus, when Aboites writes that after the failure of the Enríquez deal “[t]he
strengthening of the new Mexican State would have to begin in and from the central
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government,” this is only partially true.102 Indeed, this episode reveals the political problems of
foreign direct investment. But it also reveals the close and intimate integration of private and
public interests in water management, operating both in cooperation and competition. Federal
efforts after 1924 to “reprogram” La Boquilla for use as the foundation of an irrigation were not
intended to ruin the CAFERC, but to harness its resources. It is toward a better understanding of
the mechanics of this “reprogramming” campaign that the next chapter is aimed.
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CHAPTER 5: Integration, 1926–1930
The year 1926 marked a watershed in both Mexico City and the state of Chihuahua. The
ascendancy of Plutarco Elías Calles two years earlier corresponded to a phase of bureaucratic
reorganization and expansion, during which the new president sought to redefine the state as the
guarantor of the ongoing Revolution. Through a series of decrees and laws in 1926, Calles and
his allied successors launched a wave of federal agencies meant to implement a program of
development on a national scale. In Chihuahua, the newly-electrified mining industry was in the
midst of a bonanza driven by soaring zinc and lead prices, even while other industries recovered
slowly. But this regional strength in mineral extraction produced no corresponding political
stability. Between 1924 and 1932, nine governors of various political and social leanings ruled
Chihuahua, while the “persistent oligarchs” of the Porfirian era returned from El Paso to reclaim
properties seized by Pancho Villa’s guerillas or the Constitutionalist government.1 From this
perspective, 1926 appears to mark the start of state resurgence emanating outward from Mexico
City over the formerly stateless Chihuahua. But the case of La Boquilla suggests that this process
was rather more complicated than it might first appear.
Several failed regional irrigation schemes during this time demonstrated that Mexican
officials saw in the Conchos the future of Chihuahua. By using the waters already retained in
Lake Toronto, planners envisioned vast irrigation districts in the deserts, resettling landless
farmers and populating the northern borderlands. Of course, the electrical needs of mining
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interests were not precisely attuned to those of agricultural cycles, creating conflict over the best
use of the waters of the Conchos. The dual-use nature of La Boquilla had already transformed
the regional mining industry, but it was also capable of supporting irrigation, inviting new claims
on its use. Although the dam’s Canadian owner, the CAFERC, continued to hold multiple
concessions on the river, federal officials after 1926 succeeded in “reprogramming” La Boquilla
for use in federal irrigation projects. This was not achieved through federal fiat, but careful and
deliberate negotiations which adapted this infrastructure to different uses. In this way, I argue,
state power reemerged in Chihuahua in the latter 1920s not merely as a result of growing federal
organization in Mexico City, but through the de facto state capture of this private infrastructure.
It was the onset of drought in 1927 which made clear that these two uses could not be
reconciled, creating the opportunity for federal intervention. Facing an acute shortage of water,
company officials reduced outflows to ensure the ability to meet peak electrical demand.
Meanwhile, farmers downriver were beholden to cycles of planting and harvest, making them
especially vulnerable to unanticipated shortages of water. Their needs varied by season, by crop,
and even by elevation or distance downriver. If La Boquilla were to support the type of massive
irrigation district envisioned by federal planners, it could not also serve as the foundation of the
regional mining industry. Moving forward, Mexican officials would work to resolve this
enduring riddle of water and electricity in favor of agriculture, capturing the potential of La
Boquilla and forcing electrical expansion away from hydropower in Chihuahua.
State Expansion
The resurgence of state power after the Mexican Revolution is typically associated with
the presidency of Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–28), the handpicked successor and protégé of
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Álvaro Obregón.2 During the first half of this term, Calles adopted a populist stance closely
aligned with the ongoing institutional revolution initiated by his predecessor. Ongoing unrest
complicated efforts at consolidation, however, and this early populism by 1926 gave way to
growing authoritarian tendencies and anti-clerical policies. The latter of these provoked a
reactionary Catholic uprising called the Cristero War (1926–1929), centered on the deeply
traditional colonial heartland of the Bajío in west-central Mexico. While he began his presidency
with the broad support of labor, making friendly gestures toward the Soviet Union, Calles was
soon drawn into a struggle to temper revolutionary fervor and eliminate sectarian resistance to
state centralization. Still a controversial figure, by the end of his term, he was widely seen as
abandoning the ideals of the Revolution for the lure of power.
While the concept of “no reelection” was an article of faith in the Mexican Revolution,
Calles changed the Constitution to permit non-consecutive reelection, clearing the way for this
mentor Obregón to reclaim the presidency in 1928. But Obregón was assassinated by a Catholic
militant before he could take office, triggering a constitutional crisis into which Calles stepped.
Thus began the period known as the maximato (1928–34), named for Calles’ unofficial title of
jefe máximo, or “supreme leader” of the Mexican Revolution. Over the next six years, Calles
exercised firm control over the executive, even as three different presidents formally held the
office through democratic elections. Marking a return of authoritarianism to Mexican politics,
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the maximato was seen a Calles’ final turn away from the revolutionary path, including the
violent repression of strike activity, suppression of political opposition, and a growing affinity
for some of the fascist forms and symbols taking root in Europe.3 Calles exerted a direct and
enduring impact on Mexican state expansion for a decade until the election of the populist
Lázaro Cárdenas in 1934, who managed to break the political chokehold of his former ally,
forcing Calles into exile in the United States.
The impact of Calles on state expansion in Mexico can be seen in the burst of
bureaucratic growth during his administration, increasing both the reach and grasp of Mexico
City. Obregón was more modest in his vision of federal power and was in any case occupied
with efforts to cultivate popular legitimacy. While Calles shared many of Obregón’s social and
political aims, he proved far more eager to place a strong state at the center policymaking, and
create the institutions necessary to facilitate public spending.4 This resulted in a torrent of
acronyms in the mid-1920s, as Calles and his ministers created agency after agency. A national
bank was created in 1925, followed the next year by a credit agency to promote agriculture.
Meanwhile, a new federal commission on electricity issued the first national electric code,
signaling a long-term goal of creating a national grid.5 Based on the findings of a national survey
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by engineer José Herrera y Lasso, this code formally designated the electrical industry as a
public utility, allowing for the expropriation of lands and property.6 It also set guidelines for
electrical development and expansion, representing the first such federal oversight of the
industry.
Other institutional efforts demonstrated the clear limits of the Mexican state at this time.
A federal law on mining was decreed by Calles in 1926, which attempted to exert greater control
over the foreign-dominated industry. Calles recognized that increasing production, strong global
demand, and a reliance on costly fixed assets would allow Mexican officials to impose higher
levels of taxation without endangering production. In addition, by increasing deposits and
imposing penalties for underproduction, federal officials sought to stimulate production even
further. Ironically, these regulations hit small-scale domestic miners hardest, promoting ongoing
industrial consolidation in the hands of a handful of foreign corporations.7 And despite efforts to
dictate the terms of extraction, mining production in Mexico proved more responsive to market
forces than federal regulation. As Marvin Bernstein observed, “Calles’ mining law of 1926
became one of the first casualties of the Depression,” and federal officials were compelled to
make concessions and exemptions to sustain production after the global mineral market
collapsed in the early 1930s.8 In Chihuahua, however, these circumstances played out quite
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differently. The onset of the Depression saw a reorientation of mining away from hydropower in
Chihuahua, achieved by increasing federal pressure on the owners of La Boquilla. And this
reorientation was propelled by Calles’ dream of an irrigated Conchos valley.
Like many of his early presidential compatriots, Calles was from Sonora, where irrigation
promised to literally make the deserts bloom. Early in his administration, Calles worked to
implement a national campaign of “revolutionary irrigation,” focusing at first in the arid Mexican
borderlands. This aim was made clear in 1926, with the passage of the “Ley sobre irrigación con
aguas federales,” implementing policies prioritizing irrigation in the use of national waters.9 The
former office of irrigation was expanded to become a full agency within the federal ministry of
agriculture, and renamed the National Irrigation Commission (Comisión Nacional de Irrigación,
CNI). Through this agency, staffed with Calles loyalists, federal authorities were granted a broad
mandate to investigate and promote large-scale irrigation projects throughout Mexico. The
possibility of irrigation on the Conchos was no longer hypothetical. This agency was also
granted formal representation within the national commission on electricity (CNFM), revealing
an early interest in coordinating federal irrigation and hydroelectric development.10 In the case of
La Boquilla, efforts to coordinate these two developmental aims would ultimately prove
untenable.
It is easy to read this bureaucratic growth as direct evidence of the expanding Mexican
state, but this is only partly true. Bureaucratic reforms are necessarily aspirational, reflecting not
the state as it is, but as it might be. This proliferation of agencies offered a blueprint of the
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institutional revolution as Calles and his ministers imagined it, rather than a snapshot of the state
in 1926. And like most blueprints, these were not implemented as they were designed. Real
challenges and limitations required pragmatism and adaptation. Perhaps the greatest challenge to
bureaucratic expansion in 1926 was the unevenness of state power. At La Boquilla, for example,
the state laid claim to the waters of the Conchos, but still relied upon the CAFERC to manage
these waters, demonstrating the material limitations of state power. Even if were possible to seize
these assets, this would have come with grave political and economic consequences. This burst
of bureaucratic agency was not an attempt to simply capture the infrastructure created by foreign
capital, but rather to apply these infrastructures to state projects of industrialization and agrarian
reform without disrupting their operation.11 Attempts by CNI officials to impose institutional
priorities on the CAFERC after 1926 were effectively efforts to integrate La Boquilla into the
circuity of the Mexican state.12
The national electric survey undertaken by engineer José Herrera y Lasso between 1924
and 1926 reveals the state of the industry in the first years after the Revolution, as well as the
deep entanglement of electricity and foreign-owned mining interests. But just as importantly, it
demonstrated that engineers understood early on that hydroelectric development in arid
environments like Chihuahua was unsustainable. Tasked with creating a program for national
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electrification, Herrera y Lasso proposed hydroelectric development not in the northern
borderlands, but in wetter southern states like Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Michoacán.
Across Mexico, before the Revolution, electrification and mining had grown together
within a self-reinforcing feedback loop which stimulated both industries.13 The presence of
cheap hydroelectricity intensified mining, which increased profits, promoting further capital
investment in both mining and electrical infrastructure. This symbiotic relationship drove a postRevolution boom in mining and, by 1927, Mexico reclaimed its title as the world’s largest silver
producer, almost doubling US output. At the same time, Mexico ranked second globally in lead
production and third in zinc – minerals which were rich in the complex ores of Chihuahua.14 A
1929 engineering article stated that Chihuahua alone accounted for almost 30 percent of mineral
production in Mexico, and identified La Boquilla by name as the driving force behind the
regional mining industry.15
One of the most striking characteristics of the early Mexican electrical industry was its
deep investment in hydroelectricity. In a country which was predominantly arid or semi-arid, 78
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percent of all electricity was generated by falling waters.16 The bulk of this hydropower capacity
was based on two massive, foreign built systems – the Necaxa complex owned by the Compañía
Mexicana de Luz y Fuerza Motriz in Puebla, which powered Mexico City and central Mexico,
and La Boquilla in Chihuahua. These two systems alone accounted for 60 percent of
hydroelectric capacity and 47 percent of all electrical capacity in Mexico.17 And while Necaxa
was a more powerful hydroelectric system, owing to plentiful flows of water and an extremely
high drop, La Boquilla was unique in the colossal scale of both its dam and the reservoir it
created.18 Most of the remaining hydroelectric capacity was created by small-scale private
generators, built for a single function and lacking in any ability to transmit or distribute power.
Thus, a major portion of fungible electrical capacity in Mexico was generated by two
hydroelectric systems, one of which was acutely vulnerable to climatic cycles of aridity.
Herrera y Lasso’s exploration of La Boquilla revealed the extent of this vulnerability. In
1926, La Boquilla generated 400 megawatts daily, or the equivalent of 17 hours operating at full
capacity. The vast majority of this electricity was used in mining, and dam operators reported
that they were scarcely able to meet growing demand in the region.19 Having extended
transmission lines to Parral (75 km), Santa Eulalia-Ávalos (135 km), and Camargo (30 km), as
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well as various individual mines, the system went from being totally unused in 1918 to being
overburdened by 1926. Even if Lake Toronto were one of the largest reservoirs in the world,
engineers could not guarantee it would remain full, or that water releases tied to electrical
generation could be coordinated to serve both the needs of the CAFERC and farmers along the
Conchos. In less than a decade, La Boquilla ran into a technological bottleneck which would
critically threaten system expansion.20
In the three years after 1926, Chihuahua was besieged by a drought which laid bare the
limitations of its energy regime. A series of surveys made by engineers Javier Horcasitas and
José Castanedo in 1929 revealed the often drastic measures taken by the CAFERC to continue
electrical provision to the mining industry, even as the waters of Lake Toronto dropped
dangerously low. In reviewing mining activity in Parral, Horcasitas wrote: “It is feared that the
difficult situation in which the [CAFERC] finds itself will interrupt its ongoing program to
promote industry, since as a result of the scarcity of rain, the quantity of power which this
company generates in normal times to supply the greater part of the mines of the State of
Chihuahua is shrinking, and furthermore the water held by the dam is running out.”21 At a time
when mineral revenues accounted for 40 percent of state income in Chihuahua, drought, early
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frosts, and rumbles of escobarista guerrilla activity threatened to shutter important and profitable
mines.22 Based on the quantity and regularity of these surveys through 1929, it was clear that
drought-induced electrical scarcity, and its potentially catastrophic effects on mining, was a
major concern for federal officials.
Among the many ironies of drought at La Boquilla were the consequences it had for
subterranean pumping. Especially in Parral, where the water table was relatively shallow,
pumping allowed for extraction at far greater depths, greatly increasing the profitability of
existing mines. The scarcity of water at the surface, then, produced a costly excess of water in
the most profitable depths of these mines, slowing operations or even forcing them to cease
altogether. In the ASARCO mining properties Parral, for example, four pumps drew more than a
megawatt of electricity to extract up to 5,600 gallons of groundwater per minute, not including
various smaller pumps spread through the mines. The Prieta-Tajo group of mines in Parral was
being upgraded to remove up to 9,200 gallons per minute, enough to fill twenty Olympic
swimming pools a day. Not only was pumping important to miners, but it also constituted a
major portion of electrical usage. Between January and May of 1929, for example, ASARCO’s
properties in Parral drew about 1,000 megawatt hours, of which 60 percent was used in
pumping.23 At another group of ASARCO mines in the Veta Grande seam near Parral, between
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January and June of 1929, 8,870 megawatt hours were used in all mining activities, of which 80
percent were used in pumping.24 By the end of 1929, works at Veta Grande were suspended, due
specifically to the high energy demands of pumping.25 The same problem with drainage afflicted
the mines at Naica, which had operated ceaselessly since electrification in 1924. This smaller
property relied on 150 megawatt hours monthly to extract up to 1,300 liters per minute from its
lead, silver, and gold mines.26 Having been transformed by hydroelectricity in a period of only
years, drought threatened to cripple this new energy regime in the mines of Chihuahua.
Even in mines where drainage was not an issue, electrical rationing was reported. In the
ASARCO Santa Eulalia lead-silver district near Chihuahua City, electrical consumption fell from
an average of 220 megawatt hours in July of 1929 to 180 in October and then to 153 in
November, due solely to scarcity. Labor assignments for the mine’s 550 workers were
redistributed across three shifts to avoid hitting peak load.27 An overview of mining throughout
Chihuahua in late 1929 showed that scarcity impacted every phase of mining. According to
Horcasitas and Castaneda, three successive years of drought had finally depleted the water
reserves at Lake Toronto, resulting in power reductions in 1929. This was compounded by an
accident at La Boquilla during which a valve was left open during repairs in August of 1929,
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flooding the powerhouse and destroying one generator. Although this was repaired a month later,
by the end of September, the water level at Lake Toronto had fallen to only 6.8 meters above the
intakes, which required a minimum of 5 meters of clearance. Fearing the damage which might be
caused by air entering the turbines, electrical generation was reduced by 25 percent in October
1929, followed by another reduction of 15 percent soon after. At the time of publication in
December 1929, engineers estimated that Lake Toronto retained no more than six months’ worth
of generating capacity.28 Where La Boquilla had once transmitted to Chihuahua mines up to 440
megawatt hours every day, it was reduced by late 1929 to 320 megawatt hours, with the real
possibility that power would be reduced to 220 megawatt hours or fewer in the near future.29
Miners throughout the state responded by installing or reactivating fuel-powered
generators, essentially reverting to Chihuahua’s previous petroleum energy regime. One mine in
San Francisco del Oro, for example, brought in a disused 2,000 horsepower (1.5 megawatt) plant
formerly installed in Zacatecas. In other places, generators formerly used as primary power
sources came back into use. In this sense, La Boquilla was implicated in two energy transitions.
After 1918, this dam powered Chihuahua’s mining sector, leading to a dramatic shift toward
integrated hydropower and away from individual gas-powered generators. This shift
corresponded with Chihuahua’s mineral boom, during which these became globally-important
centers. But La Boquilla also demonstrated the vulnerability of reliance on hydropower in an arid
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environment. Thus, drought triggered a short-term shift back toward private generation, but a
long-term shift toward system expansion beyond hydroelectricity. And such an energy transition
would require yet another infusion of capital.
The drought in Chihuahua stretched into the earliest days of what would become the
Great Depression, which deeply undercut global metals prices and placed great financial stress
on the CAFERC. Under circumstances which remain almost entirely unexplored, the CAFERC’s
consortium of Canadian investors finally walked away from La Boquilla in 1929. The dam and
all electrical assets were acquired by the American and Foreign Power Company (AFP), an
overseas subsidiary of the Electric Bond and Share Company (EBASCO), which itself had been
created as a holding company by General Electric in 1905. Although more research remains to be
done on this topic, it seems fair to hypothesize that the growing series of obstacles facing the
CAFERC’s Canadian owners – including drought, global depression, electrical underproduction,
and increasing federal oversight – made La Boquilla far less attractive to CAFERC shareholders.
With a global portfolio of utilities assets, greater resources of capital and expertise, and an
increased ability to withstand the risks of Mexican investment, AFP’s acquisition of the
CAFERC in 1929 fits within a wider trend of electrical consolidation before and during the
Depression.30
After 1929, La Boquilla entered yet another phase of growth. The limits imposed the
environment made clear that hydroelectricity was not the way forward for mining or industry in
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Chihuahua. Acquisition by the AFP signaled another round of expansion which would eventually
link the falling waters of the Conchos to three northern states, while also expanding the electrical
generation base beyond hydropower. Meanwhile, Calles’ goal of “revolutionary irrigation”
ensured growing federal oversight in the region, placing Mexico’s largest dam in the crosshairs
of state planners and engineers.
Toward a “Revolutionary Irrigation”
While Calles and his predecessor agreed on the importance of pursuing Borderlands-style
irrigation projects to promote federal agrarian reform, they differed on the appropriate means of
implementation. Obregón publicly advocated land redistribution but, in practice, he protected the
private property rights of smallholders and Porfirian-era latifundistas alike. Calles had far fewer
reservations in enshrining a strong and active state as the prime mover of ongoing revolutionary
change. While he also avoided the redistribution of existing large properties, which would have
triggered fierce resistance, he had a keen understanding of the political benefits of attacking
economic patterns associated with the crony capitalism of the Porfiriato. Rejecting the traditional
institution of the hacienda, which was linked in the revolutionary imagination with waste, graft,
and coercive labor, Calles offered a vision of large-scale irrigation districts composed of middleclass smallholders, which would naturally produce the democratic and egalitarian political forms
sought by the Revolution. It was Calles who declared state-led development and private
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ownership to be entirely compatible, recasting the Mexican state as a vocal champion of popular
agrarian reform in ways never attempted by Obregón.31
It was toward this vision that Calles put forward the law on federal waters in January of
1926, formally creating the CNI within the ministry of agriculture as an agent of state-led
irrigation.32 Created by and staffed with loyalists, this institution would remain closely associated
with Calles’s vision of “revolutionary irrigation” even after Cárdenas took over the presidency in
1934.33 Years later, Calles would describe it as “the law necessary to allow for government
intervention.”34 Having created the institutional blueprint for pursuing such an ambitious state-
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led project, Aboites summarized Calles’ position thusly – “if the countryside were to be
transformed, it would be the State and none other which would dictate the direction,
mechanisms, and rhythms of this transformation.”35
And yet, this claim of state primacy was complicated – at least, according to conventional
models of the state which align closely with federal governance. While Calles had cleared the
way to transform the Chihuahuan landscape in the service of state-led agrarian reform, he relied
on at least two distinct groups of foreigners in this effort. The first was the CAFERC, owner and
operator of La Boquilla, the centerpiece upon which every competing irrigation scheme along the
Conchos was premised. The second was a New York engineering firm summoned by Calles to
study, design, and build his proposed irrigation district. As the federal CNI began to pursue its
mandate of irrigation in Chihuahua, aided by these US engineers, the CAFERC, and the Mexican
state were forced into conflict over the future of the Conchos valley. Complicating matters
further, callista officials in the subordinate CNI faced resistance from their superiors in the
ministry of agriculture. SAF officials were far more concerned with the shortage of electricity in
Chihuahua and favored proposals expanding hydroelectric development. Meanwhile, with
irrigation again becoming a priority, engineers Benjamín Enríquez and Emil Bronimann
reappeared in the record to advocate for their own proposals, demonstrating the wide range of
interests, aims, and concerns involved in such a large-scale development project. Although the
CNI eventually succeeded in creating irrigation district 5 in Delicias, this was not the organic
result of any clear and coherent state interest. Interested parties ranged from public to private,
foreign to national, and even inter-institutional in the creation of this district.
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In 1926, the Mexican section of the joint International Boundary and Water Commission
endorsed the president’s plans, formally recommending irrigation on the Conchos by the CNI.
As the group noted, the US Bureau of Reclamation had, since its creation in 1906, irrigated
almost 1 million hectares in the similarly arid and mountainous US West.36 Of particular interest
was the Elephant Butte dam in New Mexico, which was completed at roughly the same time as
La Boquilla, and had given Americans the upper hand in controlling the Rio Grande. The group
expressed concern that, if the waters of the Conchos were not better controlled, they would be
claimed by more resourceful farmers and engineers in Texas who would put Mexican immigrant
labor to productive use along the Rio Grande.37 Calles purposely sought out an engineering firm
with prior experience in large-scale irrigation projects, regardless of nationality, ultimately
settling on the J.G. White Engineering Corporation of New York.38 By early 1927, J.G. White
engineers joined head CNI engineer P. Dozal in the field to begin assessing the feasibility of
existing plans.39
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In the meantime, CAFERC officials renewed pressure on the SAF to approve a
concession to build a second dam on the Conchos. As early as 1922, company officials began to
argue that, without auxiliary dams below La Boquilla, useful water was being wasted after it left
the turbines. By building a smaller hydropower dam below La Boquilla, the company argued,
electrical capacity could very quickly be increased while also strengthening hydraulic control
over the Conchos. The original 1922 concession appears to have been ignored or forgotten, and
CAFERC did not immediately pursue the issue further. But the creation of the CNI in 1926
stirred renewed company interest in this potential concession. Based on a series of internal
memos, it appears that the SAF supported expanded electrification and was prepared to grant the
concession. But CNI officials objected, arguing that any such concession would interfere with
the work of the commission and, in any case, a moratorium on concessions on the Conchos
remained in effect. Furthermore, the company still held another valid concession on the Conchos
at a spot called La Joya, which it had acquired from German hydropower interests before the
Revolution.40 Although this concession appears to have been abandoned over the course of the
Revolution, and company officials had no plans to develop it, CNI officials argued that no
further concessions should be granted to the CAFERC while their outstanding contract at La
Joya remained unfulfilled. In September of 1926, CNI officials informed the company that no
concession would be approved until it was determined how the proposed dam might support
federal irrigation plans.41
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This decision signaled the beginning of an alternative model of development in
Chihuahua downriver from La Boquilla. For two decades, the CAFERC had operated almost
independently on the Conchos, transforming the globally-important mining industry but doing
little to pursue promised irrigation projects. The involvement of the CNI after 1926, and the
federal emphasis on irrigation laid out by Calles, meant that this era of development was drawing
to a close. While the joint CNI-White irrigation survey was being conducted in Chihuahua, a
separate but related survey was being undertaken by CNI engineer Guillermo Rode to understand
the nature of the company’s proposed works at Colina. Not content to take the CAFERC at its
word, CNI officials actively investigated ways to coordinate company investment in electrical
expansion with federal irrigation. Although this parallel series of internal and third-party
investigations produced a record which is dense and convoluted, it seems clear that CNI activity
in Chihuahua between 1926 and 1929 was almost exclusively dedicated to evaluating competing
irrigation and hydroelectric proposals, formulating a plan for a federal irrigation district, and
coordinating these efforts on the ground.
With the White-CNI survey using the failed Enríquez plan as a starting point for
evaluating irrigation, one of the plan’s authors reappeared in the record. Although his brother
Ignacio retired from public life in 1924, engineer Benjamín Enríquez continued to lobby CNI
officials on behalf of this plan. It quickly became clear, however, that the Enríquez plan was
technically incompatible with the damming proposal submitted by the CAFERC. Located just a
few kilometers below La Boquilla, this proposed dam would put the entrance of the main
irrigation canal of Enríquez completely underwater. If CNI officials determined that the dam at
Colina would best support federal irrigation, the Enríquez plan would have to be scrapped
entirely. Thus, even before the CNI-White surveys had been completed and final irrigation plans
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proposed, federal officials had to make an early decision which would shape the future of the
river.
While Enríquez argued that local support in Chihuahua justified federal funding for his
project, engineers determined that there was little else supporting this proposal. CAFERC
representative T.G. Mackenzie argued that the Enríquez plan overestimated the real availability
of water in the Conchos, and thus its potential for irrigation.42 CNI officials and the experts at
J.G. White agreed that the numbers presented were perhaps too “optimistic,” although they also
clearly mistrusted the motives of the company in opposing Enríquez.43 One official noted that the
vastly lower water flow figure offered by the company “seems to be the product of efforts to
demonstrate the convenience of abandoning the [Enríquez] project.”44 Furthermore, the Enríquez
plan called for 35 kilometers of “dead” canal, where water would flow across the desert before
distributing water. This was a serious concern in an environment where seepage and evaporation
claimed an estimated 45 percent of water before it arrived to farm fields.45
Irrigation officials faced a tough decision. While they suspected that the CAFERC was
only interested in electrification, and did not share their interest in irrigation, the proposed dam at
La Colina appeared to support federal irrigation by lowering construction costs and increasing
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hydraulic control.46 Using a water flow estimate between those calculated by the CAFERC and
Enríquez, CNI official Guillermo Rode determined that Colina would not interfere with federal
irrigation, and signed off on the project. In exchange for approving Colina, the CAFERC
promised to favor the needs of irrigation over electrical generation at the dam, as well as
guarantee 1,000 horsepower for use in irrigation pumps at a preferential rate.47 Construction
began immediately in March of 1927, suggesting that both company and federal officials were
eager to have the works completed.48 With presidential approval, the ministry of agriculture
formally exempted the Colina dam from the federal ban on private concessions along the
Conchos in September of 1927.49 In this sense, it might be said that the first element of the
federal irrigation district of Delicias was built in 1927 by a Canadian company, years before
ground was ever broken.
In the meantime, the CAFERC submitted another proposal to SAF regulators for a third
dam on the Conchos. Whereas Colina was eventually approved with only passing resistance from
irrigation officials, this third dam would be contested vociferously by the CNI. The company
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proposed the construction of a dam called Rosetilla in a narrow canyon mouth downriver from
the proposed irrigation district of Delicias. Offering no utility to federal planners seeking to
retain water within district 5, this dam would provide a small boost in hydroelectric generation
using waters which had escaped use in irrigation. Despite company efforts to pitch this dam as a
possible resource to federal irrigation efforts, CAFERC officials stated that the priority in
building Rosetilla was to increase electrical generation. Standing a proposed 24 meters high,
Rosetilla’s location outside the district and modest electrical generation capacity were offered as
a compromise by CAFERC officials between company interests and those of the CNI.
Throughout the negotiations over Rosetilla, CNI officials sought to compel the company
to support federal irrigation efforts with any new constructions. Moreover, to facilitate the
creation of this district, the existing ban on development on the Conchos was reaffirmed by
Calles on January 7, 1927. CNI officials argued in March that this decree precluded the
concession of any private rights on the river. That same month, a J.G. White engineers by the
name of Fisher submitted an opinion to the ministry of agriculture on behalf of the CNI assessing
the viability of various proposed irrigation projects. Fisher opined that auxiliary works should be
pursued on the San Pedro, a tributary of the Conchos, and that the old concession at La Joya
should be disregarded, as it was useful only for hydropower and not irrigation.50 As for the
proposed dam at La Boquilla, he believed that it was likely to flood an excessive amount or
arable land while doing little to aid in irrigation. In a later clarification to the SAF, Fisher
suggested he might be persuaded to support the concession of Rosetilla on the condition that
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irrigation be designated as its primary function, seemingly representing the position of the CNI.
But later records show that irrigation officials rejected this opinion, and continued to lobby for
the concession to be denied.51
Having received no response, the company pressed officials at the CNI and their
superiors at the SAF about Rosetilla in March of 1928. The company began to take a more
aggressive approach, which had been used with varying degrees of success in advocating for
company interests in the past. Stating that 95 percent of electricity at La Boquilla was used by
mining interests, the most important industry in Chihuahua, CAFERC officials argued that their
company was economically indispensable, and deserved special consideration in its request. In
the words of Aboites, this was “impeccable” logic for a Porfirian-era concession but failed to
address the aims of the CNI in this post-revolutionary context.52 Indeed, this request seemed
blind to the reality that the CNI was primarily interested in irrigation and agrarian reform, and
took a dim view of foreign-led electrical expansion.
By late 1928, it seemed that the company was able to interest CNI officials in at least the
possibility of building Rosetilla, due no doubt to the growing drought in Chihuahua. A letter
dated November 5, 1928, written apparently by a CAFERC official in English on CNI letterhead,
offered a detailed response to a series of concerns about the project, revealing the specific points
of friction between these two parties. It stated that the company’s primary objective was only to
gain the “largest economical power output consistent with reasonably uniform and dependable
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service.”53 With the scarcity of water weighing heavily on everyone in Chihuahua, it proposed
the terms of a contract limiting La Boquilla and Colina together to a combined electrical
generation of 160,000 megawatts annually, or a constant average of 18.3 megawatts. This
number was well below the installed capacity of La Boquilla alone, corresponding more closely
to the average operating production during the drought year of 1928. The very environment
which had made La Boquilla an engineering marvel now forced the company to come to terms
with federal regulators.
The main question facing both the CAFERC and the CNI was defining the purpose of
Rosetilla. The CAFERC sought to address acute power shortages, even if perhaps only
temporarily, and appeared amenable to prioritizing irrigation in the long run. Company officials
noted that their system was “particularly susceptible” to both environmental and economic
scarcity since it counted on an undiversified user base of relatively few large mining interests. In
1927, for example, ASARCO had ceased production at one of its mining properties in Parral,
resulting in a “marked depression” in electrical demand until rising lead prices triggered a
rebound. The addition of smaller hydroelectric dams would allow the CAFERC to reuse the
same water in electrical generation, increasing system efficiency and flexibility. But the CNI
feared the company might horde scarce resources at precisely the moment that federal officials
required a surplus of water. As one engineer noted with concern in an internal memo, “We do
not know how the power company plans to meet these shortages of water and power.”54
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With company officials and federal irrigation officials at an apparent impasse, engineer
Emil Bronimann put forth his own proposal for irrigation in the region.55 As the original designer
of La Boquilla, who oversaw completion of the dam during the Revolution, Bronimann likely
saw in this conflict an opportunity to cement his own legacy in the Conchos basin. Having been
absent in the documentary record for a few years, he appears to have fallen out of favor with the
CAFERC by 1927, and his proposal was submitted on his own behalf, rather than that of the
company. Proposing a 65-meter structure, more than twice as tall as the company’s proposed
Rosetilla, the Bronimann plan called for a reservoir impounding a massive 3 billion cubic meters
of water, almost identical to Lake Toronto. A CNI study found that such a dam would flood 186
square kilometers, including the entire settlement of Saucillo, and displace 3,000 inhabitants,
requiring $4.47 million pesos in indemnization.56 But Bronimann’s proposal relied upon the
same “optimistic” data on water flows used by Enríquez, calling into question the feasibility of
the entire project. For example, a CNI review determined that Bronimann’s claim to potentially
irrigate 150,000 hectares was off by about 100,000 hectares. More damning, however, was the
CNI’s assessment that the dam height, and extensive flooding of arable lands it would
precipitate, appeared more suited to creating a high drop for hydropower generation. CNI
officials felt that Bronimann sought to sell them a hydropower dam under the guise of irrigation.
Aboites interpreted this episode as evidence supporting CNI suspicions that the
“expansionist” CAFERC remained desperate to build a massive hydropower dam on the
Conchos. This interpretation assumes that Bronimann operated as an agent of CAFERC interests
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and, necessarily, that his separate proposal was meant to extract better terms in the company’s
negotiations with the CNI. But there is little evidence to support either of these assumptions.
Officials at the SAF who reviewed this proposal classified it as distinct from the CAFERC
proposal and assessed it accordingly.57 There was no attempt at subterfuge detected or reported.
Bronimann’s proposal was so obviously incompatible with irrigation aims of the CNI, and so
blind to the acute environmental realities which threatened both company and federal interests,
that it suggests a lone actor who was very much outside the mainstream of policy and
development circles in Chihuahua. Furthermore, a “strange” letter of support for Bronimann’s
proposal by the residents of Saucillo, who would have been flooded out of their homes, argued
that the CAFERC’s dam at Rosetilla should be rejected because it was too small, and would have
created too few jobs.58 Taking into account all of this evidence, it hardly seems likely that
Bronimann was an agent of the CAFERC by 1928.
Bronimann’s proposal was viewed favorably by SAF officials precisely because it
promoted electrification alongside irrigation, revealing again the different priorities of the
ministry of agriculture and its subordinate, callista CNI. The SAF found Rosetilla problematic
because it was only geared toward generating electricity, and would do more to benefit farmers
in Texas than in Chihuahua. The CNI proposal was also found “defective” because it would do
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nothing to increase electrical generation and retained the costly “dead” canal first proposed by
Enríquez. Relying on water flow figures deemed inflated by the CNI, J.G. White, and the
CAFERC, agriculture officials nonetheless favored Bronimann’s proposal to irrigate 150,000
hectares while also generating 18.6 megawatts of hydropower. As an added benefit, this project
would “prevent farmers in Texas from using these waters to their own advantage.”59
In the meantime, however, the Rosetilla concession was granted to the CAFERC, settling
the issue. Although there is little to suggest exactly how this decision was made, it was likely
approved by Calles himself, who had an intense personal interest in the CNI and its project of
irrigation on the Conchos. The same SAF survey supporting Bronimann’s proposal offered a
strategy for wresting this concession from the CAFERC. Here, an official suggested that an
objection to the company’s concession might be adjudicated by the SAF minister, who could
side with Bronimann in the name of public utility. This strategy perhaps sheds some light on the
real motives behind the otherwise “strange” objection of the residents of Saucillo. But nothing
came of this, the CNI and CAFERC came to terms on the concession of Rosetilla, the last dam
the company would ever build on the Conchos. And while the success of an agency created and
staffed by Calles himself might seem at first a foregone conclusion, this episode showed the
complex rivalries and interests still at play, muddling any clear distinction between public and
private interests. Having been bested by its own subordinate CNI, the ministry of agriculture and
its focus on balanced water use would take back seat to Calles’ program of “revolutionary
irrigation” in Chihuahua.
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In the meantime, J.G. White engineers continued their work on behalf of the CNI,
exploring the possibility of large-scale irrigation. These surveys confirmed what Mexican
engineers had long understood – the existence of La Boquilla figured heavily into the calculus of
viability, as it would save the CNI a tremendous amount of time and money. With this major
infrastructural piece in place, these engineers found the valley below La Boquilla to be ideal for
the type of project proposed by the CNI in virtually every way. A J.G. White engineer by the
name of Packard estimated that 58,453 hectares could be efficiently irrigated, supporting the
creation of 10,000 homes and increasing the surface area of irrigated lands in Chihuahua by 30
percent in a single project. Recognizing the tremendous national importance of the project, and
perhaps reflecting some of his own assumptions about such large-scale projects, he deemed this
project an “opportunity to achieve a high level of civilization.”60
In January of 1929, the CNI submitted all relevant materials and surveys to the SAF for
review.61 Although the CNI had the support of Calles and a clear mandate to pursue irrigation
projects, it was still the ministry of agriculture which issued water concessions. A draft of an
opinion written by SAF official Alfonso González Gallardo, dated January 29, summarized the
many materials, projects, and proposals, and offers a glimpse at how these were finally analyzed,
selected, and integrated within a single coherent irrigation project.62 Bronimann’s proposal was
eliminated for being “anti-economico,” since it was difficult to access, expensive, and flooded
too much land. The original Enríquez plan was similarly discarded as infeasible. Although it
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attempted to irrigate the largest area, SAF officials found that its lengthy “dead” canal was
problematic and, in any case, this proposal had already been made impossible by the CAFERC’s
construction of Colina on the same site. Accepting both Colina and Rosetilla as part of the
hydraulic infrastructure of the Conchos, plans were approved to begin work on the irrigation
district proposed by J.G. White and the CNI. Reflecting the ongoing interest of the SAF in
developing hydropower alongside irrigation, this ministry recommended the construction of
additional dams on the Conchos, particularly if the CAFERC could be persuaded to fund them. It
identified the company’s old concession at La Joya and another site near Falomir as potential
projects on the Conchos, as well as another on the nearby tributary, the San Pedro.63
As this document made clear, while the CNI was interested exclusively in irrigation, the
SAF remained deeply concerned by the “alarming shortage of energy” in Chihuahua. Due to the
acute shortage of water in the region, officials noted that the CAFERC was forced to exceed
normal production levels – a situation which was “incompatible” with the agricultural aims of
the irrigation project. It was for this reason that SAF officials ultimately supported the
concession at Rosetilla. Although farmers in the region had opposed the dam on the grounds that
it embodied the “creation of interests opposed to agriculture,” regulators were swayed by
Rosetilla’s ability to quickly address electrical shortages without harming irrigation.64
Furthermore, company officials promised that the operation of Rosetilla would always favor
irrigation over hydropower.
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Integration
Between 1926, when the CNI began its work in Chihuahua, and 1929, when plans were
finalized, much had changed both regionally and nationally. Near the end of Calles’ presidency
(1924–28), Obregón was assassinated before he could take office for the second time. Calles
appointed civilian Interior Minister Emilio Portes Gil as interim president, triggering the shortlived revolt of General José Gonzálo Escobar in the north in 1929.65 While technically out of
office, Calles continued to exert a powerful influence over the presidency and remained closely
associated with the CNI. Elsewhere, the violent Cristero War (1926–29) revealed a deep schism
between the secular and often socialist stance of the new Mexican state and more conservative
sectors of society. In Chihuahua, early frosts and lack of rain produced a cascading series of crop
failures and water shortages between 1927 and 1929, bringing foreign electrical interests and
irrigation planners into direct conflict at a time when electrified mining was the cornerstone of
the regional economy. And globally, the market crash of September 1929 sent shockwaves
through the Mexican economy, resulting in shrinking budgets for agencies like the CNI, which
had only recently committed to the creation of a federal irrigation project on the Conchos.66
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Nonetheless, J.G. White engineers continued their work on Delicias while the CAFERC
completed the dam at Rosetilla.
It was clear that SAF officials were eager to have Rosetilla built as quickly as possible,
likely to avoid interference with its own CNI irrigation project. Construction was approved to
begin immediately, waiving the usual requirement that plans be presented and approved in
advance.67 Although President Portes Gil had only recently reconfirmed the federal ban on water
concessions, he issued a decree allowing for the construction of Rosetilla on April 25, 1929.
Soon after, SAF minister Marte R. Gómez and CAFERC lawyer Manuel Gómez Morín signed
two contracts – one allowing for Rosetilla and another renegotiating water usage at La
Boquilla.68 In exchange for permission to build Rosetilla, the CAFERC would be formally
required to submit to regular schedules of water usage meant to meet federal aims for both
electrification and irrigation. Thus, in early 1929, La Boquilla became for the first time an
instrument of federal irrigation policy.
A copy of the contract signed on May 10, 1929, made clear the terms of this new
relationship. 69 Through “mutual agreement,” it modified and consolidated all previous versions
of the CAFERC’s contracts, setting new limits and policies on water usage while preserving all
other conditions. This allowed the CAFERC to build Rosetilla while shedding the concession at
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La Joya it had been obligated to complete. But it also essentially “reprogrammed” the company’s
three-dam array for a different set of concerns, uses, and aims.70
Article 2 of this contract made clear the interests of the Mexican state in directly
managing its water resources:
The Federal Government considers it indispensable for the best and most complete use of
the waters of the Conchos River to appropriately regulate the outflow of Lake Toronto,
which might make compatible the needs of energy production with those of water
consumption for irrigation of the lands of the Conchos Valley.71
The contract required a minimum outflow from La Boquilla of 10 cubic meters per
second at all times, with possible exemptions during conditions of drought. It also required the
CAFERC to ensure a minimum storage level annually on August 1, the start of the dry season,
and allowed the company to use water discretionally when it exceeded this minimum by 10.5
meters. Annual reviews would be undertaken every October, and the SAF held the right to
demand all information on electrical generation and storage upon request. Other planning
documents show that gauging stations were to be maintained jointly by the CAFERC and the
CNI. In addition, the Commission retained the right to order water releases for the purpose of
irrigation while it agreed to assume payment for any electrical generation losses suffered by the
CAFERC as a result. Using the multitude of studies generated by J.G. White as a basis (those of
engineers Packard, Elder, and Fisher), necessary water quantities were established throughout the

70

Collier, “The Intransigence of Things,” 203–5.

71

AHA, CT, caja 98, exp. 837, fs. 219–221. “El Gobierno Federal considera indispensable para el mejor y
más completo aprovechamiento de las aguas del río Conchos obtener una reglamentación adecuada de los desfogues
del Lago Toronto, que haga compatible la satisfacción de las necesidades de producción de energía con las del
consumo de aguas para el riego de los terrenos del Valle del Conchos.”

208

system, and a third-party engineer with experience in both hydroelectricity and hydrology would
be appointed by the Mexican president to mediate any potential disputes.72 All of these terms
would enter into effect on the day the works were completed. If Rosetilla represented a
concession by federal officials to the CAFERC, these contracts stipulated the price of this
concession.73
As the language of these two contracts suggested, and planning documents made clear,
the concession of Rosetilla cemented the formal integration of La Boquilla, Colina, and Rosetilla
within the federal irrigation district of Delicias. And this hydroelectric superstructure, while still
continuing to generate electricity, would be reoriented toward irrigation through federal
regulation over the following years. While there were long and protracted disputes between the
SAF and CNI about the relative importance of electricity, it was irrigation officials who had
gained the upper hand. Not only Rosetilla, but also La Boquilla and Colina, had been effectively
commandeered by the Mexican state. The CNI acquired an integrated series of dams on the
Conchos without spending a peso.
While this integration of company assets into the project at Delicias settled the question
of irrigation in the Conchos, the question of electricity remained open and urgent as ever. In a
transaction which has not been thoroughly explored, the CAFERC was acquired in 1929 by the
American and Foreign Power Company (AFP), a utilities holding company with a portfolio of
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interests throughout Latin America and the world.74 AFP was a subholding company of the
Electric Bond and Share Company (EBASCO), itself a former holding company of General
Electric, used for managing and financing foreign electrical utilities. Although the exact timeline
of events is unclear, this occurred about the same time that Rosetilla was built, and the Great
Depression began to wreak global economic havoc.
Meanwhile, work has also recently begun on the massive coal-fired Francke
thermoelectric generator in Torreón, in the neighboring Laguna region. Although this was
located about 300 kilometers south of La Boquilla, the Francke generator was connected via
high-tension transmission lines to the Boquilla hydroelectric system, creating what became
known as the Boquilla-Francke interconnected system – the first such network in northern
Mexico.75 The Compañía Nacional de Electricidad (CNE) was created by AFP to manage the
Francke generator, while the formerly Canadian CAFERC remained in control of its assets in
Chihuahua. After years of water shortages and soaring electrical demand, the Francke
generator’s 27 megawatts of capacity effectively doubled system potential while simultaneously
moving it away from a reliance on hydropower.76 Thus, the construction of Rosetilla and the
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Francke generator came to symbolize two divergent paths of development which both unfolded
from La Boquilla in 1929. The first represented the “reprogramming” of hydroelectric hardware
for use in federal irrigation, while the latter signaled a clear shift away from hydropower in
Chihuahua, as La Boquilla “jumped scale” to become a major element in a growing, privatelyowned, and globally-connected electrical grid in the Mexican north.77
Although little has been written about the CAFERC’s acquisition, it seems rather clear
that the expanded Boquilla-Francke system, and the technical and capital requirements it
implied, was a project carried out by AFP, and not La Boquilla’s consortium of Canadian
investors. That is, the expanded scale of the Boquilla-Francke system corresponded to the
expanded financial, technical, and logistical capacity of La Boquilla’s new ownership, which
appears to have acquired this perhaps distressed property for the purpose of expanding
electrification across northern Mexico. Based on the scope of this effort, and the coordination
and planning it most certainly entailed, it would be worth knowing how long before 1929 the
AFP had planned to create the Boquilla-Francke system, and to what extent CAFERC expansion
along the Conchos before 1929 was, or was not, coordinated with these aims. This would be
especially interesting considering that the Rosetilla concession appears to have offered very little
value to the CAFERC. In exchange for control over its hydroelectric dams, the CAFERC gained
only a nominal increase in generating capacity which, over the following years, it was rarely able

27 megawatts (compared to La Boquilla’s 25 megawatts). Together, this engineer wrote, they created a system
which produced on average about 50 megawatts.
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to use. Whether this was perhaps due to the belief that the CNI or SAF was prepared to
expropriate company properties, or the understanding that acquisition by the AFP was already
underway, it is worth exploring the circumstances under which this deal was made.
⁂
By 1930, the Conchos watershed had become a truly “federal zone,” even if the river
itself remained under the hydraulic control of private dams.78 But it is problematic to describe
this simply as a victory of the state over a foreign corporation, even if the newer dams built by
the CAFERC were mean to support federal irrigation rather than private hydropower. While the
Mexican state achieved some measure of control over water resources on the Conchos and used
this system as a model for dozens of federal irrigation projects which followed, it did not gain
control over its vital electrical infrastructure. With the sale of La Boquilla to the American and
Foreign Power Company (AFP), this northern electrical system evolved away from hydropower
and toward coal-fueled power plants. By the end of the decade, La Boquilla was linked to the
Franke thermoelectric plant in the neighboring Laguna region, where farmers used electricity to
pump water from underground aquifers.79 Until nationalization in 1960, all private electrical
assets in Mexico, such as La Boquilla, remained in the hands of their owners.80 Thus, if 1929
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marked a state victory, this was only partial. While the integration of La Boquilla into federal
irrigation projects represented a major transition in the growth of state power in Chihuahua, the
tangential evolution of the electrical industry under foreign corporate control continued to
represent another challenge to state infrastructural power in northern Mexico.

of the SRH that Mexican engineers began to build large hydroelectric works rivalling those of Necaxa and La
Boquilla.
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CONCLUSION
Although it was built through the direst days of the Depression, the irrigation district of
Delicias was completed with only minor delays, drawing a substantial portion of the shrinking
federal irrigation budget.1 When financial constraints forced the CNI to terminate its construction
contract with J.G. White, English-Mexican engineer Carlos G. Blake of Jalisco took over the
project.2 In October of 1932, the main irrigation canal finally reached the basin of the Conchos
valley at kilometer marker 43. This effectively marked the birth of federal irrigation district 5 in
Delicias, as well as the final blow to the competing proposals of Emil Bronimann and Benjamín
Enríquez.3 In the future, the waters of the Conchos would be managed from Mexico City, rather
than Chihuahua, Parral, Toronto, or Schenectady.
Contemporary Mexican engineers and bureaucrats judged this nascent program of federal
irrigation to be a major success. Within years of the completion of Delicias, CNI officials crowed
that 8 percent of national agricultural production came from a handful of these new irrigation
districts, which comprised only 2.5 percent of agricultural lands. In 1935, these districts
produced harvests valued at more than one-third of all funds spent in their creation, proving the
efficiency of this development model. Driving home the nationalist ethos of this campaign, a
CNI publication estimated that 343,077 cubic meters of concrete had been poured in support of
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irrigation, or nearly two-thirds the volume of the Pyramid of the Sun at Teotihuacán
(544,500m3).4 Had they included the foreign-built La Boquilla and its auxiliary structures in this
total, they would likely have produced a figure at least 15 percent greater than this ancient
symbol of power in central Mexico.5
Despite the measurable increase in agricultural production by the mid-1930s, this
campaign also demonstrated the long-term limitations of irrigation in Mexico. Engineers began
to see that, while local improvements could be made, the mostly arid and mountainous terrain of
Mexico meant that there would never emerge a national breadbasket comparable to the US Great
Plains or Argentine Pampas. Rather than aiming to become a major crop exporter, a more modest
goal of agricultural self-sufficiency began to seem more appropriate. At the same time, the
experience of the Depression extinguished the notion that economic prosperity might be pursued
through agricultural exports. The limitations of the Mexican environment and the enduring
importance of mining suggested to planners that industrialization might offer a more stable and
viable path to national development.
The gaze of the Mexican state shifted to foreign-owned electrical assets during the
presidency of populist president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40), which can be seen in the creation
of the first federal electrical commission in 1937.6 While the CNI continued to develop irrigation

4
Aboites Aguilar, 42. By 1935, this figure was $90.8 million pesos. However, the CNI had long since
abandoned the notion of recouping construction costs directly from irrigation districts.
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districts, which today number up to 113, Cárdenas fundamentally transformed Calles’ program
of “revolutionary irrigation” to one concerned more with social welfare than social engineering.7
By the beginning of World War II, debates about economic development and import-substitution
industrialization (ISI) would begin to dominate public and engineering discourse in the way
irrigation and agrarian reform had in the 1920s and early 1930s. Mexico’s era of “revolutionary
irrigation” was over, while a “Mexican miracle” of energy-intensive industrialization and
economic development was just beginning.
Rethinking the State
In his history of Delicias, Aboites characterized the federal cooptation of La Boquilla and
its auxiliary dams as a “triumph” of the emerging Mexican state over an “expansionist” foreign
company which cared little for the social needs of Mexico.8 The research contained herein
supports this assessment, albeit with some important caveats pointing to a more nuanced
relationship between the state and foreign interests. Mexican officials clearly identified La
Boquilla as the key to development in Chihuahua and made demonstrable efforts to incorporate
this infrastructure into state projects once the means of federal authority allowed. This
incorporation was driven by a concern that water and power would be otherwise lost to more
acquisitive and enterprising Americans downriver, demanding federal control over national
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resources. To the extent that federal officials succeeded in building a large and productive
irrigation district just below this privately-owned dam through savvy negotiation, this effort was
indeed a “triumph” of the Mexican state. In fact, this process illustrates rather strikingly the
comprehension of contemporary engineers that infrastructural systems were central to the
practice of state power.
With that said, the complex relationship between the CAFERC and the many different
gears and springs of Mexican state machinery requires a more nuanced reading of public-private
interaction in this case. While company relations with various state actors were often
confrontational, and marked by mutual suspicion after 1917, the historical record suggests that
the effective operation of La Boquilla was seen equally by federal officials as critically
important. While the violence delivered by CAFERC agents upon poor residents along the
Conchos in 1913 cannot be ignored, this appears to have been an isolated incident carried out
during the brief counter-revolutionary reign of General Victoriano Huerta. In other periods, the
federal government served as a check against such abuses and forced the company to come to
terms with landowners. And unlike many damming projects, which displace entire communities,
La Boquilla displaced dozens of residents while facilitating the creation of an agricultural district
populated by tens of thousands of farmers. La Boquilla supported federal agrarian reform efforts
in a direct way, even if this support was unintentional.
The CAFERC was indeed “expansionist,” as one might describe any utilities promoter.
But the company was not unlimited in its power to act. The relationship between the company
and state actors was defined not by mutual hostility, but constant and dynamic shifts in political
and economic expediency, social contexts, and environmental conditions. The record
demonstrates rather clearly the increasing challenges faced by the CAFERC after 1917, and the
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many subsequent accommodations it made with the Mexican state to preserve its assets.
Although Aboites presented a list of allegations against the company, this was short and mostly
inconclusive.9 Read alongside the research contained herein, these evoke a company which was
neither uniquely virtuous nor uniquely malignant.
Mexican state sovereignty was exercised in Chihuahua not despite the CAFERC in the
late 1920s but through it. The CAFERC and the Mexican state were not locked in a zero-sum
struggle for survival, as the language of “triumph” suggests. To the contrary, it was the
productive tension between these interests which shaped the creation, growth, and expansion of
La Boquilla. The claim that company officials sought to deliver the largest possible volume of
water downriver to Texas appears to be based mostly on assumptions about the company’s
interest, rather than documentary evidence.10 The Mexican state did not thwart a “game” being
played by the CAFERC, as this process has been characterized. Instead, it appears that company
and state officials both achieved most of what they sought, especially before the terms of
engagement tipped in favor of federal officials in the late 1920s. This is not to say that all private
interests benefitted, or that public interests were genuinely supported by claims of public utility.
Rather, the company and the federal bureaucracies with which it was forced to negotiate found
common cause in increasing La Boquilla’s capacity, even if they differed on its best use. The

9

Ibid., 153; citing Almeida, Almada, Bistraín. Drawing on a multitude of sources, including personal
interviews, Aboites stated that there were irregularities in the granting of the Colina concession, which required the
intervention of the governor to move forward. In addition, in 1931, engineer and Chihuahua governor Andrés Ortiz
allegedly received a one-time payment of $100,000 pesos to resolve a fiscal debt of $5 million pesos on behalf of the
company. In its favor, Aboites noted that the company donated $15,000 pesos in 1927 to a campaign to build a water
supply in Chihuahua City.
10

Aboites, La irrigación revolucionaria, 162, 171. There is no evidence that the Canadian-owned CAFERC
had irrigation or hydroelectric concessions on the lower Conchos or Rio Grande, or would have had any other
interest in preserving water for use in Texas.
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story of La Boquilla between 1905 and 1929 was not one of triumph or defeat, but of dynamic
accommodation between Toronto, Chihuahua, and Mexico City. If the Mexican state won a
“triumph” on the Conchos in 1929, it was not over a foreign company, but over the territory of
southern Chihuahua. And in this victory, the CAFERC was not an adversary, but a reluctant
partner.
This relationship begs a critical reinterpretation not only of the history of Chihuahua in
the long Mexican Revolution, but also of the role played by large technical systems in processes
of state formation, especially when these are foreign-owned. If a large hydroelectric dam such as
La Boquilla was critical to the exercise of state infrastructural power in Chihuahua, it follows
that the CAFERC was an agent of this state, even if this was unintentional and indirect.
Technology imposes no will of its own, but reflects the aims and concerns of its users. Of course,
the category of users in this case was complicated. The CAFERC sought regular and increasing
profits through electrical expansion, not Mexican state expansion. But these aims did not change
the fact that federal regulators, with growing budgets and expertise, astutely coordinated
company activities with state objectives. Tracing La Boquilla back to its creation and even its
concession, it is impossible to identify a moment in which the dam did not serve both state and
private interests. These were always inseparable. And the fact that private interests in this case
were foreign hardly makes La Boquilla unique. To the contrary, this exploration of state
formation through the lens of expanding infrastructural power suggests an alternative approach
for exploring the deep and wide entanglement of foreign capital in processes of state formation
in Mexico and throughout Latin America.
Rereading La Boquilla
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When La Boquilla was proposed on the Conchos in 1905, it was seen by both company
and federal officials as the key to unlocking the economic and social potential of the Mexican
north. And while this was essentially a private undertaking, it conformed to the broader patterns
of state-supported development pursued by Porfirio Díaz. That is, while La Boquilla was unique
in its scale and ambition, it was a rather conventional Porfirian-era project in the sense that it
sought to leverage private foreign capital to strengthen Mexican state infrastructural power. But
while the unique nature of the Porfirian political economy is generally understood, rather little is
known about the widespread phenomenon of foreign-led electrification before the Revolution.
This is important because electrification supported countless major development projects in late
Porfirian Mexico, especially in and around urban areas. And unlike the railways, which were
heavily damaged by warfare and nationalized beginning in 1929, the electrical system at La
Boquilla continued to expand during and after the Revolution, playing a vital role in
reconstruction even as it remained in private hands for decades. By any measure, foreign-led
electrical development was a major contributor to Mexican state activity before, during, and after
the Revolution – a fact which is rarely recognized in the historiography. Future research
exploring the relationship between private electrical operators and federal regulators after the
1920s, when many other important industries were nationalized, promises to reveal much about
the nature of state power during the populist administration of Lázaro Cárdenas.
This tension between foreign investment and national development was seen in the
protracted debates over imports, and especially those related to cement. This dissertation has
shown that, even within the closed and relatively small community of northern industrialists in
Chihuahua-Torreón-Monterrey, there were great differences over how best to promote regional
industry without prejudicing the efforts of foreign investors. While regulators in Mexico City
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attempted to mandate the use of national cement, practical concerns, personal relationships, and
political instability complicated the issue. It bears repeating that state infrastructural power refers
not only to actual infrastructures, like La Boquilla, but also to the logistical networks through
which resources are accessed and distributed, projecting power across space. By this definition,
the Mexican cement industry most certainly must be counted. It was for this reason that cement
debates were so hotly contested, as regulators sought to expand state infrastructural power in the
form of a hydroelectric dam without harming the potential infrastructural power represented by a
vibrant domestic cement industry. This episode reveals that, even before the emergence of the
Constitutionalist revolutionary state in 1917, there was interest among federal and regional
officials in promoting domestic industrial growth alongside foreign investment. It also highlights
the fact that, although the CAFERC had the outward support of federal and state officials, this
support was not monolithic. At La Boquilla, a range of public and private interests intersected in
complicated and often unpredictable ways.
If there was an episode which most clearly demonstrated this overlap between state and
company interests, it was the siege laid by villista forces in Chihuahua after 1915. The repeated
attacks on the dam site demonstrated Pancho Villa’s intimate knowledge of the inner workings of
Chihuahua’s unique political economy at the end of the Porfiriato. In short, Villa knew the
critical sites of economic activity and he exploited them. But these attacks also demonstrated the
inability of the Mexican state to act directly in Chihuahua without the use of agents like the
Terrazas-Creel family, reflecting a clear lack of real infrastructural power. Railroad technology
served the aims of its users, opening the region to mining and investment as well as troop
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movement, sabotage, and robbery.11 In the same way, La Boquilla was used by villistas after
1915 as a bank, warehouse, and bargaining chip with company officials in El Paso and Toronto.
Although Porfirio Díaz had orchestrated a modernizing boom in Mexico, the economic network
through which this was facilitated continued to rely on regional power brokers and lacked
anything resembling strong central authority. Thus, by the end of the Revolution, the
infrastructural power conferred by La Boquilla served not the Mexican state, but the counterstate forces of Villa who physically controlled the dam. In returning La Boquilla to productive
use as quickly as possible, company and federal officials had a common cause.
The new Constitution of 1917 marked a major rethinking of the relationship between the
state and its national resources, even if this change was initially aspirational. It also provided the
legal basis for federal intervention in the operation of La Boquilla, thus harnessing its
infrastructural power in support of the state. Although La Boquilla’s owners had previously
hinted at the possibility of irrigating lands below La Boquilla, evidence shows that this was not a
priority. Communications between the company and federal regulators after the Revolution show
that the CAFERC was solely interested in expanding electrical generating capacity. And while
federal officials supported this aim in the short-term, recognizing its indisputable importance to
Chihuahua’s mining industry, the Constitution of 1917 also opened the possibility for state-led
development on the Conchos in the form of irrigation. As a hydroelectric dam, La Boquilla
provided both energy and hydraulic control over the Conchos, inviting new claims on its use by a
growing Mexican state. Engineers and bureaucrats began to promote irrigation as a means of
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Knight, “The Weight of the State,” 229. Highlighting again the ambivalent nature of technology, Alan
Knight observed that systems like the Mexican railway were “hostages to fortune,” serving federal troops and
guerrillas with equal facility.
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implementing agrarian reform, identifying Lake Toronto as an ideal resource for supporting such
projects. Yet federal power remained weak in the 1920s, and local irrigation initiatives relying
yet again on foreign capital ended in political scandal. With a new federal government still
consolidating power in Mexico City, La Boquilla remained beyond the grasp of the state for a
decade, operating according to its initial design as an engine of private mining interests.
The integration of La Boquilla into the circuitry of the Mexican state began in earnest
during the presidency of Plutarco Elías Calles. A burst of bureaucratic expansion after 1926
corresponded to increasing funding for state-led development projects. The creation of the
Comisión Nacional de Irrigación (CNI) marked the beginning of a massive federal irrigation
campaign, in which Delicias figured among the first major projects. Irrigation efforts ran into
problems almost immediately, however, as a prolonged drought hit Chihuahua, throttling both
electrical and agricultural production. For the first time, it became clear that the ambitious scale
of La Boquilla exceeded the productive capacity of its environment. The flows of the Conchos
were neither regular nor voluminous enough to support both federal irrigation and mining in
Chihuahua. This realization would shape all future development on the Conchos.
Through a series of negotiations and concessions, federal regulators allowed La
Boquilla’s owners to build a few small dams to address the acute shortage of electricity. But
these contracts prioritized federal irrigation in the long term, fundamentally altering the
trajectory of development in the region. While La Boquilla and its auxiliary dams remained in
private hands, their use was thereafter dictated by federal water use policy. At about the same
time, these hydroelectric assets were acquired by a multinational corporation affiliated with
General Electric. This group immediately began construction on a massive coal-fired plant
designed to reorient the electrical network away from hydropower, marking a definitive
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divergence in private electrical and public agricultural development. Through environmental
scarcity and direct federal intervention, officials effectively annexed the infrastructural power of
La Boquilla by “reprogramming” the hardware of this hydroelectric dam to meet the irrigation
aims of the Mexican state. Meanwhile, the private Boquilla-Franke electric grid would continue
to expand for decades with minimal federal oversight.
Infrastructure as Archive
The creation and expansion of La Boquilla between 1905 and 1929, in constant tension
between public and private interests, was a process in which the role of state infrastructural is
clear. This hydroelectric system, including its later expansions, projected material power across
(and beneath) the territory of Chihuahua, made real claims on natural resources, and transformed
the geographies of labor, settlement, and agriculture in Mexico’s northern borderlands. But while
Canadian and, later, US investors saw La Boquilla as an engine of mining in Chihuahua, a cadre
of Mexican engineers would read this infrastructure quite differently. Through federal irrigation,
engineers saw an opportunity to address the major complaints of the Revolution – poverty,
agricultural underproduction, landlessness, and the perceived backwardness of certain sectors of
Mexican society. For them, La Boquilla was a solution to a riddle which had eluded central
authorities in Mexico City for centuries – how to settle the “precarious” north.12
In recent decades, rather than chasing elusive definitions of the state across periods and
disciplines, historians have instead focused on the social relations through which state formation
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Aboites Aguilar, Norte precario. In this effort, one can clearly hear echoes of the nineteenth-century
Argentine statesman Juan Bautista Alberdi, “gobernar es poblar” – “to govern is to populate.”
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occurs. That is, scholars have rightly sought to understand what the state does rather than what
the state is.13 Infrastructural power offers an excellent method for exploring the networks through
which states and societies interact. Furthermore, and perhaps most generatively, it offers a way
to explore cases like La Boquilla in which foreign, private interests played an important role in
state formation – cases which are common in the history of Mexico, and yet far less common in
the historiography. This is a unique analytical strength of infrastructures, especially energy
infrastructures, which might serve for the scholar as a signal in the noise of chaotic and diffuse
processes of change.
Infrastructures such as La Boquilla are archives of human activity, and especially of
large-scale relationships of power. Because these are material archives in which global links can
be unambiguously observed and analyzed, they support research which transcends national
borders and contexts. In the history of Mexican electrification, as well as development
throughout Latin America, foreign investment in infrastructural systems has long been a
normative process, a fact which has not yet been highlighted in studies of the region.
Categorically framing such involvement as either detrimental to, or supportive of, processes of
state formation ignores the incredible complexity of the interests involved in the creation and
expansion of systems like La Boquilla. This study demonstrates the utility of reframing foreign
infrastructural development as a normative element of state formation in Chihuahua, in Mexico,
and throughout Latin America.

13
White, The Organic Machine, ix. This idea is drawn not from the study of state formation, but of society
and environment. While White’s gendered analogy might be read as dated in today’s academic climate, his emphasis
on relationships remains important: “As I have gotten into middle age, history has seemed less and less about things
or ideas or individual persons and more and more about relationships... In aiming for a relationship, I mean to do
more than write a human history alongside a natural history and call it an environmental history. This would be like
writing a biography of a wife, placing it alongside the biography of a husband and calling it the history of a
marriage. I want the history of the relationship itself.”
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